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ABSTRACT 
 
On September 18, 2014, a referendum on Scottish independence took place with 55.3% of 
voters choosing to remain in the United Kingdom, indicating that Scotland’s Union with England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland would tenuously endure for the near future. Meanwhile, just under 
two years later, on June 23, 2016, Britain made international headlines when nearly 52% of the 
public chose to leave the European Union via a referendum. How we make sense of the 
recalibration of political, economic and democratic scales within advanced industrial nation states 
is as relevant an endeavour as it has ever been. While much work has been done attempting to 
explain how and why political reform has been occurring across the world in terms of the partisan 
motivations and contested relationships involved in designing and reforming political institutions, 
economic factors and the possible politics behind them have been given much less attention. This 
dissertation uses an historical approach to provide a post-war analysis of the political economy of 
decentralization and devolution in Britain.  
Each chapter aims to capture how the competition between different actors at different 
levels of the state (local, regional and national) seek to control the means of capitalist development. 
In turn, the chapters indicate how this competition steers partisan relations in certain directions 
over time with the constant push and pull to control the levers of domestic capital investment 
especially. There is also a perpetual tension over the centralization and decentralization of 
decision-making apparatuses which ranges from the circumscribing of local government, the 
implementation of regional de-concentration, broadening asymmetrical devolution, and new 
public management approaches to local and regional policy-making.  
Ultimately, this dissertation shows how British devolution is broadly connected to the 
struggles over decentralization and democracy because of how they are simultaneous expressions 
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and re-articulations of the spatial contradictions of capitalism and its associated class tensions. 
Political parties (statewide and regional), local councilors, the working class, and spatially rooted 
social movements, have been and continue to be divided by place and ideology when it comes to 
the scaling of the state, how economic development should be pursued, and how decision-making 
should be institutionalized. 
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Chapter 1: Decentralization, Devolution and the Political Economy of Scale  
 
Introduction 
 
In the 1950 general election in the United Kingdom the Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
parties won 99% of the popular vote and 100% of legislative representation, a pattern that remained 
virtually unchanged over the next two decades. Meanwhile regional parties like the Scottish 
National Party or the Welsh Plaid Cymru registered support that collectively amounted to far less 
than 1% of the total votes throughout the same period. Yet by 2000 many of the political aims of 
these regional political players would be accomplished, with the establishment of devolved 
regional parliaments after 1997 and the regular election of their own members to the national 
parliament in Westminster since the 1970s. The success of this regional politics with its focus on 
decentralizing the United Kingdom’s traditionally centralized form of political power is surprising 
as it goes against the grain of most of twentieth century British politics. Just how the country 
shifted from a seeming consensus for a nationally focused polity in the 1950s to a more devolved 
one at the turn of the century has produced much debate about the actual factors that have led to 
what amounts to a profound shift in the political status quo.  
As is often the case, the story is more complicated than first appears. Reforms to the 
economic and political institutions in post-World War II Britain have entailed shifts in how they 
are organized at different levels of the state. Traditionally and conventionally, the United Kingdom 
has been viewed as top-down governing configuration, to the point that it has often been considered 
the bastion of centralization among developed democracies. To observers, this was reinforced by 
the constitutional practice of parliamentary supremacy at Westminster, where the dominant 
governing political party of the day was ‘unencumbered’ by any competing jurisdictions, be they 
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regional or hierarchical, in implementing any national legislation they devised. The single member 
plurality electoral system reinforced this by tending to produce legislative majority Labour or 
Conservative governments. Despite their competing partisan allegiances, both parties long 
remained wedded to the ideal of Britain as a unitary state.    
Nonetheless, measures for devolving legislative powers from the national level to regional 
levels were introduced at Westminster in 1997, with the caveat that regional populations had to 
support devolution through separate popular votes. In 1998, referendums were passed in Scotland 
and Wales, inaugurating a new era in British politics. The implementation of devolution led to a 
reconfiguration of the British constitution; indeed, some have argued that the policy package 
implemented by the Labour Party at the time was the most important since the Reform Acts of the 
nineteenth century.1 This is interesting because for most of the twentieth century the British left 
tended to view devolution as incompatible with socialist aims to take democratic control of the 
commanding heights of the economy, and particularly after World War II as inconsistent with 
Keynesian demand management. Anything but a centralized approach to social policy and 
economic planning was a threat to a key pillar of the welfare state, namely the uniform provision 
of social services across Britain. However, things shifted by the late 1990s when the Labour Party 
sought devolution as the key to what they called ‘modernization’. The economic context had 
changed, and the era was dominated by a new paradigm committed to supply-side economic 
policies influenced by new right-wing thinking and neoclassical economics, which encouraged 
among other things the downloading of responsibility to other levels of the political system. But 
within the ranks of the left, devolution was also increasingly held in esteem for its potential to 
further democratize British government and placate regional populations unhappy with the 
                                            
1 See Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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methods of governance employed by the Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher and John 
Major.  
By contrast, the right had traditionally viewed devolution, for the most part, as inconsistent 
with the sovereignty and security of the national level, though there was some scattered right-wing 
support for Scottish Home Rule. Overall, British-ness rather than regional identity was more 
relevant to the Conservatives. Even by the time that devolution became law in the late 1990s, 
decentralization of this magnitude was being opposed by the political right for its potential to break 
up the state. However, over time the Conservatives have come full circle regarding devolution. 
Now they also view it as an engine for Britain’s economic competitiveness in a global economy, 
consistent with the view that regions are economic innovators. Moreover, devolution deals 
between local and national authorities are now being negotiated by recent Conservative-led 
governments.   
Even though the postwar political system was dominated by two parties and showed no signs 
of letting up, Britain in the twenty-first century boasts a regionalized union state that is contested 
at the margins by multiple parties. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own elected 
legislatures, accountable to regional populations and with alternative electoral systems that differ 
from what is used at the national level. These institutional reforms are no small feat considering 
that similar reforms fell short in 1979 when Scotland and Wales were unable to secure devolution 
via referendums. The failure at that time is somewhat surprising when we reflect on the decline of 
two party dominance at the national level in the 1970s, amid what appeared to be intractable 
economic decline and a concomitant rise of nationalist politics in the form of a dramatic legislative 
breakthrough for the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. Yet it was roughly twenty years 
after these events took place that constitutional reform was finally secured, at a time when 
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nationalist voting had declined. All of which makes devolution both a fascinating and a perplexing 
phenomenon to consider.  
Political scientists tend to regard constitutions and institutions as difficult to change, which 
begs the question: why and how does the dispersal of power like devolution take place? Some 
studies have attempted to shed light on this question but often approach it in a way that describes 
decentralization as an inevitable byproduct of an inexorable economic and technological 
transformation (globalization) that is external to partisan struggle.2 Economic factors and the 
possible politics behind them have been given much less attention. More broadly, the common 
themes associated with designing new institutional means of decision-making tend to fall into one 
of four categories: pluralistic group activity/demands for a more inclusive political system; the 
need to find new functional methods to govern advanced industrial societies; local as well as 
regional dissidence produced by social movements and political actors; and sheer political will and 
the strategic calculations made by political parties in power.  
Aspects of Britain’s recent devolution are clearly unique to the UK. A major reason for this 
is the historic asymmetry of regional institutions responsible for social, economic and urban 
development. Not all regions can be considered equal when it comes to devolved political and 
fiscal powers, either now or in the past. There is also a history of peripheral resistance by Scotland, 
Wales and Ireland that has influenced the politics of place and identity in the United Kingdom.3 
                                            
2 In addition, taxonomies of decentralization and devolution have appeared without reference to the contexts of 
political, social and economic contestation, focusing instead on the ‘politico-administrative’ features of devolution. 
See Paolo Fedele and Edoardo Ongaro, “A Common Trend, Different Houses: Devolution in Italy, Spain and the UK,” 
Public Money and Management 28, 2 (2008).  
3 See Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988); and James Mitchell, Devolution in the UK (New York: Manchester University Press, 
2009). Interestingly, recent commentary has claimed that Scottish nationalism as we know it today began in the 1960s 
and 1970s, achieving maturity in the 1980s and 1990s. This nationalism was not seeking independence to defend 
ancestral culture. Rather, it was a left-leaning political mechanism to protect against neoliberalism. See Ben Jackson, 
“The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism,” The Political Quarterly 85, 1 (2014): 50.  
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At the same time, the UK’s recent devolution is in line with an international trend towards 
decentralization – as in the political, administrative and/or fiscal authority granted to regional 
and/or local levels – which makes it an interesting case for comparison. Much work has been done 
attempting to explain how and why political reform has been occurring across the world in terms 
of the partisan motivations and contested relationships involved in designing and reforming 
political institutions.4 Here a deep examination of the reasons reform has occurred in the United 
Kingdom can then be brought into dialogue with this broader comparative work. Accordingly, this 
dissertation will examine devolution as a case study of this Western trend of decentralization and 
its relation to broader questions of institutional and democratic reform, focusing on Britain from 
the postwar period to the present, with attention to the overlooked role of political economy.  
 
Why Study Devolution and Decentralization? 
 
With modern democratic states like Britain being restructured, scholars have been examining 
new and previously under-appreciated forms of institutional organization including devolution (as 
a type of decentralization), drawing attention to the changing spatial characteristics of state power 
and democratic politics. Expanding literatures have sought to decenter the entrenched role of the 
national scale as the predominant locus for state activities and question the internal coherence of 
national economies and civil societies.5 Broadly speaking, the examination of decentralization is 
relevant given the dramatic changes that many Western states have undergone in recent decades. 
                                            
4 For example, see Patrick Heller, “Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, South 
Africa, and Porto Alegre,” Politics & Society 29, 1 (2001); Stephanie L. McNulty, Voice and Vote: Decentralization 
and Participation in Post-Fujimori Peru (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); and Yves Mény, “The Political 
Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France, and Spain,” in Regionalism in European Politics, ed. Roger Morgan 
(London: PSI, 1987).  
5 Neil Brenner et al., “Introduction: State Space in Question,” in State/Space: A Reader, ed. Neil Brenner et al. (UK: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 3. 
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In the 1960s, regions became an important basis for administrative and political mobilization 
across Western countries. The literature points out that the 1970s marked the beginning of a 
decisive turn towards the creation of intermediary levels of government. This phenomenon has 
been referred to as the rise of ‘meso’ government. Just as democratization has been said to occur 
in waves starting with developed and then in developing countries, the first wave of post–World 
War II thinking on decentralization focused on what has been termed the de-concentration of 
hierarchical government structures, namely the implementation of regionally administered 
outposts of the national bureaucracy. The second wave of decentralization, beginning in the mid-
1980s, broadened the concept to include political power sharing, democratization, and market 
liberalization, expanding the scope for private sector decision-making. During the 1990s 
decentralization was a way of opening governance to wider public participation through 
organizations of civil society.6 Clearly, some of these aims have proven to be in tension with 
others, like market liberalization and increased public input.  
 There are many possible examples of institutional reform that could be described as 
decentralizing or de-concentrating political, and/or fiscal power. For example, a decentralizing 
thrust was observed in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s when reforms swept across almost 
every country in the region. It was claimed that such changes were implemented to strengthen the 
role of local and regional governments. At the same time, national governments were also 
abandoning various social programming efforts in favour of more neoliberal approaches to policy. 
Ultimately, the experiences in Latin America were not isolated; by the mid-2000s sixty-three out 
of the seventy-five countries with a population of five million or more across the world came to 
                                            
6 Shabbir G. Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, “From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance,” 
in Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices, ed. Shabbir G. Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli 
(Harvard University, 2007), 2-3. 
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experience some degree of decentralization since 1980.7 Many of these countries underwent 
transitions to elected governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, after more than two decades 
- that is, the 1940s and the 1950s - of increasing centralization of government power and authority 
in both more developed and less developed countries, governments around the world began, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, to decentralize their hierarchical structures.8 Connected to the creation of a 
regional level of government has been an emerging trend in municipal authorities to directly elect 
mayors. Moreover, localism has arisen in the context of bureaucratic reform and local government 
modernization, which claims to empower individuals as consumers of public services. Yet this 
new localism tends to paper over deep ideological differences between neoliberal and social 
democratic understandings of the role of the public domain.9 
 In addition, intermediate government has figured at the supra-national level, initially just 
in Western Europe. But with the fall of the Eastern Bloc it has since become a broader European 
phenomenon. This was in part due to the consolidation of the European Economic Community in 
the 1970s, and especially in the mid-1980s when funds provided by the supranational level 
enhanced regional consciousness in peripheral areas. This bound subnational institutional 
developments to the concomitant economic growth and expansion of the European community.10 
More recently, member states in the European Union (EU) comprising nearly 90% of the 
                                            
7 Andrew Selee, “Exploring the Link between Decentralization and Democratic Governance,” in Decentralization and 
Democratic Governance in Latin America, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin et al. (United States: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, 2004), 3. 
8 Cheema and Rondinelli, “From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance,” 3. 
9 Kevin Morgan, “The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?,” Regional Studies 41, 9 
(2007): 1245.  
10 L. J. Sharpe, “The European Meso: An Appraisal,” in The Rise of Meso Government in Europe, ed. L. J. Sharpe 
(London: Sage, 1993), 2. 
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population have seen some level of decentralization.11 Extra-constitutional relations in the form of 
supranational bodies and alliances is often pursued in connection to the liberalization of trade.  
The global shift in the transference of power, authority and resources to supra/subnational 
levels of government indicates that few spaces around the world remain untouched. This begs the 
question: how does the altering of political institutions impact the substance of politics? This is 
important because assertions are often made about the connection between political reform and the 
enhancement of democratic processes. In fact, decentralization is often synonymously linked to 
the concept and practice of subsidiarity, in which political decisions are made as close as possible 
to the level on which they have immediate impact.12 In an age where we hear a great deal about 
democratic governments suffering from democratic deficits, facing increasingly apathetic publics, 
the idea of restructuring state or democratic institutions into new political tiers that would 
potentially bring democracy to levels where citizens can interact more directly with politicians 
might seem to be something prized and actively sought after.  
However, others like Mark Purcell consider this the “local trap,” namely the problematic 
assumption that decentralization automatically leads to democratization.13 Indeed, there are 
various concerns that come with the local scale: decentralization for some is an impediment to the 
achievement of both program and horizontal policy goals, threatening equality before the law. To 
be sure, areas that are unable to handle complex problems may require large public agencies for 
implementation. This draws attention to the fact that even if elites are committed to 
decentralization at subnational levels, new laws and regulations need to be implemented along 
                                            
11 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill, “The Global Trend Towards Devolution and Its Implications,” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21 (2003): 337.  
12 Michael J. Goldsmith and Edward C. Page, “Introduction,” in Changing Government Relations in Europe: From 
Localism to Intergovernmentalism, ed. Michael J. Goldsmith and Edward C. Page (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 10. 
13 Mark Purcell, “Urban Democracy and the Local Trap,” Urban Studies 43, 11 (October 2006): 1926.  
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with redeployed personnel and rechanneled resources to achieve institutional capacity building. 
Moreover, decentralization might reinforce or revive local power structures that centralized 
government may have been designed to control. In developing countries especially, issues about 
the elite capture of devolved power in the form of clientelism have been a common concern. This 
means that potentially shaking up existing patterns of political control and patronage might be 
necessary. Of course, this is much easier said than done. 
Mediating between claims about the outcomes of decentralization requires an appreciation 
of history and context. Decentralization always occurs within a wider structure of power dynamics, 
and the interplay of political forces determines the choice of principles for the drawing of 
administrative, political and economic boundaries. The autonomy of regional and local levels of 
government are often partly the consequence of central decision-makers putting restrictions on 
local jurisdictions, partly a result of a pre-existing institutional structure which limits the agenda 
of legitimate political action, and partly the product of the structure of social relations which state 
institutions are designed to sustain. Subnational levels may develop degrees of autonomy and 
contradict these structures of social and political relations, but the extent to which local political 
institutions might challenge these structures depends on both mobilization and allies.14 Where 
power resides spatially is political and is often the product of antagonistic political struggle. 
Decentralization thus provides the potential to reorganize how political power is wielded at 
different levels of the state. It opens room for exploring multiple spaces of contestation between 
central, regional and municipal levels, including the extent to which democratic institutions have 
or have not changed over time. However, why political restructuring in the form of decentralization 
takes place needs to be more thoroughly examined. This is relevant because understanding why 
                                            
14 B. C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State (Winchester: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1985), 203-205.  
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political reform and institutional decentralization happens connects to how states and democracies 
are changing. As argued below, the major approaches to understanding why decentralization takes 
place are limited in their ability to capture the connections between political actors, civil society 
relations and economic environments.  
  
Why Does Decentralization Occur? 
 
The literature on why decentralization occurs falls into four areas: pluralism, functionalism, 
centre-periphery struggles, and the rational actor model. In the first group, civil society groups 
mobilize to achieve a more representative and inclusive political system. Decentralization is 
implemented to ensure more legitimate and accountable relations between government and citizen 
interests, by making new spaces for democratic decision-making accessible to the public. An 
example of pluralism in connection to decentralization is observed in Robert Putnam, Robert 
Leonardi, and Raffaela Nanetti’s (1993) book Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy. The authors find that in regions where civic action is strong, leaders partake in 
horizontal versus hierarchical political relations. This is because “government institutions receive 
inputs from their social environment and produce outputs to respond to that environment.”15 Thus, 
the authors claim that bottom-up civic participation in local social networks determines both the 
quality as well as the variations of different political and legal institutions. However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, we also need to account for the fact that political actors simultaneously impact 
the capacity of civil society top-down, often by redesigning subnational institutions.16 
                                            
15 Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Rafaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy (United States: Princeton University Press, 1993), 9.  
16 Nick Vlahos, “The Politics of Subnational Decentralization in France, Brazil and Italy, The Journal of Public 
Deliberation 9, 2 (2013): 5, 12.   
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The second group considers geographic as well as population pressures as consequential for 
government structure, such that countries with large populations are more likely to decentralize 
functions to subnational governments in order to oversee tax obligations, and implement various 
policy measures.17 Functionalist arguments also assert that decentralization (in the post-war 
period) has been a response to pressures originating in the administrative overload of the central 
state.18 As a result, local governments are rationalized as service providers, and meso governments 
now typically seen in regions have been established in many countries. Scholars adopting this 
approach also tend to highlight how globalization and European integration force governments to 
recognize the limitations and constraints of central economic planning and management. Thus, 
functionalists consider decentralization necessary to produce a more efficient organizational model 
of public service delivery.19 Changes are therefore held to occur because they serve to make things 
work better. But that assumes rather than explores what any given institutional goals might be. The 
problem with functionalist and modernizing discourses are that they neglect how institutional 
restructuring is a political project in the service of class and partisan objectives. Decentralization 
is but one manifestation of political struggle.  
 For the third group, decentralization arises from centre-periphery cleavages and the push 
from below by (regional) parties and social movements. The groups commonly cited are those 
linked to regional political mobilization including regional nationalisms, linguistic minorities and 
ethno-regionalist parties. Research indicates that ethnic nationalism creates pressure on the state 
to relinquish decision-making powers; the electoral threat of regionalist parties generates the clout 
                                            
17 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Beyond Federalism: Estimating and Explaining the Territorial Structure of 
Government,” Publius 43, 2 (2013): 197; Sharpe, “The European Meso: An Appraisal,” 9. 
18 Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the Politics of Social Solidarity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 170.  
19 Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-Level Governance, 7. 
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necessary to push national parties towards decentralization as a means of policy appeasement.20 
Studies also examine peripheral mobilization through a party lens, namely the ethno-regionalist 
challenges to centralization and how these reflect the territorial dimension of party politics. 
Research on this territorial dimension points out that culturally distinct peripheries are trying to 
defend their minority culture against the encroachment of state- and nation-building policies. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that more than one explanatory approach is needed to 
fully understand how certain cleavages can produce political devolution or decentralization. 
Indeed, shifts in the territorial distribution of political power may have as much to do with political 
struggle for resources as they do with identity.21 Moreover, countries vary, with some having 
strong regional parties but weak regional cleavages, or the opposite. As a result, regional cleavages 
do not automatically translate into party systems, and even where they do, the political pressure 
applied by regional parties is often not enough to cause a country to decentralize.22  
 Lastly, there are those who argue that strategic choices by political parties determine the 
issues that land on the political agenda and their salience in public debates. Based on Anthony 
Downs’s median voter model, decentralization could be a rational act aimed to maximize electoral 
possibilities. In other words, by calculating the electoral tradeoffs, a party in power weighs the 
risks involved in institutional change. In the case of devolving power, this would involve giving 
up some influence over national power for the opportunity of competing for decentralized power 
                                            
20 Simona Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-Level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical and Normative Challenges 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7; Emanuele Massetti and Arjan Schakel, “Ideology Matters: Why 
Decentralization Has a Differentiated Effect on Regionalist Parties Fortunes in Western Democracies,” European 
Journal of Political Research 52 (2013): 797. Bonnie M. Meguid, “Institutional Change as Strategy: The Role of 
Decentralization in Party Competition” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Cornell University, 2008), 3. 
21 Jonathan Hopkin, “Political Decentralization, Electoral Change and Party Organizational Adaptation: A Framework 
For Analysis,” European Urban and Regional Studies 10, 3 (2003): 228. 
22 Sonia Alonso, Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility: A Comparison of Belgium, 
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 26; Dawn Brancati, “The Origins and 
Strengths of Regional Parties,” British Journal of Political Science 38 (2007): 135. 
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in the future and the possibility of winning future elections at both levels.23 Moreover, political 
calculations are taken in the context of path-dependent and internal institutional dynamics 
influenced by William Riker’s political party model. Here decentralization results from the 
difference in levels of political party centralization and national party strength.24 Rational actor 
perspectives also see politics as occurring within an institutional status quo, with rules governing 
policy, spending, and the way taxable powers are distributed between levels of government. 
Equilibrium defines this state of affairs and decentralization entails renegotiating a new one. 
Change only occurs when some disturbance upsets this equilibrium. But what causes such 
disturbances? Here rational choice approaches offer only weak, essentially anecdotal reasons, 
which basically amount to suggesting that it was in somebody’s self-interest to seek change. While 
veto-player accounts deny that decentralization is carried out by benevolent leaders, they tend to 
assert how self-interests override more cleavage-based objectives. Yet cleavage-based approaches 
have a lot to recommend in terms of understanding where the dynamic tension fueling change 
comes from. In fact, new theorists of decentralization are being encouraged to go beyond studies 
of median voter models to better understand institutions and politics.25  
Contrary to assertions about the effects of post-industrialism and the de-alignment of class 
voting, class politics in industrialized societies and the social structural bases of politics, are still 
empirically supported and debated.26 Class has defined the process of political institutional reform 
                                            
23 Kathleen O’Neill, “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy,” Comparative Political Studies 36, 9 (2003): 1074-
1075. 
24 R. Enikolopov and E. Zhuravskaya, “Decentralization and Political Institutions,” Journal of Public Economics 91 
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25 Jonathan Rodden, “Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36, 4 
(2004): 494.  
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of the current spate of scholarship still revolves around the use of class as a relevant way to understand democratic 
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over different historical periods because of the tensions inherent in establishing and then 
maintaining the capitalist form of democracy that emerged in Western countries.27 For Colin Leys, 
there is a significant connection between the capital-labour relationship and the discussion of 
political parties and actors: “the short and long term changes which are constantly occurring in the 
capital-labour relation, interacting with political leadership and organization and the effects of 
ideological struggles, have affected the political significance of the class system in Britain in 
decisive ways.”28  
However, parties should not be reduced to their class base. Class interests are not ahistorical 
givens, but are rather historically constructed by movements, organizations and leaderships that 
act in particular contexts and entail possible alliances or oppositions.29 There is nothing immutable 
in the relation of class to party, as broad social and economic trends are able to alter the ties of 
class to party. Recognizing this nearly fifty years ago, David Butler and Donald Stokes argued that 
the emphasis of classes in relation to political parties has shifted from the maintenance of 
established traditional allegiances to the articulation of new grounds for party alliance.30 This 
dissertation accounts for the way political parties and actors adapt to shifting political 
circumstances over time by focusing on the redesign of political and democratic institutions. 
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Ultimately, political parties and actors need to be studied over long periods of time in order 
to understand how as organizations aim to defend specific interests, they formulate programmes 
that reach beyond the class whose interests initially inspired it, and adapt to changing contexts.31 
Though decentralization is often viewed as a phenomenon associated with the protection of power, 
social relations flowing out of capitalist development are often taken for granted. The result is that 
less of a focus is given to the way that the contradictions of capitalism and economic governance 
are reflected in the outcomes of intra- and inter-state political restructuring. Decentralization 
should be linked with the reasons collective actors seek to develop or limit political and economic 
institutions at different levels of the state to regulate political-economic conflict. The next two 
sections will elucidate the aspects of the political economy of scale research that this dissertation 
builds upon and adds to, i.e. the ways in which the scaled organization of political-economic 
institutions under capitalism are socially produced and transformed and how this helps understand 
the British political struggle over devolution. 
 
An Alternative Analytical Approach to Studying Decentralization 
 
This dissertation uses a political economy of scale approach to address why decentralization 
happens (how this particularly relates to British devolution is followed up in the method section 
below). The analytical parts include: redefining how decentralization should be examined, 
explaining why the politics of scale is relevant to the study of decentralization, and, lastly, 
describing the contested social relations involved in scale production and reproduction. In this 
approach, both centralization and decentralization are inter-related facets of the politics of scale. 
                                            
31 Leys, Politics in Britain, 143-144.  
 
 
16 
 
Actors at different scales of the state are implicated in either the maintenance or redesign of 
economic and political decision-making institutions at the local, regional and national level. Fully 
grasping this requires a different framework for examining decentralization and institutional 
reform.  
A sizeable portion of the broader literature tends to view decentralization as a partisan choice 
to implement at the national level alone.32 It is also common to see attention given to just one form 
of decentralization, even though it does not simply consist of the government-to-government 
transfer of either fiscal or political powers to some alternative or new subnational level. Countries 
that are (in the process of being) structured around multiple tiers of governments may not have 
symmetrical constitutional powers, the same legislative capacities or electoral and party dynamics, 
equal fiscal revenue generating authority, or developed public administrations. This tends to 
produce uneven institutional outcomes.  
A fruitful way to approach this topic is to draw from scholarship that recognizes the need for 
studying the links between both centralization and decentralization. In this sense, decentralization 
is part of a continuum of institutional reform that encompasses both centralization and 
decentralization. This implies a change in perspective, towards focusing on the political system as 
a whole.33 To do this, the study of decentralization should avoid reifying newly restructured state 
levels as fully completed projects. Rather, decentralization consists of new or any altered means 
of political and fiscal authority that get implemented by incumbent or incoming governments and 
the often-ongoing struggles to influence these by opposition actors. 
                                            
32 Pedro Camões, “Political Decentralization in Western Europe and The Dynamics of Institutional Change: An 
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This requires going beyond path-dependent ‘high’ politics at the national level of the state. 
Political scientists have asserted in the not-so-distant past that the state possesses sovereign control 
over its territorial borders, meaning it is self-enclosed and that state-level actors constitute the units 
of the global system.34 This leads into a binary distinction between domestic and foreign, where 
the national scale is a fixed part of the modern international system and a static foundation for 
political and economic life.35 By contrast, scholars in the field of geography have created a useful 
heuristic for examining the state in terms of a set of social relations between competing scales of 
the state. Here the politics of scale begins with the core assumption that scales (i.e. national, 
regional, local and supranational) are not territorially fixed and timeless but are instead made and 
remade.  
The object of this analysis is to deconstruct rather than reify; this begins by analyzing 
institutions as complex phenomena, whose reproduction is always incomplete and coevolves with 
other emergent phenomena.36 Seeing the state as a political process in motion allows for an 
examination of the role of political strategy in the production of new sites of governance.37 
Therefore, scales do not exist outside of the social relations that sustain them, thus empirical 
analysis should not treat scales as institutionally separate from each other but rather as intertwined 
dimensions continuously being struggled over and reworked.38 
All scales of the state – meaning local/municipal, regional/provincial, and national levels – 
can and do change. What this dissertation intends to do is examine how scales of the state in the 
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UK are changing over the post-war period, from sustaining a centralized national orientation to 
moving in a more decentralized direction. It is important to note that the active design and re-
working of political scales does not automatically equate to decentralization. Demands for 
pluralistic forms of inclusion in the political system are not simply capitulated to whenever 
mobilization from below is high. Decentralization demands are met with countervailing 
tendencies, some of which are centralizing. Scales consist of various interconnected institutional 
apparatuses and the actors that use them for some form of decision-making and implementation of 
their goals. When examining change at any given scale, different territorial scales, local/regional 
political parties, government/bureaucratic officials, as well as social movements, need to be 
considered all together as potentially part of the process of contesting governance and influencing 
institutional change.  
Research on state rescaling has opened productive avenues into historical and contemporary 
issues, but the literature contains methodological and empirical questions that need more 
systematic consideration.39 One relevant area that the politics of scale has been slow to pursue is a 
comprehensive inter-scalar examination of an encompassing political system. Less empirical 
research has expressly tended to local, regional, national and even supranational reproduction 
simultaneously over an extended period. Conventional accounts tend to focus exclusively on how 
one scale impacts others: selective national state top-down strategies, the regional assertion of 
political rights, or otherwise the ways in which local government is a political force. Taken 
separately, these neglect the structuring of interdependence between national and subnational 
levels.  
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Emphasis placed on one or two scales may be due to research constraints, as the complexity 
of integrating local, regional and national scales offers significant difficulties for detailed and 
consistent analysis. Therefore, there has been the need for more nuanced approaches to the 
periodization of state spatial development and to operate along multiple temporal and spatial 
horizons.40 Yet, this should not deter other academics from designing an integrated approach. In 
fact, the impacts of institutions which affect interdependence between scales tend to be under-
theorized in comparative research, because it is not clearly distinguished from the impact of 
decentralization.41  
Another area of the politics of scale that has needed more exploration regards the agents of 
change. There has been a noticeable lack of focus on the actors involved with rescaling; the role 
of party politics for example has been significantly neglected in the politics of scale.42 Speaking 
to this, Rhys Jones claims that devolution represents an opportunity to study the role of people in 
reproducing and transforming UK state forms. He argues that prominent scholars have failed to 
elaborate on the human actors who have been involved in political transformation.43 All of this 
raises the issue of how political actors and parties have in the past and currently are strategically 
maneuvering themselves nationally and sub-nationally. It is vital, then, to make clear who the 
actors are in contesting the politics of scale. Specifying the interests or ideological objectives they 
are seeking also matters. 
To this end, this dissertation builds on critical democratization/institutionalism literature, 
drawing from its political economy emphasis on the factors pushing the (re)formation of political 
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and democratic institutions. This literature approaches democratic politics as a relational struggle 
involving structurally unequal agents, particularly different collective actors. Critical 
democratization scholars argue that democracy involves the distribution and use of power, and 
power relations determine whether democracy emerges, stabilizes, and maintains itself.44 Göran 
Therborn notes that modern democracy was no accident of history, but arose out of the 
contradictions of capitalism, i.e. the basic struggle between capital and labour is what carried 
representative institutions beyond the boundaries of the ruling class.45 In the capitalist nation-state 
the major arenas of struggle have often been parliamentary institutions where citizenship rights are 
significantly contested.46 Political parties emerged as mediators in the installation, delaying, and/or 
consolidation of democracy, where strong parties were used for mobilizing the democratic 
pressures coming from subordinate classes against bourgeois and aristocratic classes.47  
Critical theorizing about democracy has sought to counter mainstream theorizing about 
political institutions, which is often isolated from the larger social environments they exist in. 
Historic campaigns in the twentieth century between left and right are often unaccounted for in 
mainstream social science, and emphasize the actual differences in the left and right’s core views 
of what they think democracy should be, and how both are affected by the actions of the other.48 
For Jonas Pontusson it is not simply that institutions matter, but that underlying structured and 
unequal relationships actually shape the configuration of institutions. Structural power relations 
and variable interests are essential to understand the politics of institutional change, such that 
economic and political development cannot be examined in isolation from each other. Ultimately, 
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understanding changes in policy paradigms and political-economic institutions cannot be 
comprehensively understood without some analysis of capitalism and its dynamics.49 
This approach to understanding democratization fits with an examination of decentralization 
and the politics of scale but would focus more on the reasons why institutional and democratic 
reform are connected to the way state scales are configured. Where this dissertation departs from 
these critical scholars is by examining other facets making up the modern democratic state, such 
as territorial politics. For Jim Bulpitt, territorial politics is the arena of political activity concerned 
with relations between central political institutions in the capital city and those interests, 
communities, political organizations and governmental bodies that are outside of the central 
institutional complex but within the boundaries of the state.50 Hence, territorial restructuring is 
conceived as changing patterns of relationships among levels of government to the extent that tiers 
of government may be created or abolished, and autonomy may be deepened or revoked.51  
Just as struggles that politicize economic and social cleavages can be informed and affected 
by institutions like party and electoral systems, so are institutional rules regarding the design of 
political decision-making powers at different levels of the state. This is very clearly the case with 
the asymmetry of devolved powers in Britain that were included in the failed referendum packages 
in 1979. It was present again but this time successful, in the 1997 reforms, which devolved some 
authority over various administrative responsibilities to certain regions while simultaneously 
entrenching many of the traditional powers of the central government. In the current period, 
Matthew Flinders underlines the politics behind the recent reforms, noting that “from an empirical 
                                            
49 Jonas Pontusson, “From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in their Place 
and Taking Interests Seriously,” Comparative Political Studies 28 (1995): 124.  
50 Jim Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1983), 139.  
51 Simon Toubeau and Emanuele Massetti, “The Party Politics of Territorial Reforms in Europe,” West European 
Politics 36, 2 (2013): 300; Liesbet Hooghe et al. The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 
Democracies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 41. 
 
 
22 
 
perspective there is a naïve assumption that (New) Labour’s reforms represent a fundamental 
reform of the British constitution and democracy; it is worrying that it is assumed that several 
pieces of constitutional legislation have amounted to fundamental reform of British democracy.”52  
Thinking about changes to the state and democratic institutions requires a consideration of 
the economic imperatives created by capitalism and how these impact constitutional debates and 
reform. In Britain, funding formulas, the control of finance and macro-economic policy is 
important to this equation. Spatial concerns tend to be marginal except where they can be 
subordinated to national economic policy aims like productivity, growth, and public-sector 
efficiency.53 These last few points draw our attention to an under-examined social and relational 
facet of the politics of scale and decentralization. In this sense, I draw from scholars like Jamie 
Gough, who argue that social relations operate at every scale and there are essential relations 
between these scales. Social relations at a given scale are always structured by processes and actors 
at other scales. With the different construction of social relations at various scales, reforms may 
be used by social actors to modify those relations.54 In this perspective, understanding the state 
through a lens of the territorialization of political power will require an historical examination of 
the geography of capitalism.55 
In the context of Britain, what that boils down to is that capitalist reproduction has tended to 
be an uneven process, with development in one area causally linked to underdevelopment in 
another.56 Indeed, the territorial nature of the British economy has long been one of its defining 
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features, where the City of London and the economy of the South East has been the most 
prosperous region because it is the home of the country’s financial sector and the associated 
services and industries it draws. London and the South East were entrenched as the financial and 
economic powerhouse of the state at a time when the British Empire was at its height. This was 
also consolidated alongside the presumptions of Westminster being the principal locus of power.57 
The boost that was given by finance capital to the position of London and to the centralization of 
power, population and wealth also coincided with the relative weakness of the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors in the peripheral regions.58 Spatially differentiated patterns of income and 
employment are reflected in London and the South East by the much higher concentration of 
corporate assets, research and development money, and high skill jobs. Moreover, the South East 
is the chief source of inflationary pressure with monetary policy being determined for the UK in 
this region.59 The territorialization of politics thus tends to be structured along the dominant class 
cleavage in capitalist societies.60  
As a result, the spatial unevenness of class relations in the UK has been caused by different 
labour processes and diverse forms of capital ownership depending on the time of development, 
the preceding social and cultural relations predominating in the territory, and the remoteness from 
centres producing commodities.61 The political economy of scale can explain this in terms of 
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spatial and territorial politics by examining specific locational (i.e. local, regional and national) 
patterns of economic, political and social activity in capitalist society. Interpreted through a 
political economy lens, the politics of scale consists of a) the spatial workings of capitalist 
commodity production and the process of accumulation, and b) the concomitant antagonistic class 
relation between capital and labour, which includes the role of the state in mediating this 
antagonism and securing the framework for capitalist development.62  
Ultimately, the impact of the economy in the structuring of decentralized institutional reform 
contests at national, regional and local scales leads into larger constitutional debates about 
devolution and ultimately democracy. Post-war democratic theory and comparative analysis has 
revolved around a stable theory of democracy premised on the democratic method developed by 
Joseph Schumpeter, American pluralism vis-à-vis Robert Dahl, and Seymour Lipset’s 
modernization theory. This dissertation unpacks some of the staple features of postwar analysis 
regarding democracy and democratization and uses devolution to nuance mainstream academic 
debates. Democracy, as the most prominent mainstream academics assert, includes sovereign 
power vested in elected bodies that are territorially centered at the national level. Yet, asserting 
from the outset that democracy primarily equals the procedures related to voting and elections, 
obscures the politics involved with its development, naturalizing what is historically messy and 
without fixed (territorial) boundaries or (institutional) content.63  
The emphasis on national level representative institutions has been more than a mere 
omission of the subnational for reasons related to research design. The fact of the matter is that 
modernization theory and its concomitant in the democratic method has been just as much a 
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political project as it was an academic one. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset claimed that 
“democracy and the conditions related to stable democracy […] are essentially located in 
Northwest Europe and their English-speaking offspring in America and Australasia.”64 The 
polities that approximate the model of the modern political system entailed high degrees of 
urbanization, widespread literacy, high per capita incomes, extensive geographical and social 
mobilization, commercialization and industrialization of the economy, mass communication 
media, and the participation of the societal members in social and economic processes.65  
Mainstream democratic analysis has obscured how there is a complex interplay and tension 
between different forms of democratic organization, to the point that national legislatures are not 
the only politicized battlegrounds for conflicts between left and right parties, business interests, 
trade unions, and pressure groups.66 Once we recognize the territorial face of the state we see that 
organizational power struggles take place between scales; central, regional and local governments 
utilize particular power resources in pursuit of their own objectives.67 What gets accepted as 
democratic is the result of political contestation. But this is by no means preordained. Overall, 
while the democratic method applied to modern nation-states has been declared as established fact, 
the gritty details of how ‘democracy’ entails struggles over what it looks like in relation to the 
geography and scaling of the state tends to be left out of the analytical picture.  
If democracy can be restructured, it is up to scholars to discern approaches for examining 
democratic processes and institutions, especially with an eye to new or additional factors that 
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influence the way it is organized. If both the state and democracy can and do change through the 
same or different processes of restructuring, then generally accepted concepts would have to be 
reconsidered, particularly if prominent notions formerly held as acceptable are deemed to be 
unreliable, or just lacking nuance. If that were the case, traditional sources of understanding may 
not have been appropriate all along. Unraveling where in time and place notions about really-
existing democratic formations have potentially misrepresented phenomena they were said to have 
represented, ultimately falls on alternative forms of analytical understanding. 
Taking British devolution as a scaled phenomenon seriously also requires an appreciation of 
the connection between administration and politics. For Paul Hutchcroft, political-administrative 
systems are amalgams of structures of authority and power. The former refers to formal rules 
conferred upon individuals in official capacities, while the latter relates to informal means where 
incumbents pursue goals that may diverge from formal structures of authority.68 Yet, considering 
that voting is not the sole place where power resides, an ability to influence subnational policy-
making and gain access to decentralized services of the state depends on many factors.69 The 
struggle for power is endemic even in administrative relations, where modern institutions like 
bureaucracies and political parties are often penetrated by informal patron-client networks that 
undermine the formal structure of authority.70 Scholars of legislatures, elections, parties and 
patronage systems attend to both authority and power. Yet, while formal structures of authority 
comprise a significant element of political activity, less attention is given to territorial dimensions 
of power and authority.  
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This links with scholars who have treated the examination of Britain as a union rather than 
unitary state. The difference is not merely semantic. In Britain, legal tradition has it that Parliament 
at Westminster is sovereign, and parties compete to form a majority in Parliament. Parliament is 
said to represent the state, and its sovereignty has become a deeply engrained ideology. It has been 
an article of faith that its system of limited accountability and erratic representation of votes, 
operating within an unwritten constitution, is the highest form of political development; the 
modern British state has needed to secure the myth of the supremacy of Parliament through 
political contests with regional actors and municipal governments.71 A number of academics point 
out that this is pure fiction, based on myths about citizenship, territorial authority, and political 
power, which conceals more than it reveals. Reflecting on key attributes contained in The Acts of 
Union reveal the administrative territorial face of the British state. British politics and 
administration from a historical point of view was asymmetrically devolved. This makes 
differences in administrative capacities and responsibilities relevant to understanding competing 
processes of integration at the centre and decentralization at the periphery. Scotland and Wales for 
example, have had different connections than England has with Westminster and Whitehall. As 
such, parliamentary and popular sovereignty at the national level has not been so easily reconciled 
with Britain’s union form. 
In another important way, with the ‘meso’ signaling an important change to the territorial 
dimension of politics, the necessity for new concepts to understand contemporary events and 
processes has ignited questions about the role of centre-periphery dynamics in territorial 
decentralization. The process by which states acquire, consolidate and retain territorial authority 
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has been controversial. The dominant paradigm of viewing territorial politics has been provided 
by theories of national integration and assimilation, associated with perspectives of modernity. 
Ostensibly, national states were formed around centres and were seen to have absorbed peripheries 
using a national language and educational system, political democracy, as well as a unified 
economic system spread evenly across state-territories. Yet the so-called diffusion of homogeneity 
across the territorial state has been unable to explain the wave of peripheral nationalist movements 
that swept through advanced Western countries. Among these are the Basques and Catalans in 
Spain, Corsicans in France, the Celts in the United Kingdom, Quebecois in Canada, Flemish and 
Walloons in Belgium, Sardinians in Italy, and so on.72 
Following the powerful resurgence of territorial politics, scholars have been interested in 
explaining the dynamics of regionalism in terms of the political articulation and mobilization of 
territorial interests. Increasingly, scholars have been examining how decentralization has impacted 
state-wide party dynamics as well as the denationalization of party systems. The fact of 
regionalism has not only opened a host of critiques about commonly held assumptions of state 
sovereignty, but also how to interpret political party dynamics given the challenges made by ethno-
nationalist political parties. In terms of why devolution takes place, conventional work asserts that 
the rise of regional social movements, the expansion of regional politics parties, and the 
regionalized pattern of majority party support, provide the main pressures to devolve.  
What tends to be sidelined from these analyses is the extent to which local politics is a vital 
part of administrative territorial reform and devolution.  To understand why devolution has taken 
place we need to understand that local and regional politics are inextricably bound together in 
Britain. Indeed, any study of devolution which neglects adjacent struggles to reform local 
                                            
72 Keating, State and Regional Nationalism, 1-2.  
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government is missing a very important piece to the puzzle of devolution. To be sure, local 
governments have been locked in concurrent struggles with Westminster over the extent of service-
delivery functions that each provide. Prior to legislative devolution, councils were the only other 
domestic arena for party struggle aside from Westminster, such that local councilors were the sole 
elected representatives other than Members of Parliament.73 The subnational was not merely the 
extension of civic participation, but a field of partisan activity, where the local level was a training 
ground for national politics.74 A tradition of local government was established in the nineteenth 
century that asserted rights of autonomy over local affairs. Over time, local government has 
endured various forms of attack, reform and subsequent revival and this links with regional 
devolution because of the partisan dynamics at play in political restructuring, which carried 
forward up to the devolution settlements in 1997 and well beyond them. 
Thus, the constitutional character of Britain is dynamic, and it should be studied in terms of 
multiple territorial and scaled political traditions that co-exist in relation to each other. 
Understanding political restructuring in Britain must start by acknowledging that there is a 
dialectical relationship between both centralization and decentralization that informs Britain’s 
constitutional tradition. The relevant scholarship speaks to a dynamic between parliamentary 
privilege and regional and local precedence in politics. With deep rooted constitutional traditions 
prevailing in Britain, gradual rather than radical change is noticeable in political restructuring 
initiatives. Thus, reform has often meant providing the continuance of diverse institutions while 
Westminster debates the extent to which the executive retains functions and policy areas. For 
James Mitchell, the move towards a devolved polity has been no different from previous changes, 
                                            
73 Howard Elcock, “Local Government and Devolution,” in Changing Party Policy in Britain: An Introduction, ed. 
Richard Kelly (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 178.  
74 Max Beloff and Gillian Peele, The Government of the United Kingdom: Political Authority in a Changing Society 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1980), 264.  
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and the consequence has been that devolution owes a great deal to the historical working of the 
union and in the ways the UK at the centre has managed its constituent parts.75  
 According to some, prioritizing political economy when analyzing the historical working 
of Britain and the contests between constituent parts, can lead to structural determinism.76 In this 
perspective, class-based narratives fail to account for the struggles to preserve, articulate and 
represent the long-standing ties that the Scots, Welsh and Irish have to the land and the linguistic-
cultural identity that has developed. There are good reasons for centre-periphery studies to 
emphasize regional sentiment, especially given that mainstream political science has been 
obsessed with viewing Britain as a unitary state dominated by the national government, and 
denying any dynamic, if not awkward relationship with the regions. Nonetheless, recent 
scholarship has attempted to reconcile through a political economy lens why nationalism arose, 
and how it led to devolution. Arguably, the types of protests that occurred at the margins of the 
state in response to the national level, were heavily attached to economic downturn and the way 
capitalism was managed.77 This dissertation will reflect upon the influential role that that 
organization of capitalism across Britain had on local job placement, the types of industry located 
in certain regions and why, and how this was reflected into the national political realm of 
decentralization and devolution.  
 
 
                                            
75 James Mitchell, “The United Kingdom as a State of Unions: Unity of Government, Equality of Political Rights and 
Diversity of Institutions,” in Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom, ed. Alan Trench (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 28, 47.  
76 Michael Keating aptly pointed out that Catalonia is not an underprivileged nation seeking independence; we should 
thus be cautious about simply asserting that peripheries automatically seek secession because they lack economic 
development. Keating, State and Regional Nationalism, 12. The same could be said about other regions such as 
Lombardy-Veneto in Italy, where the League originated and is still strongest. 
77 Jim Phillips, Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2008). 
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Research Design: Tracking Devolution in Britain from the Post-War to the Present 
 
This dissertation uses an historical approach to provide a post-war analysis of the politics of 
devolution in Britain. The goal is to explain why people turned to devolution as a political strategy 
and why this strategy made gains when it did (in terms of electoral results and concrete government 
initiatives). As the recent ‘historical turn’ in political science research recommends, to do that we 
need to go back and look, both to understand the reasons people gave for why they were doing 
what they did but also to gauge the contextual backdrop to such decision-making, something actors 
may or may not have been aware of.78 Such an approach departs from the conventional social 
science variable-testing methods which can, at best, only measure the co-variation of variables, 
not really explain why co-variation is occurring or indeed the origin of the different variables or 
the setting they interact within, never mind the inescapable problems involved in operationalizing 
the variables in the first place. By contrast, what is sought here is more than a statistical relationship 
among variables but a causal reconstruction that will explain a given social phenomenon. But this 
does not just amount to mining history to create a narrative. As Renate Mayntz argues,  
causal reconstruction … seeks to explain a given social phenomenon—a given event, 
structure, or development—by identifying the processes through which it is generated. 
Causal reconstruction may lead to a (more or less complex) historical narrative, but in its 
theoretically more ambitious version, causal reconstruction aims at generalizations—
                                            
78 For example, historical institutionalists have argued that regimes are renegotiated as well as reinterpreted such that 
the combination of mechanisms and political contestation influences change. See Gerard Alexander, “Institutions, 
Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13, 3 (2001); Ellen Immergut and 
Karen Anderson, “Historical Institutionalism and West European Politics,” West European Politics 31, 1-2 (2008); 
Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999).  
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generalizations involving processes, not correlations. The identification of causal 
mechanisms is the hallmark of such an approach (emphasis in the original).79 
As a branch within historical institutionalism, mechanism-based approaches have become 
quite popular, conventionally known as process-tracing, systematic process analysis, and causal 
reconstruction.80 But the term ‘mechanism’ conjures up images of a kind of determinism that lacks 
agency and the possibility of variation. By contrast, this dissertation will draw from historical 
sociology approaches inspired by the work of E.P. Thompson, Perry Anderson, Michael Mann, 
and many others. Here, history is a method to identify structural and causal relations between 
political actors across time and space.81 Structured relations are ongoing and clearly cause things 
to happen but are not unaffected by subsequent reactions and can be challenged and changed. 
Rather than searching for mechanisms, I examine how structured relations established by 
capitalism create certain pressures and conflict, both at the various scales of the state and across 
civil society. These pressures manifest both in political activity as well as uneven and often 
unstable economic outcomes.  
Highlighting this dialectical relationship of politics and economics in modern capitalism, a 
guiding assumption of this dissertation is that devolution emerges from clashing ideological 
visions involved in managing the modern capitalist economy. There are three ways the political 
economy of scale will be deployed to demonstrate this: 
                                            
79 Renate Mayntz, “Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomenon,” Philosophy of Social Sciences, 34, 2 
(2004): 238. 
80 See Mario Bunge, “How Does It Work? The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms,” Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 34, 2 (2004); Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski, “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences,” The Annual 
Review of Sociology 36 (2010). 
81 For example, E. P. Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class examined specific events as a method 
to construct a narrative account of class formation. This was not about understanding why events had to turn out the 
way they did, but rather, how things turned out. As cited in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Can One or a Few Cases Yield 
Theoretical Gains?” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich 
PeterReuschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 314. 
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I. Track reigning political economy policy paradigms in each era – Keynesian and neoliberal 
– and the challenges to their dominance over time; 
II. Assess political reasons behind different scale commitments at different times;  
III. Gauge political dimensions and dilemmas in maintaining or otherwise pursuing different 
approaches to the politics of scale in different periods.  
By examining the competing partisan approaches to political economy and the policy choices 
made to achieve them, we can evaluate their impact on local, regional and national scales, and how 
political contests sustain, challenge and sometimes transform scales. The issues found at these 
scales and used as empirical evidence to elucidate the three objectives above are: 
I. Local level: the urban-rural divide which consists of county-county council boundary 
disputes; struggles to retain and improve local government authority vis-à-vis the national 
government; various local pursuits with decentralizing social service delivery decision-
making; and the ongoing struggles over the control of urban development. 
II. Regional level: the North-South divide, which consists of geographical contradictions in 
economic development, between outer areas of the North, North East, North West versus 
inner areas of the South and South East of England; the institutionalized means of 
deconcentration and decentralization to attenuate this division; and the marked rise of 
nationalism and industrial strife because of concentrated job losses at the margins of 
Britain. 
III. National level: domestic struggles with geopolitical influences that impact national policy 
objectives; the attempts to create regional economic centres of employment for global 
competition during balance of payments crises and a declining pound; and the over-
emphasis on overseas finance versus indigenous manufacturing in the regions. 
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A small-N case-study design is fitting for this project because of the detail that is needed to 
be historically specific and to make statements about the political economy of institutional 
restructuring. Using a comparative lens, scholars have overwhelmingly utilized quantitative 
methodology to assess qualitative and historical aspects of decentralization.82 A problem with 
assessments of decentralization from a quantitative perspective is the tendency to focus on 
codifying decentralized institutional structures as a means for establishing correlations (like how 
politically and fiscally developed regional authority is for example) without detailing the reasons 
why reforms are undertaken. And yet this is just what we need to know if we are to unravel what 
has caused decentralization to advance when it has.  
As an example, some comparative research has found that left parties are the most prone to 
undertake decentralization reforms. Such findings claim that the political left is more supportive 
of local democratic decision-making than the political right. Various examples in Western Europe 
are used to support this assertion.83 However, the comparative literature has not really explained 
how and why political parties and actors approach decentralized institutional reform differently 
over time. An aggregative approach to decentralization focuses too much on an either-or scenario 
– success or failure – and this fails to grasp important details regarding how political parties and 
actors pursue their strategic objectives, and specifically how these change or conflict, within and 
beyond their own organizations over time. Without qualifying the reasons for what was fought 
over in terms of the type of fiscal and/or political authority involved in institutional reform 
alongside the broader social relational context that these occur, we may fail to recognize the 
purposes they are meant to serve. Nuances about what exactly makes the right or left more or less 
                                            
82 Michiel S. de Vries, “The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis of Arguments and Practices 
in European Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 38 (2000): 204.  
83 For example, see Camões, “Political Decentralization in Western Europe and The Dynamics of Institutional 
Change.” 
 
 
35 
 
democratic in their approach to decentralization can easily be lost, notably when institutional 
achievements are aggrandized by political actors despite being tenuous, if not contradictory.   
For the purposes of this study, only Scotland, Wales and England, rather than the entire 
United Kingdom (which also include Northern Ireland), will be examined. Northern Ireland, 
though certainly important to the Union and an examination of devolution, represents a markedly 
different case than the others in terms of its unique political and economic development, much of 
which has been influenced by the very particular conditions at work throughout its history, i.e. the 
tense conflict between Catholics and Protestants over integration of the region with Ireland versus 
maintaining links to the Union. The patterns of economic investments and decisions over 
establishing, removing, then re-establishing devolved power in the region are simply too different 
from Scotland, Wales and England to make for meaningful comparison. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
The chapters are organized according to specific periods between the immediate post-Second 
World War and the new millennium: Chapter 2: National Level Scale Commitments from 1945-
1970; Chapter 3: The Struggles over Scale Commitments from 1970-1995; and Chapter 4: 
Devolution as a Scale Commitment from 1995-Present. These periods are designed to capture 
specific historical contests over land planning and urban development; regional economic policy-
making and institutions; and national macro-economic policy and political decision-making. 
Chapter divisions meet several contextual criteria.  
First, they address the issues surrounding the urban-rural, the North-South and domestic-
international divides throughout the post-war era, along with the decentralized institutions being 
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implemented and contested. Secondly, these chapters are grouped in a way that reflects 
institutional and economic approaches through ideological eras i.e. Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism. So, Chapter Two will reflect the post-war commitments to the welfare state and its 
attendant concerns over full-employment. A shift in ideological paradigm is notable by the 1970s 
and Chapter Three covers a transition from demand to supply-side management of the economy. 
This chapter also reflects the rise of neoliberal approaches to economic and political decision-
making. Chapter Four reflects new approaches to managing the economy and approaches to 
political reform. Thirdly, commitments towards power and authority at local, regional and the 
national level are discussed in relation to the reasons why devolution became used as a solution to 
solve economic problems experienced in Britain.  
In this sense, each chapter aims to capture how the competition between different actors at 
different levels of the state seek to control the means of capitalist development. In turn, the chapters 
indicate how this competition steers partisan relations in certain directions over time with the 
constant push and pull to control the levers of domestic capital investment especially in traditional 
heavy industry and manufacturing. There is a perpetual tension over the centralization and 
decentralization of decision-making apparatuses which ranges from the circumscribing of local 
government, the implementation of regional de-concentration, broadening asymmetrical 
devolution, and new public management approaches to local and regional policy-making. The 
evolution of devolution is captured by indicating the ways and means of decentralized decision-
making imposed by the national level, and the responses by competing subnational actors against 
their inability to do what they were supposed to do.  
For ease of comparison, each chapter is organized in the same way, moving by section from 
the national to the regional to the local scale, assessing how the reigning political economy 
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paradigm was deployed across the era and the political reactions each induced. Finally, each 
chapter concludes with a discussion of competing coalitions of interest sustaining or challenging 
the existing organization of the scales of the state and the reasons for their actions. 
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Chapter 2: National Level Scale Commitments from 1945-1970 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the antecedents of devolution in the post-Second World War era by 
examining the political economy of postwar reconstruction at different scales of the state. The 
chapter specifically looks at the partisan relations invested in the implementation of key 
decentralization projects. The most relevant national, regional and urban planning policy 
institutions that were developed and opposed by various political and class coalitions is presented 
as a tool to understand how different levels of the state are produced, sustained and ultimately 
challenged. Labour and the Conservatives were in the driver’s seat with respect to the welfare state 
and long boom, but they were also integrated into the international economy that limited their 
domestic policy options. This impacted regions and cities as they were unevenly differentiated by 
the types and placement of industry and made for a geographically oriented politics of contestation 
in response to different experiences with social decay and unemployment.  
The post-war period is a relevant place to start for a few reasons. Too much has been taken 
for granted regarding this period, particularly the centralization of the British state as a consensus-
driven cross-party project. By contrast, we can observe diverging ideological motivations pursued 
by different partisan actors. State projects were actively contested at the national level by 
opposition actors, not simply adhered to in a general agreement with collectivist politics. The 
period is relevant as there was a coming to dominance of the national scale, particularly seen in 
the state-wide expansion and consolidation of welfare state services and economic planning by the 
Labour Party. The Conservatives had their own policy agenda, more market-driven than 
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collectivist. Nonetheless, they too were committed to a particular form of politics focused on the 
national level as well. 
Despite advances towards social democratic citizenship1 there were problems with how 
national scale programmes were applied regionally and locally. The subnational level was being 
actively produced and reproduced just as the national level was, and this led to various political 
struggles. Subsequently, mobilization from below built up, boiled over and bolstered the 
devolutionary politics that was becoming bitterly contested by the late 1960s. Building on the 
analytical framework laid out in the first chapter, this chapter analyzes the national, regional and 
local levels of the state, focusing on the most relevant events that produced and reproduced the 
politics of scale in the post-war era. These events are situated in three periods following the war 
that the Labour and Conservative parties alternated in power: 1945-1951, 1951-1964, and 1964-
1970. A closing discussion weaves together the political economy of decentralization projects, 
what this meant for competing interests and commitments, and how it fed into challenges by 
partisans at different scales of the state. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 For T. H. Marshall, citizenship can be divided into three types of rights: civil, political and social. Civil rights refer 
to the rights necessary for individual freedom, including liberty of the person, freedom of speech and faith, the right 
to own property, and the right to justice. Political rights entail the right to participate in the exercise of political power, 
including the right to vote through the expansion of the franchise. Lastly, social rights are forms of economic welfare, 
social security, as well as the ability to share in the heritage of the nation; the educational system and social services, 
including health care are elements of this. Marshall points out that citizenship is connected to the rise of capitalism 
and has historically operated as an instrument of social stratification. Nonetheless, the evolution of citizenship has 
also altered patterns of social inequality in advanced industrial societies. See T. H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social 
Class,” in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 
94, 109-110. 
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The National Level from 1945-1970: All-Party Consensus for Centralization 
 
It is generally held that the expansion and consolidation of the welfare state required the 
centralization of administrative and political functions. However, commitments to a model that 
required planning at the statewide level had to be established and implemented as the 
Conservatives, who were mostly responsible for governance throughout the twentieth century, 
were less keen on state intervention in society and the economy. The coming to prominence of the 
national scale in the way that it did - with a heavy emphasis on national level planning - starts with 
the concerted effort by the Labour Party. As will be shown, the national scale in the immediate 
post-war era was an actively contested political terrain.  
1945-1951 
On July 5, 1945 the Labour Party made history by winning its first ever legislative majority 
government. The vision of capturing power at Westminster had finally become a reality and this 
was fundamental to Labour’s strategy as the state and existing parliamentary institutions were seen 
as instruments to achieve a socialist society.2 Exactly what the party thought a socialist society 
would look like and how to achieve it would oscillate over time. There were conflicting tendencies 
within the party which found expression in different attitudes, particularly between centralism and 
decentralism. Regarding the latter, local autonomy was viewed as a tactical way to undermine the 
                                            
2 The Labour Party emerged out of the coalescence of trade unions, socialist societies and the Independent Labour 
Party; its broad-church political economy was especially eclectic and diverse until the end of the First World War. By 
the mid-1920s, Fabianism was the dominant strain of political economy within the Labour Party, and remained so into 
the post-1945 period. The parameters of socialism oscillated over time, but consistently referred to a programme of 
change in the economic and social organization of the state in order to improve the material position of the working 
class. Socialism would entail the substantial extension of public rather than private ownership of the means of 
production in modern capitalism, a commitment to the redistribution of wealth, the enhancement of social welfare 
provisions, and the need for planned economic conduct to achieve macroeconomic stability. See Noel Thompson, 
Political Economy of the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism, 1884-2005, Second Edition 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 1-3, 108-109, 137. 
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bourgeois state and as a training ground for socialist democracy.3 To be sure, after World War I 
advocates within the shop steward’s movement and guild socialists were seeking decentralized 
democracy through small, collective forms of community participation. Notwithstanding this, the 
ideology that would become dominant within the party, particularly in the inter-war years, was 
Labourism. This was a fusion of trade union concerns for free collective bargaining and a 
commitment to parliamentary reform and independent representation.4  
Early in the inter-war years pragmatic electoral considerations aimed to expand the electoral 
base of the Labour Party. It was argued that to redistribute resources and improve conditions in 
deprived regions and among workers in general, a centralizing policy would have to be the primary 
course of action.5 Labour’s political strategy was heavily influenced by their experiences between 
the end of the First World War and the Great Depression of the early 1930s. It became apparent 
that despite the severity of the recession, capitalism was not about to collapse, and this encouraged 
thinking about the efficacy of centralized planning with an emphasis placed on the power of the 
state. By 1936 the party drew from the economic doctrine of John Maynard Keynes as a means to 
promote the state’s management of the capitalist economy. Despite the advances made at the 
municipal level in the years leading up to the global economic collapse, by the early 1930s only 
marginal gains were being made locally. This led advocates to the conclusion that a majority 
government at Westminster would sooner be achieved than the control of a great many local 
                                            
3 Keith Bassett, “Labour, Socialism, and Labour Democracy,” in Local Socialism? Labour Councils and New Left 
Alternatives, ed. Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge (Hong Kong: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1984), 87-88. 
4 John Callaghan, “The Left: The Ideology of the Labour Party,” in Party Ideology in Britain, ed. Leonard Tivey and 
Anthony Wright (London: Routledge, 1989), 25-26. The decentralist strand would later re-emerge and be pursued by 
the left-wing of the party as an alternative to centralized planning models applied by the party elite at the national 
scale. 
5 J. Barry Jones and Michael J. Keating, “The British Labour Party: Centralisation and Devolution,” in The Territorial 
Dimension in United Kingdom Politics, ed. Peter Madgwick and Richard Rose (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1982), 182. 
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governments.6 As a result, Labour’s Immediate Programme was published in 1937, laying the 
policy foundation for Atlee’s government in 1945.7  
Labour’s post-war reconstruction programme began with the passing of the National 
Insurance and Health Service Acts of 1946. Universal coverage regarding sickness, unemployment 
and pension benefits were established, along with a new National Health Service. In terms of 
industry, economic policy aimed at high employment through demand management fiscal policy. 
The government took ownership of key enterprises like the Bank of England and civil aviation 
(1946), coal, cables and wireless, rail and road transport (1947), and electricity and gas (1948), 
followed by iron and steel.8 This attempt to control the economy reflected how World War II had 
impacted the national mood in favour of social change. Public attitudes had shifted during the years 
of the wartime national coalition government after observing the collaboration between the state, 
employers and unions. Moreover, arising out of the war, cities were damaged and housing 
shortages had become a national urban problem, agriculture suffered with production at half of its 
prewar level and livestock was decimated, industrial production had slumped to one-third of what 
it had been leading up to the declaration of war, and, lastly, there was a drain of human resources 
and disruption of communication networks.9 This meant that a large scale undertaking was 
essential to rebuild and restore what had been lost.   
An extension of government power coincided with the view that controlling the instruments 
necessary to carry out national plans would raise up the conditions of the organized working class. 
Most assessments of Labour’s approach tend to agree that it added up to a substantial reshaping of 
                                            
6 The push for a Local Authorities Enabling Bill to allow for councils to have greater power was dropped in the 1930s 
in favour of national planning. 
7 Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 75-77.  
8 J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, Politics in Britain: From Callaghan to Thatcher (Great Britain: W & R 
Chambers Ltd., 1988), 15-16.  
9 Derek Urwin, A Political History of Western Europe Since 1945 (Essex: Pearson Education, 1997), 22-24.  
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the relationship between the state and society, institutionalizing a new level of public responsibility 
for social provision and an enhanced role for the state in the economy.10 At the same time, it needs 
to be pointed out that nationalization was not socialization. Colin Leys argues that it is a popular 
myth that the postwar Labour government made the tax system very redistributive and brought a 
great reduction in income inequality.11 Systemic problems with Labour’s approach amounted to 
the inability and lack of desire to get inside the inner workings of private industry, and this was 
influenced by the inability to control capital investment.  
Labour had to tread a delicate balance between the interests of capital and organized labour. 
In terms of the latter, the capacity to impose its economic policy rested on the ability to convince 
unions to exercise voluntary wage restraint and in 1948 there was a call for a freeze on wages. It 
was extremely difficult to act without the consent of workers given the strength of unions after 
WWII. In terms of capital, there was opposition to state intervention which also posed a problem 
for the party: a severe balance of payments deficit convinced Labour to avoid confrontation in 
order to garner the cooperation of industry. Private industry was not fully incorporated into 
Labour’s centralized planning programme, and it was clear that new planning bodies were not 
going to redistribute power within industries and attempt to practice a mixed economy with the 
government taking a stake in private companies. The nationalized industries operated on a 
corporate model with boards of private capitalists appointed by public officials. This did not 
change the power relations between managers and workers, however, because the boards were still 
more industry-controlled than government-directed, and there was a lack of union representation 
and zero worker control of them. The boards were free from ministerial interference and each 
                                            
10 James E. Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 156. 
11 Leys, Politics in Britain, 60. 
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board operated without any industry-wide coordination.12 This model created poor industrial 
relations, to the point that class relations heavily impacted the direction of the economy and helps 
explain why the immediate post-war national scale planning model hardly altered how economic 
decisions were made and administered. The failure to develop mechanisms for intervening more 
decisively in industry was not especially visible in the late 1940s as the government did a good job 
of managing the economy given the circumstances, and this served to blunt efforts to alter the 
structure of economic policy-making. The main policy objectives were to ensure full employment, 
manage the balance of payments and maintain and improve the standard of living.  
Yet the means of exercising control over the budget and the balance of payments and 
investment ultimately proved to be inadequate.13 Investment was beyond the control of the 
interventionist state, which limited the extent of the social democratic project. There are two 
reasons behind this: first, there was the impact of the City of London, i.e. finance capital, on 
economic policy-making. Britain has long been dominated by a particular fraction of the dominant 
class. Here the City’s position of prominence was institutionalized within the state system through 
the Bank of England and its connection to the Treasury during the inter-war years.14 The Treasury 
assumed control of foreign exchange at a time when the gold standard system was collapsing, and 
the Treasury was needed to provide loans to British dominions to prevent defaulting on their loans 
as a result of the transition from gold as a reserve currency in an era of economic crisis. Financial 
backing was given to stabilize currencies in these countries against the pound which maintained a 
single monetary area that continued into the postwar period. Yet, London’s interests and the 
                                            
12 Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, 109. 
13 Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion, 167-168, 176. 
14 Frank Longstreth, “The City, Industry and the State,” in State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Colin 
Crouch (London: Croom Helm, 1979). 
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Treasury’s control of capital flows over the group of nations called the Sterling Area created a 
Catch-22.  
Britain became heavily indebted during the Second World War and the war effort created a 
huge burden on the economy which undermined London’s position as a world lender. Britain ran 
a trade deficit during the war and sold much of its overseas assets, which meant it had little left to 
liquidate after the war, and so fell short of dollars to pay for post-war reconstruction. Therefore, 
British governments turned to their allies for support and their WWII liabilities were eventually 
written off, but at a considerable price. Basically, Britain had to agree to a multilateral regime of 
trade with the US as the financial guarantor of the Sterling Area. Therefore, notwithstanding 
financial levity at the end of the Second World War, the Labour government was unable to control 
international influences on internal economic planning.15  
This leads to the second of the external influences that affected Labour’s post-war objectives. 
Though the Bank of England was nationalized by the government, it was the Treasury that 
remained responsible at the macro level for monetary policy. Monetary policy was a messy affair 
from 1945-1951 because of the conditions attached to relief aid. Much of the financial assistance 
provided by the United States - initially in the form of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration in 1943, credit lines, and then Marshall Aid via the Economic Cooperation 
Administration in 1947 - came with stipulations associated with currency stabilization and 
monetary reform. To garner international economic cooperation for the United States’ designs on 
creating a world-wide regime of free trade and the removal of domestic tariffs, onerous conditions 
on loans were forced on borrowing countries. Having to abandon controls over trade and make 
sure currency was convertible for transactions was a huge problem for Britain, to the point that the 
                                            
15 G. G. Sterling, British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher (London: Phillip Allan 
Publishers, 1985), 136. 
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pound was verging on collapse by 1947. Despite the Marshall Plan’s assistance as a response, aid 
was unable to prevent another Sterling crisis from happening in 1949, which prompted the 
devaluation of the pound and marked the changing reality that Britain’s exchange position on the 
international stage was a fragile one.16  
Exogenous influences would haunt the Labour Party the next time it was in office as well. 
Nonetheless, Labour’s approach to centralized planning and the national scale would return when 
they were re-elected in the mid-1960s. Despite shifting the focus to a more expansive national 
programme and institutional set-up, their commitment to the national level was short-sighted with 
respect to subnational scales. Early calls for a reformed and more inclusive planning model were 
largely ignored, underscoring the efforts - and albeit circumscribed approaches - to regional and 
local planning and institutional design that took place.   
1951-1964 
In 1951 the Conservatives were able to win a majority government because of the flawed 
first-past-the-post electoral system’s disproportionate allocation of seats to votes earned. The race 
was tight, with Labour garnering 48.8% of the vote but only 295 seats whereas the Conservatives 
had 48% of the vote and 321 seats. The Conservative victory ushered in the re-creation of 
traditional class alignments by gaining a significant number of Liberal votes and two-thirds of the 
overall middle-class. At the same time, Labour had retained the support two-thirds of the working 
class. Here we see the versatility of the mid to late century British Conservative Party, how it 
sought to govern at all costs by alternating between libertarian and collectivist approaches to 
achieve power and get re-elected. Societal trends that affected landed property interests and 
privileges did not prevent Conservatives from seeking to preserve the status quo and retain as much 
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of the old order as possible, sometimes appeasing forces that threatened it. In general, the party 
has continued to maintain a cautious free-market, individualist, low-tax, strong defense approach 
to retain support from the upwardly mobile skilled working class.17  
Between 1945 and 1951 the Conservative Research Department was active in producing a 
number of policy documents and charters that blended traditional Toryism, namely deregulation, 
private enterprise, individual initiative, reduced public spending and lower taxes, with a vague 
acceptance of some degree of government planning and some support for the welfare state.18 At 
the time they were elected the Conservatives could not mount an immediate rejection of the Labour 
programme, not least because certain nationalized industries denied the need for privatization, and 
this meant that their approach to policy was somewhat amenable to social changes within society.19 
Nonetheless, the manifestos of 1945, 1950 and 1951 contain tax-cutting, anti-collectivist and free 
enterprise rhetoric that the Tories are not often credited with at the time because of the general 
idea that a consensus had been reached between the right and the left regarding the centralized 
direction the state needed to take. To be sure, wartime attitudes came to favour social and economic 
investment which initially benefited Labour, but despite the legacy created by the welfare state the 
Conservatives mounted a challenge against it with the aid of international forces. To the 
Conservative Party, the finance of the welfare state came from national insurance contributions, 
taxes and local rates, and this was seen by them as regressive. Especially regarding national 
insurance contributions, the welfare state was claimed to be working-class self-help organized by 
the state.20  
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In 1950-1951, a certain amount of credit was given to the Labour Party for creating a positive 
economic climate despite the difficulties it faced, but their popular image was fading with the 
prospects of radical reform. Fortunately for the Conservatives, they had occupied government 
when the dividends of the postwar were starting to take off, seen in the rise of profits and wages 
caused by the global upsurge associated with postwar reconstruction.21 The popularity of various 
policy initiatives as well as the degree to which they were embedded in the state were critical in 
determining which changes were going to be brought in. Still, collectivism was only half-hearted 
under the Conservatives. The shift back to Conservative-style policy began in earnest with the 
denationalization of iron and steel, followed by the removal of price controls, and then a more 
emphatic license was given to private initiative. This heralded the shift to the retraction of social 
provisioning and the freeing up of the market.22  
The Conservative Party’s approach to policy in the early 1950s was premised on securing 
and maintaining a strong currency to stabilize prices and achieve as high a level of employment as 
consistent with the first two aims. Yet as early as 1952 the government experienced a balance of 
payments crisis, which was in turn used as an opportunity to move away from full employment. 
The middle class and businesses were given relief with the emphasis on tax reductions and the 
pursuit of economies in spending, despite social programmes still remaining in place. By 1955-
1956, a recreated politics of taxation arose comparable to that of the interwar years, and the 
fundamental tenets of the ‘postwar settlement’ were compromised. The Conservatives felt that 
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their association with the economic failure of the 1930s had been shed and the proof was in their 
re-election in 1955 and 1959, respectively increasing their share of the vote in both cases.23  
 The postwar economic boom had politicians riding high, to the point that Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan had come out stating that the British people had never had it so good. However, 
if economic growth was attributed to the Conservatives in the early to mid-1950s, then so was the 
embittered process of the decline of the British Empire, seen particularly with the Korean conflict, 
the Suez Crisis, and decolonization. Moreover, the ‘British disease’ was becoming an acute 
problem, with Britain’s industrial weakness relative to international competition increasing, along 
with speculation against Sterling that led to deflationary measures in 1955 and 1957.24 By the end 
of the 1950s British politics was dominated by economic problems, and to deal with international 
competition, both spending and wage controls were sought.  
Local government reform was one way to curb spending (examined fully in the section below 
on the local scale). There were also calls for regional economic planning throughout the 1950s, 
despite rejecting it when they came to power (examined fully in the section on the regional scale). 
It was thought that both business and unions needed to be brought together to modernize the 
economy, so the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes was set up in 1957 to influence 
wage-bargaining. By the time the 1959 election took place, Harold Macmillan claimed he was 
seeking to establish a corporatist or planned approach to policy-making. Eventually, the National 
Economic Development Council (NEDC) was developed to encourage trade unions to behave in 
exchange for a bigger say in interventionist economic policy.25 The NEDC’s aims were to examine 
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economic performance, consider obstacles to faster growth and to seek agreement about the ways 
to improve economic performance.26  
The problem with this planning arrangement was that despite resembling a semi-tripartite 
body, it lacked any authority. Moreover, there was very little commitment to cross-class power 
sharing rather than an endemic attachment to top-down governance. The planning model instituted 
under the Conservatives suffered from ambiguities in their competing visions within the party for 
both checking inflation and curbing spending versus institutional transformation, and this because 
planning was unpopular within the party and the Treasury. To be sure, the only way to get 
competing factions on the right to agree to some type of institutional framework was to develop it 
in a way to curb unions by implementing an incomes policy.27 This was something the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) had recognized early on and argued that the new institutions would have 
to be free to set their own agenda, and that unions should control who would represent workers. In 
the end, the NEDC was not integrated at all into policy-making, which made its ambit purely 
prescriptive.28    
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Overall, the economic measures pursued by the Conservatives proved insufficient. From 
1962-1963 unemployment was the highest it had been for many years, with certain regions being 
hit the hardest. Restrictive fiscal policy was considered the culprit and the Conservatives’ 
economic competence had been questioned even further by economic decline. The very brief 
flirtation with planning only in the early 1960s indicates the reticence on behalf of the 
Conservatives towards a regional apparatus to deal with economic performance. At the time, the 
Labour Party with Harold Wilson as the leader drove forward the need to have ‘democratic’ 
planning and more intervention to secure higher levels of economic growth. 
1964-1970 
A general election was set for 1964 after Prime Minister Macmillan resigned. The Labour 
Party ended up winning a small majority with most of its electoral support concentrated in the 
outer regions of Britain. The election marked a peak in relative class voting which reflected 
disillusionment with the Conservative Party’s ability to continue to increase working-class living 
standards. The 1964 election had been fought on who could best modernize the productive base of 
the economy and what institutional reforms would be required to achieve that modernization. 
Labour campaigned on economic planning, the application of new technology to industry, full 
employment, faster growth, equitable disbursement of industry across the country, the control of 
inflation, and solving balance of payments problems. For the Labour Party, economic growth was 
the means to social progress and this could only come with a dirigiste approach to industrial 
modernization.  
A major administrative reform was the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs to 
oversee the government’s National Plan. Once in power, the Labour Party attempted to build an 
alliance between big, private, modern capital and Labour’s base in the manual working class, 
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largely from Wales, Scotland and the North East region. But it was unable to reconcile competing 
class and political interests. The DEA took over the responsibilities of the NEDC that was set up 
by the Conservatives in the early 1960s, but its tenure was very short lived. The DEA had been 
created to serve as a counterweight to the Treasury, yet little came of the department as it was 
unable to wrest policy instruments from the Treasury to fulfill its own objectives. For a corporatist 
institution, the DEA was the direct representation of manufacturing industry in the state rather than 
the whole of capital or labour. It was an innovation as far as having a peak organization for industry 
represented at the government level. The problem was that leading participants of the banking 
sector were not that supportive of it. In fact, industrial capital was disappointed by the external 
focus of finance capital and its investment relation to the City as well as bureaucratic resistance by 
the Treasury to integrated planning at the national level.29  
Inter-ministerial conflict was not only seen with the Treasury’s resistance to its rival 
economic department as the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) also worried 
that urban physical planning would be subordinated to the DEA. The MHLG regarded any attempt 
at local level spatial planning as an affront to the demarcated area of its own jurisdiction.30 In 1966 
economic policy was transferred to the Treasury, and by 1969 the DEA was disbanded with its 
physical planning aspects of development transferred to the Ministry of Technology and the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The lack of institutions to develop and coordinate 
planning reveals the problems in the British system of governance at the time. There was no 
regional tier of administration and government to properly utilize the different regions’ potential 
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to contribute to national economic growth. The gap in formal machinery to oversee economic and 
physical planning meant that the National Plan was unable to achieve its stated objectives. 
The National Plan had set up targets to increase outputs, but the country had inherited a £800 
million trade deficit from the previous government. The government faced a situation where it 
could not increase output unless its competitive power was increased. Labour had felt that pay 
policy was the key to curbing inflation and making the economy more competitive internationally 
by limiting wages. But this incomes policy would come at a time when union density had increased 
from 42.7% in 1968 to 47.2% by the early 1970s. Shop floor militancy would dramatically rise 
under Labour’s policies particularly when they decided to impose statutory wage freezes.  
When Harold Wilson became Prime Minister, the British pound had been overvalued against 
the American dollar which led to speculation against Sterling. By the middle of 1965 the 
government had taken conditional debt on by borrowing from the IMF and the Federal Reserve in 
the US of over one billion dollars. It is a matter of debate if a different approach to deflationary 
pressures would have aided the longevity of the National Plan. Whatever the case, the National 
Plan was abandoned in 1967 largely because of the cumulative speculative crises against Sterling. 
Problems with the balance of payments were further aggravated by the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 
because the Suez Canal closed, affecting oil and shipping charges. A decision was made to deflate 
the pound, which came with a host of effects including cut-backs in investment in nationalized 
industries and local authorities.31 One of the consequences of austerity was a statutory incomes 
policy. As a result, relations with the TUC became marked by distrust.32 Ultimately, the Labour 
Party was unable to resolve the contradictions implicit in its vision of growth between policies 
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aimed at planning and structural reform, and those for controlling inflation by moderating wages. 
While wages were held down early on with the voluntary support of the unions, the statutory 
imposition of a wage freeze along with deflationary financial measures alienated the TUC from 
the government.33 The opposition of trade unions became very bitter in 1969 when Labour 
published a White Paper called In Place of Strife, which set out new proposed government powers 
to impose a conciliation period before a strike could take effect and insist on a ballot of the 
membership of the union.34 
A noticeable feature of the postwar period from 1945-1970 was the ongoing battle that 
governments had with deflating the domestic economy, and then shifting the fiscal burden to 
earned income and consumption. There was no way to avoid this while the main objective was to 
ensure that London and the pound remained a top reserve currency for international trade. 
Furthermore, as the avoidance of deficits by each government in power was the constant focus of 
attention, it took away the prospects for institutional reform. There was a clear attachment to the 
national scale that persisted in both the Conservative and Labour parties. Nonetheless, the 
differences between Labour and the Conservatives were clear in the types of controls that they 
were willing to impose on the economy. How national actors approached the organization of the 
state at different scales came with costs and ultimately reflected upon the national level. This is 
explored in the next two sections. 
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The Regional Level from 1945-1970: Regional Asymmetry and Uneven Capitalist Development 
Across Britain 
 
The ‘regional question’ in Britain is hundreds of years old, stemming from the incorporation 
of Wales into the Union in 1535 and then Scotland in 1706, the struggle of Prime Minister 
Gladstone and the Liberals for Home Rule from 1886-1893, as well as the partition of Ireland into 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1922. The social movements that mobilized at 
different periods have influenced the asymmetrical evolution of the administrative and political 
organization of the British state. The intensity of struggle, moreover, has coalesced with dramatic 
changes in societal and economic circumstances. Politically, nationalist parties formed in the inter-
war years to provide an alternative to national two-party dominance but were largely ineffective 
in parliamentary affairs until their cumulative breakthrough in the 1960s.  
Decentralization to the regions was a complicated debate as partisans held overlapping 
allegiances. Factions within the Labour Party, especially the Welsh and Scottish wings, numbered 
supporters of devolution. Moreover, the STUC and Welsh unions had complex attachments to 
Labour’s approach. The interwar years and especially the Second World War had muted calls by 
nationalists for Home Rule (not least because certain continental European nationalists were open 
supporters of fascism). The dormancy of the passion for self-rule has been seen by some as a result 
of the common purpose generated by the wartime effort against the Nazis, of the process of 
rearmament that led to job creation and production in traditional industries, and the expansion of 
social services to working class people. During the post-war period, the most concerted expansion 
of social, economic and democratic rights under the aegis of Labour’s welfare state lasted for a 
few years and managed to keep devolutionists at bay. Yet, in a short time, external circumstances 
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altered the position of Britain despite domestic efforts, and the regions – being integrated in the 
way that they were – were the hardest hit.   
During the post-war period, attempts to reorganize and manage productive relations included 
national policies geared towards regional economic development, land-use, property relations, 
housing and infrastructural provision, and the regeneration of inner cities. In relation to this, we 
need to factor in territorial politics as a part of these processes, integrating bottom-up pressures 
from cities and regions in response to the above policies, but not simply to protect or enhance 
culture or language. This reveals the extent to which spatial structure is central to social struggles, 
where processes of mobilization are often quite specific to particular localities. For example, South 
Wales and Clydeside have histories of relatively combative relations between labour and capital, 
the product of a wide range of conditions characteristic of those areas.35 Class coalitions across 
space can feed into regional political mobilization, and this helps explain how devolutionary 
politics became a response to the management of combative class relations.  
1945-1951 
Uneven development is a systemic and spatial problem connected to capitalist production; it 
is often the case that economic expansion in one area is causally linked with underdevelopment in 
another. Moreover, the effects of spatial patterns of production tend to combine and become 
mediated through social struggles in civil society. As a result, policy variations are actively formed 
in the context of particular places.36 In Britain, this is often referred to as the North-South divide. 
The spatial division of labour in Britain developed at the time of its imperial height in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century when its economy became regionally differentiated along 
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sectoral specializations. Shipbuilding, iron and steel, heavy engineering, coal, cotton, jute, and 
woolen textiles were concentrated in Scotland, Wales and Northern England. The importance of 
these industries coincided with their position as exporters throughout the British Empire. At the 
same time, the territorial structure of the British economy was (and still is) demarcated by the most 
prosperous region of London and the economy of the South East area linked to the capital, wherein 
the financial sector and its associated industries were located.37 Thus, there is a tendency to speak 
about British capitalism in ‘inner-South’ versus ‘outer-North’ terms.  
It was when Britain’s relation to the international economy changed with its decline as a 
world trading power that production in these industries fell and previously dominant spatial 
structures produced a regional problem.38 The emergence of a regional problem regarding the 
organization of capitalism with an increasing disparity between regions was observable in the 
1920s and 1930s, and this resulted in the Royal Commission on the Graphical Distribution of the 
Industrial Population in 1937. The (Barlow) Commission’s Report found that the inter-war 
experience showed that heavy industries were needed less than they had been in the previous 
century, and where new industries were developed in place of traditional sectors it tended to leave 
large concentrations of population stranded, creating unhealthy urban environments.  
The Barlow Report had influenced the post-war planning model implemented by the Labour 
Party. To be sure, the geography of production was adjusted by the implementation of institutional 
structures and these were applied differently by national governments. The legislative framework 
for immediate postwar regional policy was the Distribution of Industry Act of 1945.39 The Act 
reconfigured the wartime Special Areas into Development Areas – Merseyside, the North East, 
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West Cumberland, Central Scotland and Dundee, and South Wales. These Development Areas 
(DAs) identified districts that could act as focal centres for industrial development. They also 
coincided with the Treasury’s development of Standard Regions in England to which departments 
were required to conform and operated by bringing senior regional officials together in 
coordinating committees. The first attempt at creating some form of regional coherence on the 
activities of central government departments - different from raising local governments to a 
regional level - was the division of England into ten regions during the Second World War, each 
of them responsible to a Regional Commission. They coordinated civil defense arrangements and 
the Commission held the authority to exercise full powers of government in the event of a 
breakdown of communications with London.40  
The Distribution of Industry Act gave powers to regulate the (re)location of industry and 
attract industrialists to select outer regions in response to the regional problem. Nonetheless, there 
were problems associated with it. One issue was that the system of location control only applied 
to factory industry, rather than the tertiary sector. This was problematic because the net growth of 
employment was in the service industries. Another problem was that subsidies for capital 
equipment lacked qualifications, such that capital-intensive firms using lots of machinery and very 
little labour could still get generous grants to go to a development area where it would do nothing 
to reduce local unemployment.41  
Notwithstanding the attempt to steer the economy, the traditional orientation of British 
capitalism persisted into post-war reconstruction with old sectors continuing without any serious 
reorganization. One of the reasons was that post-war conditions were favourable to traditional 
                                            
40 A. H. Hanson and Malcolm Walles, Governing Britain: A Guide-Book to Political Institutions (London: Collins 
Sons & Co., 1970), 215. An issue was that regional commissions confused and exacerbated the task of overseeing 
field services of central government and became viewed as a centralizing replacement for local government.  
41 Hall, Urban and Regional Planning, 103-104. 
 
 
59 
 
industries by giving priority to the export of materials from within their sector. The demand was 
there for ships, coal, and capital goods because economies were reconstructed after the war and 
industrial rivals were few and far between, which made it possible for world trade in manufacturing 
to increase. Another reason was the lack of investment by industrial capital. Wartime import 
controls by the Labour government protected British industry, and industrial capital showed little 
inclination to take advantage and innovate.42 After the first balance of payments crises in 1947 
industrial expansion and factory building were no longer considered priorities in the depressed 
outer regions. International market conditions attached to foreign loans prompted cuts in 
expenditure on regional policy and a relaxation of constraints on the location of export industries 
in more prosperous areas. The relaxation of controls on industrial location meant that 
manufacturing employment in growth sectors was spatially concentrated.  Established industries 
of the outer regions expanded by taking on labour and operating existing capacity to its fullest, and 
where investments were made it was in outmoded technology, rather than securing increases in 
productivity through new production methods. These regions remained dependent upon a narrow 
range of industries which masked the problems that would become so prevalent by the end of the 
1950s and early 1960s with the rise of international competition.43 Therefore, with the resolution 
of the economic crisis of 1948-1951, expansion of output and low levels of unemployment in the 
peripheral regions carried on, but the most dynamic elements of industry during these years 
remained within inner Britain where inter-war growth was also centered. 44  
The capital-labour relation was extremely influential in the form of economic and 
decentralized policy changes that were taking place. The nationalization of coal met the demands 
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of Welsh miners for example and organized labour across outer Britain, as well as the demand for 
cheaper output by industrial capital. The postwar development of the steel industry also reflected 
the political pressure of trade unions to consolidate steel employment.45 At the same time, 
manufacturing capital was able to use the nationalization of industry as an opportunity to reduce 
inward investment and pursue more profitable ventures elsewhere. Ultimately, the policies pursued 
by competing classes hindered the modernization of primary and secondary industries; both capital 
and labour appeared to have been happy with a policy that would eventually turn out to be an 
impediment to more development and innovation.  
In this sense, patterns of capitalist development should be interpreted as embodying changes 
in the organization of the processes of production as well as the spatial distribution of the activities 
in which these processes were comprised. The spatial structure of capitalist production was itself 
partly the outcome of the struggle over the processes of capitalist reorganization, but the patterns 
of growth and decline were further influenced by the institutional framework that constituted how 
jobs were relocated, resources were used, and social conditions were reproduced.46 Both 
centralization and decentralization coalesced and conflicted with each other, which made for 
complicated relations between actors at different scales of the state, as some industries were being 
nationalized and became quite centralized, whereas policies with respect to industry re-location 
implied decentralization from the central region of the South and South East. Therefore, the state 
has been important in mediating this antagonism. It will become clear by the end of this chapter 
that the attempt to decentralize production - through industry location controls and incentives to 
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invest in outer Britain - related to a larger discussion about the decentralization of political 
decision-making from Westminster to regional apparatuses. 
Just as the state was implicated in forms of intervention in the economy, there were debates 
within the Labour Party over the form and extent of decentralization that could be pursued in a 
way that was consistent with the postwar reconstruction. The Labour Party under Atlee was not 
interested in devolution. Nor did Cabinet agree to set up a Secretary of State for Wales, which 
Scotland possessed for decades. The party elite had claimed that extensive decentralization would 
not be a useful device to achieve the economic reconstruction of Wales. Labour did, however, 
agree to form a Council for Wales that would keep the discussion about devolution alive and on 
the political agenda especially by the latter half of the 1950s when the argument for a Secretary of 
State and a Welsh Office resurfaced.  
1951-1964 
When the Conservatives came back into power in 1951 they allowed the regional apparatus 
created by Labour to atrophy, to the point that by the mid-to-late 1950s most regional committees 
were discarded. Regional policy would only re-emerge after 1959, which reinforced the impression 
that decentralization was anti-Tory. This was linked to the Conservatives’ objectives in the freeing 
up of capital; there was no domestic industrial strategy except in the negative sense of facilitating 
capital export. Even then, gains were primarily in the making of foreign investments. Employment 
in the 1950s carried over the pattern of the concentration of employment in London and the South 
East, with service branches under-represented in the old industrial regions of England and Wales. 
Initially, low unemployment in the early 1950s concealed weaknesses in the continued dependence 
on heavy industry in the outer regions. The situation would be exasperated by the Tories as their 
domestic policies were aimed at striking a balance between the needs of the monopolies in 
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nationalized industries in terms of profits and overseas investment as well as the demands of the 
labour movement for continued full employment. The reality was that domestic industry was 
neglected in favour of overseas investment, which facilitated penetration of external markets, but 
in doing so the Conservatives set in motion a process of industrial dereliction as they failed to 
expand from a secure base at home.47  
Changes to Scotland and Wales’ industrial structure rapidly accelerated during the 1950s, 
with income and employment levels reflecting the regional distribution of industry. By the end of 
the decade the unsoundness of Britain’s economic position could not be ignored, as the slow rate 
of growth, sluggishness of exports, increasing seriousness of balance of payments crises, and 
inflationary trends also combined with regional imbalances.48 Until the development of the NEDC, 
the Conservatives had politically neglected regional inequality. It was thought that the strength of 
labour in the relatively full employment regions of the South East and Midlands of England, 
combined with national bargaining structures would bring all wages up. Phillip Rawkins claims 
that the emergence of regional discontent and minority-nationalist opposition to the maintenance 
of the structure of the British state and capitalism was strongly related to this process of uneven 
development. The flow of jobs away from rural places into more prosperous areas exacerbated 
marginalization elsewhere in the regions causing the breakdown of established social structures, 
particularly with the emigration of young people.49 A recession in 1958 led to an abrupt fall in the 
demand for the products of traditional industries, which led to a reduction in capacity and 
employment, especially in shipbuilding and coal mining. In addition, the reorganization of the 
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international division of labour lowered the costs of producing and exporting goods to Britain. 
This hindered South Wales, the North East of England and central Scotland from achieving 
economies of scale of their own. Lastly, the rise in demand for oil as a source of energy had 
coincided with a fall in demand for coal, and the concomitant closing of pits would mostly be in 
Scotland, the North East and South Wales.50  
Regional policy was reactivated with two acts passed in 1958 and 1960. The Distribution of 
Industry Act of 1958 was tied to development areas with high rates of unemployment rather than 
economic regions. There was an emerging regional policy as well under the 1960 Local 
Employment Act with the rate of local unemployment being the sole criterion for the designation 
of development districts. Debates centered on the role of inward investment to improve the 
performance of regional economies and tackle disparities in unemployment. As the methods that 
had to be used to restructure the economy could not entail the wholesale closure of sections of 
industry because it would cause mass unemployment, dominant groups sought to cut wages and 
have some form of economic planning (vis-à-vis the NEDC) implemented by the early 1960s.  
The NEDC consisted of six representatives from private employers, six from the trade 
unions, two from the nationalized industries (Transport and Coal), two academics, three Ministers, 
and the Director of the National Economic Development Office. This led to the establishment of 
formal machinery for consultation with individual industries, which would later be revamped and 
expanded with more authority in planning under the subsequent Labour government. The biggest 
problem with the NEDC was that it was weak in relation to the strength of the Treasury. The NEDC 
was set apart from the Treasury and Bank of England and was not designed to restructure industrial 
capital. This ultimately led organized labour to refuse to participate at the planning table. Regional 
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planning instruments thus lacked the ability to secure compliance for growth because they were 
voluntary, and this was at the heart of the problem with state intervention in Britain.51  
Despite the intensification of regional policy and diversion of new investments to the West 
and North of the country, depressed areas declined even further after the 1958 recession. The 
government’s priorities continued to be with balance of payments problems rather than planning. 
This not only impacted the quality of goods produced domestically, obstacles to growth came from 
international competition, the rising price of exports, and the loss of colonial markets and their raw 
goods to decolonization and independence.  
The planned restructuring of regional economies to make domestic industry cheaper and 
more efficient had opened an opportunity for alternative parties to gain ground in local and by-
elections in a show of disdain to the national level. Skilled workers in heavy industry as a leading 
section of the labour movement experienced a decline in employment. At the same time, a 
realignment with foreign capital was taking place that created an overdependence on branch-plant 
subsidiaries. An influx of foreign capital, particularly in the automobile industry, was gravitating 
to the reserve of unemployed workers coming from older industries, but the jobs that were provided 
were low skill and low wage. As a result, independent political action emerged with Plaid Cymru 
and the Scottish National Party (SNP) acting to challenge the broad patterns of national economic 
change that had differentially impacted the country. In fact, the mass actions that had become 
common place in the early 1960s because of the economic crisis that was maturing in the regional 
economies would take a more severe turn in the latter half of the decade. 
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1964-1970 
Until 1964, when the Labour Party regained power nationally, the Labourist approach to 
thinking about economic management had been faced with a serious dilemma after enduring 
consecutive electoral defeats between 1951 and 1959. Labourism was, for the most part, a 
centralist doctrine and anti-devolutionist. However, Labour policy was forced to evolve in 
opposition, and by the early 1960s administrative devolution was seen as a potential complement 
to the party’s traditional views of government, meaning it was compatible with parliamentary 
supremacy, as well as the Treasury’s control of the economy and regional interests.52 Leading up 
to the 1964 election the Labour Party in Wales published plans for a Welsh Secretary of State and 
Welsh Office. Though there was a shift in attitude towards decentralization at this point, the Welsh 
Office and Secretary of State had become catalysts for greater efficiency in decision-making. With 
weaknesses being attached to centralist management, administrative reform came to be viewed as 
a way to help coordinate economic development.  
Two sorts of planned economic coordination being used in France were applied in Britain in 
1965, i.e. by industrial group and by region. Regions were assigned a Regional Economic Planning 
Council (REPC) charged with the preparation of a regional study and plan. The English regions 
were the old standard regions used since WWII, while Wales and Scotland were their own regions. 
Regional development was politicized to the point that the original National Plan was published 
before any contribution from the councils could be made. In fact, REPCs were designed to be 
regionally representative, but their function was to carry out a centrally-determined policy. 
Moreover, the councils lacked political standing, formal powers or finance, and as a result many 
members resigned. Councils took on the role of lobbying for local interests, but in areas like the 
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West Midlands it became difficult to win cooperation for a policy of diverting industry from their 
own region. Subsequently, every regional council came to publish a plan for economic 
development and the government mostly rejected their recommendations.53  
As was pointed out in the first section, there were ministerial conflicts surrounding the 
government’s plans for regional economic planning. This translated into systematic problems for 
the government’s DEA, not least because there was a disconnect between having a mandate to 
produce regional plans without the capacity to implement its recommendations. On the economic 
side, it proved difficult to divide up economic planning; the short term remained the Treasury’s 
responsibility, while the long term was the responsibility of the new DEA. On the regional side, 
the work of the economic planning councils and the economic planning boards had a strong 
element of physical planning. Thus, on the planning side, the national government’s approach to 
regional development conflicted with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, because the 
new regional councils crossed over into the demarcated planning responsibilities of local 
governments. The result was that national/regional planning exercises came to an end in favour of 
the Ministry of Housing’s local-regional variety. With the DEA abolished in 1969, the work of the 
economic councils and boards shifted to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, reflecting 
the fact that future planning exercises would not be the national-regional type.54 
Regional assistance had been re-activated in the early 1960s, but it assumed greater 
prominence under Wilson, particularly to address ethno-proletarian mobilization.55 It was not a 
coincidence that unemployment in coal mining, shipbuilding and steel following the end of the 
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postwar boom related to an anti-government swing in Scotland and Northern England after 1959. 
To be sure, only after 1963 were negative controls applied to investing in areas that already had 
an abundance of jobs. The reduction of regional unemployment relied on providing incentives to 
industry to relocate. From 1952 unemployment went from a peak of 400,000 to 600,000 in 1963, 
prompting a revision of regional assistance. The 1966 Industrial Development Act replaced the 
previous Development Districts created by the Conservatives with Development Areas (DAs) and 
covered a higher proportion of the working population. Yet, even with 40% of the entire country 
cordoned off as development areas, within a year, some districts were particularly distressed. This 
convinced the Labour Party to assign a special development status to certain areas and grant them 
more financial help, which also coincided with a regional employment premium introduced to 
subsidize wages. Thus, to improve the competitive position of the DAs a Regional Employment 
Premium was introduced in 1967 as a form of a labour subsidy for manufacturing industries. 
Overall, total expenditure on regional policy increased in nominal terms from £30.3 million in 
1963-1964 to £301.5 million in 1969-1970. Yet, this did not prevent unemployment from rising in 
the DAs from 3.2% in 1964 to 4% in 1970.56 G. C. Peden points out that there were some serious 
problems with regional policy, starting with the fact that investment in development areas was 
delayed or withheld because of uncertainty felt by businessmen about the future scope and level 
of regional assistance.57 
Scotland, Wales, and the North of England were all being reorganized as subsidiary 
economies regarding industrial structure. In fact, regional policy was not geared towards the 
encouragement of indigenous enterprise rather than branch-plant manufacturing with decision-
making centres elsewhere. For example, little development of new enterprises and of employment 
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between 1958 and 1968 took place, with only 37% of employment created in new establishments 
coming from local enterprise, against 33% from the rest of Britain and 30% from overseas. By 
1968, 58% of total employment in the regions was in plants whose control lay outside of local 
conurbations. The result was to generate the perspective that there was an erosion of decision-
making powers within the areas being used as points of entry by international capital.58  
Despite attempts to create jobs in the tertiary sector; trying to improve industrial efficiency 
by investment allowances for export industries and industrial equipment; founding hi-tech 
industries with state help; an enhancement of R&D; and the redirection of investment to the 
peripheral development areas, things were never going to be the same again politically and 
economically following the 1964 election. Especially not with a day-to-day struggle to support the 
pound. Alex Cairncross points out that at some stage in the 1960s, regardless of government policy, 
devaluation was perhaps inevitable.59 With hopes of generating growth through structural reform 
and planning fading, the government attempted to impose an incomes policy on workers. Prime 
Minister Wilson became convinced of the need to reform industrial relations, which meant 
weakening the unions’ position. Labour went on to attempt to solicit compliance for wage restraint 
and impose sanctions on unions, but dissension in the party and in the TUC would push Wilson to 
reconsider.  
Pressures from below were being articulated via strikes and industrial protest and by 
employers lobbying the state. Industrial politics was intimately connected to regional policy; the 
perceived failure by successive UK governments to address economic decline led to industrial 
militancy and the re-emergence of the ‘Scottish question’. To be sure, the industrial relations 
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strategy of attempting to curb unions with In Place of Strife was central to the devolutionary shift 
in Scottish politics, according to Jim Phillips. He points out that two institutions tended to operate 
as a conduit or a proxy for opinion, articulating but also shaping it – the STUC and the Scottish 
Council for Development and Industry. In the 1960s political and industrial elites were looking for 
ways of alleviating popular concerns about slow economic activity and settled upon enhanced 
devolutionary mechanisms favouring increased control from within the Scottish Office of a more 
robust regional policy.60 
Nationalist activity became focused on administration in the 1950s and 1960s, and as 
ministries were reorganized their existence provided a stronger argument for expanding Welsh and 
Scottish-based organization. In Wales, administrative decentralization was a means to garner 
bureaucratic recognition. By contrast, Scotland had had a more extensive regional apparatus. The 
Secretary of State for Scotland represented Scotland in Cabinet and acquired an influence on the 
Scottish economy to aid with unemployment and slums. Yet it only had advice at a junior level. 
Ultimately, the state’s connection to the structure of productive capital-labour relations made 
policies involved with the restructuring of the economy fodder for labour unrest. Rising 
unemployment in peripheral regions prompted conversations about democratic devolution in order 
to control economic circumstances in the regions.  
As a result, new territorial coalitions took shape in the latter 1960s with the effects of 
rundown industries and failure of regional policy to bring new alternative employment.61 Appeals 
to the electorate by the SNP and Plaid Cymru attracted the attention of voters and especially Labour 
supporters in their own heartlands. Indeed, big changes were observed in political support for the 
nationalists as they started to modernize their parties and achieve victories like that of Plaid Cymru 
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securing its first ever national seat in 1966. Moreover, the demise of the DEA in 1969 marked the 
end of what initially was a more concerted effort at creating a regional dimension to economic 
development. The unforeseen consequences of this failure did not only affect places like Scotland 
and Wales. The loss of the DEA deprived English regional economic planning of its sponsor and 
would come to influence English regionalism in the 1970s. The politics of scale was ostensibly the 
politics of economic development and industrial relations. However, the geographical 
decentralization of production part of capital and industrial reorganization coalesced with political 
objectives at the local scale as well and is discussed below. 
 
The Local Level from 1945-1970: Urban Planning and Local Boundary Contestation across 
Britain 
 
Decentralization policies at the local level were a complicated web of attempts to influence 
urban and land development during the post-war era and they fed into larger problems of the limits 
to the planning models used to reconstruct Britain after the war. The local scale and how it was 
continuously contested in terms of its boundaries and functions prompted several official inquiries 
into democratic organization and reform. England’s and Wales’ system of local government, 
namely the administrative counties, county boroughs, municipal boroughs, urban districts, rural 
districts and parishes, dated from the nineteenth century via the Municipal Reform Act of 1835 
and the Local Government Act of 1894.62 Conflict was built into the local government system as 
major towns and cities with urban problems were unable to plan development because surrounding 
regions were controlled by other local authorities that sought different objectives. Moreover, the 
City of London and its governing body, the London County Council was at centre stage with its 
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reputation as an imperial city, and it often prevented the dispersal of local functions. The alliances 
and bargains between politicians and industrial and commercial interests meant the character of 
the LCC largely responded to countervailing political and property-owning agencies. The 
government was often reluctant to envisage radical interference with existing land use and 
especially land ownership.63  
The ‘area problem’ was not unrelated to the ‘regional problem’ described in the previous 
section. The local government model established in England and Wales became rapidly outdated 
and regionalism was one potential response to territorial strain. Services to be performed by local 
government began to increase and slowly, uniform national standards became expected, which 
highlighted how areas had failed to provide a financially secure base to build their services. Local 
government pioneered the provision of public services in a period when the national government 
offered little beyond traditional functions like defence against external attack. By the start of the 
twentieth century virtually all the services later associated with the nationally organized welfare 
state were being provided by many local authorities, such as school education, policing, public 
health, hospital care, road maintenance, water supply and sewage.64 Local government 
administrative systems in England and Wales were divided into two tier County Council and one 
tier all-purpose authorities, County Boroughs. The upper tier of local government as it emerged 
comprised Counties and County Boroughs while the lower tier comprised rural and urban districts. 
Yet in many parts of the country the distinction between urban and non-urban existed only in 
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institutional structure because urban growth and transportation changed the distribution of the 
population.65  
The main source of local finance was property tax and it was a bitter point of contention. 
There was divisiveness around the privilege accorded to ratepayers, as local politics and councils 
were often regarded as the preserve of private property owners who paid a local tax, the rate. By 
contrast, local council tenants were not viewed as legitimate local citizens, and this culture 
persisted into the 1960s.66 Welfare, housing, education, and physical planning were more 
concentrated in upper tier councils in areas under the two-tier County and District system in the 
one-tier County Borough councils in urbanized areas. While local governments gained money by 
charging for services and imposing taxes, property tax provided less yield compared to what the 
central government could collect through income taxes, especially as it drew more workers into its 
net. The problem of suburbanization made boundaries irrelevant. Towns grew and aspired to be 
County Boroughs, while existing County Boroughs struggled against the spread of population 
outwards to the suburbs, and their County Councils tried to extend boundaries to regain mobile 
populations and those fleeing rates. Boundary extensions were always opposed by suburban 
County Councils, realizing they were in a zero-sum game with Country Boroughs seeking gains 
over territory, tax base and status. The desire for boundary reform was not reciprocated by new 
suburbs.67  
During the interwar years, regionalists offered an alternative organization beyond piecemeal 
boundary changes. For regionalists the problem was that County Borough extension perpetuated 
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the divide between town and country which they saw as no longer relevant. The novelty lay in 
greater scale and consistency, which meant considering the problem of the adjustment of local 
government divisions. In the absence of readily definable British regions, the schemes differed, 
making it more a response to existing problems than a clearly defined and articulated vision. 
Overall, local government lacked balance as local units did not reflect community; people 
consumed services in one area while paying rates in another, often splitting communities into rich 
and poor. Territorial conflict between expansionist towns and conservative counties was reflected 
in the attitudes struck and the representations made whenever the structure of local government 
reached the national agenda.68 
1945-1951 
During wartime there were conversations about modernizing local government; in 1945, the 
coalition recommended that a Local Government Boundary Commission (LGBC) be created to 
examine and make recommendations for change where the issue of area and function were 
serious.69 The incoming Labour government created the LGBC but its recommendations for new 
county boroughs and new single-tier counties in urban areas were never implemented. The 
government was more focused on taking over many local government responsibilities rather than 
enhancing their powers to oversee them. By 1949 the LGBC was abolished, and reform was 
declared too impractical for the near future. The expansion of the welfare state and the onset of 
nationalized social services downgraded the question of local government reform. As services 
were being modernized and new machinery for their implementation was being developed, 
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justifications for extended boundaries and new all-purpose local governments conflicted with the 
coordination of services by the national level.70  
There were contradictions in Labour’s approach, particularly because it chose to separate 
economic development from other aspects of planning and coordination in new legislation 
concerning municipal responsibilities. The post-war local planning model coincided with regional 
economic planning policy apparatuses arising from the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act described 
above. The 1946 New Towns Act led to the creation of ad hoc ‘Development Corporations’ to 
build New Towns. Yet, there were no powers accorded to local authorities in this act; the relevant 
Minister appointed a chairman, his deputy and seven other members. The role of the new 
Corporations was strengthened by their power to finance most housing and infrastructure services, 
to select which industries they required and recruit their new inhabitants based on skills. As an 
adjunct, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act granted statutory powers to local authorities to 
plan and regulate development within their boundaries. This act allowed for a levy against private 
developers and landowners on land transactions and development, but it stopped short of providing 
local authorities a positive role in the development process. The Act only gave local authorities 
the obligation to control future developments by regulatory planning, but it did not provide extra 
resources for them. Being able to curtail unwanted development by the private sector without extra 
resources made essential development difficult. The lack of state oversight of development was 
underscored by muted attempts at administrative coordination and reform in the period.71  
The new Ministry of Town and Country Planning (MTCP) had lacked coordinating functions 
over land-use, housing and economic development, and this transpired largely because the 
Treasury viewed it with apprehension. This was further mirrored by the Ministry of Health which 
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was responsible at the time for housing and local government functions. To be sure, the defeat of 
the MTCP was also in the interest of the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Transport, each of which had concerns over maintaining their respective economic, 
agricultural land, and highway planning roles, and sought to ensure their own powers were not 
usurped. This is very relevant to a discussion of the political economy of scale because land value 
affects land use, housing, transport and other aspects of urban life, including serious spatial 
inequalities characteristic of British cities. After WWII a majority Labour government had the 
parliamentary resources to embark on land nationalization but faced powerful opposition. Land 
policy at the time had sought to give a more dominant role to the state, and owners’ rights in land 
and the maintenance of profits were to be seriously curtailed. Yet Labour was neither able nor 
willing to clash head-on with existing class structures invested in private property.72  
This made the system of planning developed after WWII the product of conflicting interests 
of class, mediated by political parties and other organizations. The 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act and the 1946 New Towns Act coalesced with the Distribution of Industry Act that 
gave powers to local authorities to try to regulate the location of industry. Combined, the major 
objectives were urban containment, the end of sprawling suburban growth, the reconstruction of 
urban centres and the creation of greater regional balance by redirecting industry away from the 
relatively prosperous South East and Midlands towards outer Britain of the North and West. Yet 
according to Peter Hall, the responsibility for urban development plan-making and development 
control in Country Borough and County authorities were separate. Cities were functionally divided 
from their hinterlands, and that made effective planning of entire urban regions impossible. Local 
authorities were balancing populations moving into urban regions and out of congested areas into 
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the suburbs, and because there was no regional coordination, there were boundary conflicts 
between conurbations and neighbouring counties.73  
1951-1964 
The principal impulse for development in the postwar era came from the private sector. Not 
simply urban but even economic planning was reactive to the private sector as subsidies for 
locating in Development Areas responded to demands from private industry, which meant there 
was also little scope to shape industry. Here we see the full impact of systemically unequal 
influences upon the political process. The ownership of land was not directly changed in favour of 
state redistribution. Fractions of capital sought to protect rural landed interests, and so traditional 
agriculture with the combined strength and influence of financial capital were able to have 
financial levy clauses on development processes removed from the 1947 Town Act when the 
Conservatives came to power. Prior to this, landowners would refuse to bring land forward for 
development without perceived incentives.74 This relates to a broader discussion of 
decentralization and devolution because the politics of place was such that urbanization had 
created a situation for local authorities that could not be accommodated by them. There were 
unsatisfactory planning procedures and inadequate resources to manage major housing shortages, 
a lack of social amenities, and problems with local employment.  
Conservative orthodoxy about local government held that local circumstances required 
decisions to be made locally and that centralized party involvement in local government was 
anathema to local needs. Nonetheless, while local decision-making seems to be one orthodox 
interpretation of local government roles, the Conservatives have strongly defended the ratepayer. 
The Conservatives’ electoral suburban strongholds were safeguarded against threats to property 
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values by preventing council housing construction. The franchise was historically denied in local 
elections and only granted to occupiers of rateable property in 1945 when Labour extended the 
franchise locally, adding eight million non-ratepaying voters to the local electorate. However, even 
with the coming of full adult suffrage in local elections in 1945 non-resident ratepayers retained 
the right to vote in local elections as late as 1969. The dominance of ratepayers rested on the idea 
that they should control local authority, while councilors should simply be trustees of the rate.75 
Between 1951 and 1960 the Conservatives undermined Labour’s attempts at positive land-
use planning by limiting the role of local authorities. The freeing up of speculative builders in the 
1950s encouraged capital to enter the property market, which resulted in higher land and housing 
prices. The Conservatives rejected Labour’s interventionist posture which was also evident in their 
land values policy, as the free market in land was partially restored in 1953-1954. State 
intervention was further eroded by dismantling the Ministry of Town and Country Planning in 
1951 and its regional offices. As the Conservatives looked to the private sector to meet physical 
development needs, regional economic and unemployment imbalances were accelerated. By the 
end of the 1950s central government was increasingly undermining the activities of local 
authorities. With local government expenditure being viewed as a major part of public expenditure, 
there was a push to control the economy by limiting the spending of local authorities. Economic 
aggregates were being pursued in the interests of better economic performance. Local authority 
expenditure was treated like private consumption or central expenditure, namely as an element of 
aggregate demand and employment.76 In 1958, the Local Government Act chose to give authorities 
a fixed sum of money out of which their expenses had to be paid, the major concern being towards 
improving efficiency. 
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The Conservatives had used a Royal (Herbert) Commission set up in 1957 to help justify the 
restructuring of the London County Council (LCC). By 1963, a new system was inaugurated, and 
it amalgamated the outer, more conservative suburbs with the core as a means of breaking Labour’s 
long-standing control of the LCC. Whereas there was a lack of will in general for local government 
reform, reforming London was perceived by the Conservatives to be in their political interest. This 
proved complicated, however, because as soon as the Herbert Commission report was accepted 
the LCC began to fight back. Pressures excluded some suburbs so that the result was a consequence 
of the interplay of partisan advantage and parliamentary bargaining. The structure of 
intergovernmental relations was more complex than appreciated and reform was more difficult 
than originally intended.77    
From 1960-1964 Conservative attitudes began to shift towards an acceptance of indicative 
planning. They would not aim to intervene extensively, but rather encourage tripartite forms of 
consultation and advice between local, central and private actors in the planning sphere. The 
Conservatives did not create the administrative structure necessary for an effective planning 
system however, and any developments in economic planning in the North East or Central 
Scotland, for example, were not related to land-use planning regionally, locally or nationally. The 
fact is that only central government could deal with the area problem; local authorities were simply 
not capable of tackling it. 
1964-1970 
On coming to power in 1964, Labour did not attempt to return to the positive land use 
planning framework of the 1940s. Espousing the ethos of the mixed economy, the government 
believed that an effective planning system could harness both public and private resources towards 
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maximizing economic growth and producing a socially just society. In the areas of housing and 
land values, the monopoly of the state was rejected, ignoring Labour’s Manifesto commitments to 
nationalize land development. However, Labour did attempt to resolve speculative development 
and reform the statutory land-use planning system. There was wide concern that British 
manufacturing was being starved of investment because of the greater profitability of land and 
property speculation that had been set in motion by the Conservatives.78 This underscores how 
determinants of economic policy are intimately connected to urban and regional development: the 
ineffectual land policies of Labour were influenced by powerful financial interests. And in fact, 
speculative property development failed to be restricted by controlling commercial rents or by 
taxing profits. Economic growth in depressed regions was made more difficult by the choice of 
political priorities influenced by the interests of British international capital. 
Regional policy was like macro-economic policy in that it was centrally determined but 
planning at a regional level required a spatial machinery and a means to link it to the planning of 
local government and its Whitehall sponsors. For Michael Keating, Labour institutionalized 
regional planning with three purposes in mind: provide a spatial dimension to the national planning 
the government was committed to; provide a framework for the diversionary regional economic 
policy; and link national policies with local government land-use strategies. As mentioned in the 
previous section, one institutional change was making the DEA responsible for drawing up 
regional strategies under regional economic councils and boards created to assist in the national 
indicative planning programme. The new responsibilities entailed partially voluntary integrated 
land-use and regional planning under regional planning bodies. The problem was that the local 
authority system needed to be altered because it lacked regional visions, whereas the regional 
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bodies had the visions but no powers. While Labour did not substantially reduce the functions of 
local government, it had little conception of the need to revitalize it, and in so far as it sought 
modernization it was in the context of promoting faster economic growth. Serious regional 
planning would challenge the old central-local division of responsibilities and to succeed, the 
centre would need to regionalize its own operations under a dominant department of territorial 
governments or give up its monopoly, sharing it with regional elites. Yet it chose neither of these.79 
In 1965-1966 a partial gap was filled in the formal machinery with economic planning 
regional councils and boards intended to deal with a different sort of planning, i.e. economic 
development in relation to the national economic plan. As soon as they were created the councils 
were immersed in spatial planning. The logic should have been apparent that it was impossible to 
produce a development strategy for an area like the North East of England without a physical 
planning component to control and guide the spatial directions of economic expansion. Planning 
and regional councils were partially focused on regional investment in relation to the National 
Plan, yet the councils and boards soon found out that they were aligned closely with spatial 
planning. The reports that were produced found opposition from local authorities, who were 
concerned that local autonomy in planning matters was being undermined by an outside body with 
a purely advisory remit to central government. Regional councils had no power while local 
authorities had the power but were unlikely to agree to a strong regional strategy.80  
It was clear that areas were extending farther than a conventional sphere of influence seen 
with the spillover of citizens into areas surrounding conurbations. Thus, urban development 
needed to reflect a wider region to match up to economic development planning, but this was not 
what transpired. Local level intervention on behalf of the national government would have required 
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a level of planned decentralization to encompass the conurbations because of the level of out 
migration that was taking place because of urban sprawl. In this way, industrial decentralization 
had large ramifications for new communities outside of the commuting range of conurbations. An 
adequate decentralization programme therefore needed to be part and parcel of both industrial 
placement as well as physical and land planning of regional areas. 
The mid-to-late 1960s saw increasing mobilization and support for regional nationalisms, 
and nationalist sentiment reflected the disdain for complacency in many parts of Wales and 
Scotland. In this period, shares of the national vote increasingly went to the SNP and Plaid Cymru. 
As a response, the national government inquired into the matter of institutional reorganization. In 
1966 two Royal Commissions were set up for England (Redcliffe-Maud) and the other for Scotland 
(Wheatley). Both reported in 1969. The Royal Commissions on local government in England and 
Wales, and in Scotland, was followed by a Royal (Kilbrandon) Commission on the Constitution 
in 1969. These were strategically separate from each other, though both had concerns regarding 
regionalism, with the result that no comprehensive review of territorial government was formally 
produced. The commissions on local government were set up to produce reforms desired by the 
centre, and the Kilbrandon Commission was set up to buy time, yet when it finally reported, the 
issue of nationalism that they hoped would have gone away actually increased. The demand for 
constitutional change varied, being much greater in Scotland than elsewhere. The existing 
structures and procedures of government differed in ways that would make adaptation to a 
common format difficult. Rather than respond to a series of pressing administrative proposals and 
political needs, central governments were not interested in comprehensive constitutional reform 
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and considered English regionalism, local government reform and devolution to Scotland 
separately and sequentially.81 
 
Coalitions of Interest and the Political Economy of Scale from 1945-1970 
 
This section draws together how competing coalitions of interest created and maintained 
political and economic scales of the state. It discusses why the national political economy of 
decentralization projects fed into larger debates regarding local and regional institutional reform. 
One argument this chapter has pursued is that we need to shift how we analyze the British system 
of governance. The tendency to see subnational levels as mere aggregates of the national level has 
done a disservice to appreciating the outcomes of partisan struggles at different scales of the state. 
After examination, this chapter has shown how different scales of the state seek to promote their 
own objectives despite national political parties dominating the political terrain of Britain. 
Traditional perspectives have missed why and how the British state was produced and reproduced 
after the war, rather than simply maintained across political parties and subnational levels.  
The chapter has questioned the image of the postwar period as simply being a ‘golden era of 
capitalism’ as it is often perceived to be. This critique also connects to ideas about politics in 
Britain reflecting an English pattern of class conflict. There is a tendency to over-stress 
homogeneity as it relates to the politics of class, treating territorial relations as benign or ignoring 
them entirely. Culture, language and an attachment to land had merged with working class 
resistance against British capital, as well as Whitehall and the majority government’s approach to 
the regional and local question. Looking at the period from 1945 to 1970 through the lens of the 
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political economy of scale, we see that there were tensions at work in creating and maintaining 
coalitions of interest to support the commitment to the national project sought by Labour. The 
beginnings of the support for devolution being pursued as a policy option was a means to break 
with the status quo, particularly because ‘planned’ capitalism and the tide of the welfare state 
project was not raising all boats equally across the regions. While calls for devolution were 
ultimately denied at the time largely because of the organization of British party politics and the 
strong attachment to national political control, the antecedents of devolution are observable in the 
postwar period (particularly at the administrative level) despite notions of consensus politics 
prevailing. Thus, in order for us to appreciate the bigger picture, and understand why it is that 
devolution becomes implemented when it did in the 1990s, we have to look at the finer details of 
scalar politics taking place after the Second World War.  
One way to appreciate how scales are contested by partisans is to reflect on the contradictory 
relationship between capitalism and democracy. What democracy looks like in terms of procedural 
decision-making is connected to how scales are designed and fought over by political and class 
actors. This has been inextricably bound to processes and outcomes associated with uneven 
capitalist development in Britain. If we reflect upon the eighteenth century British state, the system 
could be described as both constitutional and parliamentary but not in any sense democratic. It is 
interesting to note that the British monarch and his/her six or seven ministers were the executive 
but did not fully control Parliament; rather, they influenced the behaviour of sitting members via 
patronage and the formation of cliques (eventually becoming modern political parties). The initial 
rise of the party system in the nineteenth century developed out of elites attempting to control 
parliament by greater numbers grouped together. Many seem to think this was proto-democratic, 
but it was restricted to a very limited portion of the population. Parliament was based on three 
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estates of the realm – the nobility, the clergy, and the commons; nobility and clergy had 
representatives in the House of Lords while the rest of the population had the knights of the shires 
and members from parliamentary boroughs who sat in the House which was elected on an 
extremely narrow franchise until 1832. This system of government was ‘democratized’ as working 
class forces demanded that legislative and executive political institutions broaden the base of 
representation through successive extensions of the franchise, but that process took more than half 
a century, with most working men only able to vote after World War I.82  
Institutional design and reform was mediated by political parties in power and, despite their 
competing ideologies, they held similar views about where democratic decision-making in Britain 
should reside. The constitution was often interpreted to be government-centered, with the 
executive as the active and originating element, and the electorate’s role confined to choosing a 
House of Commons.83 Nonetheless, the rise of the modern state created a problem: the need to 
secure the myth of the supremacy of Parliament with a reality of executive domination. For Martin 
J. Smith, the administrative fusion of minister and parliamentary sovereignty had important 
implications for the development of British government and the distribution of power within the 
executive. A hierarchical form of government was the result. Ministerial responsibility was a 
means of reconciling the notion of democratic government with limited popular participation, and 
the establishment of departments placed policy-making in the executive away from electoral 
constraints as it created a direct chain of accountability from ministers to MPs and reserved only 
a limited role for the citizen in the process of government.84   
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 The attempts to accommodate the demands and advances of the working class through 
political liberalization would set in motion a chain of events. The competitive system that emerged 
in Britain after World War I was dominated by an uneven spread of class party politics in the 
regions. There was a strong contrast between the depressed North and the expanding South, with 
Labour support on average higher in Scotland, the North East, Lancashire and Cheshire, Yorkshire 
and Wales than in the West and East Midlands, South Central region, East Anglia, the South West, 
London and the South East. Political cleavages between North and South influenced patterns of 
party allegiance within classes, and the type of industrialization as well as the extent of economic 
distress in the interwar period were markedly different by region. The patterns of alienation from 
established authority in peripheral regions demonstrates that the local political environment has 
been relevant to regional variation in class politics.85 The regionalized support did not make 
Labour a particularly regional party, as sectional interests were socio-economic. There was, 
however, an attempt to shed its peripheral image for a national one, which made it Unionist like 
the Conservatives, seeking to gain and exercise power nationally.86 Moreover, the Labourism of 
the trade unions promoted the elevation of a British-wide working class which meant that despite 
there being some advocates in favour of Home Rule, devolution did not figure in the programmes 
of the first two Labour governments and was shelved. Part of this was electoral calculation as 
devolution would reduce the number of Scottish or Welsh Labour MPs.87 
Democratization is often considered complete with the extension of both the franchise and 
social welfare, and by association this has been taken to mean that democratization coincided with 
centralization. A problem with this line of argument is that the type of democratic citizenship 
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available to citizens was being rejected early into the post-war period.88 For example, between 
1947 and 1950 social movements coalesced into the Scottish Convention and the Scottish National 
Assembly, both of which had organizing schemes for Home Rule. These were cross-political 
means of promoting subnational interests aside from winning electoral seats. One example is the 
national Covenant - a petition to support a Scottish Parliament - and while it collected two million 
signatures it was ultimately ignored by Labour. Similarly, in 1950 the Parliament for Wales 
Campaign was launched to lobby for a parliament with adequate legislative authority in Welsh 
affairs, garnering 240,000 votes or 14% of the electorate. The type of democracy that was being 
pursued by political actors had continuously undermined calls by actors at subnational levels to 
reform regional and local administration and governance. Even so, class loyalties remained 
important for those on the left who appealed to class unity to uphold the centralized state 
structure.89 
This chapter draws attention to how the democratization of the state was playing out within 
the struggles surrounding decentralized policy institutions. For the most part, democratic scholars 
have accepted that the British constitution was adhered to by Labour and the Conservatives 
because of their acceptance of the fiscal sovereignty of Parliament over its territory. This translates 
into a belief that Parliament is the embodiment of democracy rather than a set of interrelated 
partisan political processes that also include actors in local government and regional 
administration. It is true that territorial management in the British state was far more reflective of 
Conservative-led governments and their subsequent Union ideals. To be sure, the centre seemed 
successful by ensuring that membership in the Union brought tangible economic and political 
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benefits. This was possible because nationally-organized mass parties were able to mobilize the 
electorate and colonize peripheral government and political activity. Yet a price was paid for this 
as Jim Bulpitt points out, influencing the structure of territorial politics. Maintaining external 
support systems was the highest of high politics, with successive Prime Ministers finding defence 
and foreign policy and protection of Sterling dominated their tenure. Peripheral interests were 
adversely affected more and more by external policies, as external policies favoured finance capital 
in London, rather than industrial capital in the periphery. Local authorities and peripheral working-
class communities were left to cope with problems.90  
The long history of the overt, formal exclusion of groups and individuals from political 
participation in Britain was the product of Tory and Whig policies. With the Liberals all but 
decimated at the polls for several decades following the end of the First World War, the battle to 
shape the terrain of British politics was between competing Conservative values over a strong 
executive power as the preserve of propertied classes and the aristocracy, and Labour’s collectivist 
attempt to expand the franchise and utilize parliamentary democracy as a means to assert national 
social citizenship priorities to the general public and working classes especially. The attachment 
to Parliament was particularly conflicted within the Labour Party and labour movement more 
broadly. Traditions of municipal socialism and decentralized decision-making gave way to 
centralized measures that sought to modify government machinery in a way that promoted national 
structures. Competing political visions were only more complicated by the tendency of the 
electoral system to produce one party government, making the majority control of Parliament a 
primary focus of attention.  
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The dominant ideology pursued after the Second World War added to the commitment to 
the national scale. Keynesian economic management was focused on national aggregates, and 
subsequently avoided regional and territorial dimensions of the periphery. Indeed, Labour had 
implemented a technocratic model of planning that did not go the route of industrial democracy. 
This coincided with a view that Labour had structurally altered the economy by moving away from 
private industry towards a paternalistic state that stressed the importance of public ownership.91 
As was pointed out, however, the reality was that the private sector, finance capital and the 
Treasury resisted any diminution of their powers. Nonetheless, partisan priorities ensured that 
versions of national structures were pursued, and this is what separated Labour from the 
Conservatives.  
The support for devolution to elected assemblies was not something any national party was 
willing to grant while in power and cartelizing tactics were used to marginalize any other party 
that sought to promote a concept of sovereignty that went against the centrality of Parliamentary 
government. However, this chapter points out that variations in asymmetrical administrative 
decentralization reflected the complexity of capitalist state development. Alignments to competing 
political scales were heavily influenced by working class disappointment, expressed through 
organizations like the STUC. In the immediate post-war years, the STUC maintained a progressive 
policy stance based on the unity of the wartime military alliance. Yet political changes would take 
place as the period after 1945 represented a failure of social democratic political organization for 
the outer areas of Britain, prompting political nationalism to fill a void for working class people 
who were struggling. As early as 1953 the STUC demanded of the Royal Commission on Scottish 
Affairs, the re-establishment of the Scottish Economic Conference and more direction in key 
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economic departments. While using some of the contradictions of the development of capitalism, 
social democracy was able to maneuver between the interests of capital and the working class. 
Yet, the loss of Labour votes in industrial regions of Scotland in favour of the SNP reflected the 
inroads made by the SNP among the working class, and though the post-war boom was taking 
place, Labour in Scotland was unable to avoid the issue of sentiments of the Scottish people. This 
highlights the strengths and weakness of social democracy as pragmatic political-economic 
policies did not alter existing arrangements enough to satisfy demands.92  
In the 1950s, the deepening unpopularity of the Tories in the peripheral regions was central 
to the development of regional policy in the early 1960s. The reliance on obsolete heavy industry 
in the regions led to the prompting of representatives in trade unions to argue for peripheral 
solutions to problems. With the shift of capital to England and the dependence of industries on 
state policy, political parties may have been able to militate against Home Rule at the time but the 
absorption of regional concerns into mainstream developments were not to last.93 Regional policy 
was delivered as a response to pressures from below, from those who experienced unemployment. 
Where regional policy appeared to be inadequate, industrial politics contributed to the growth of 
devolutionist pressure and the labour movement’s politics towards militancy. This would be not 
limited to the Conservatives. Working class disappointment was noticeable with respect to the 
economic management of Wilson’s government.94 Thus, the (re)production of the regional scale 
in Britain played a large part in the devolutionary politics that began to take off in the late 1960s.  
Industrial restructuring and regional policy were accompanied by demands for 
administrative decentralization and autonomy in Scotland and Wales. The Scottish voice in 
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Cabinet was able to argue Scotland’s case in expenditure matters and it provided a powerful form 
of territorial representation as compensation for having to endure centralist government. In 
Parliament, Scottish legislation was handled in special Scottish committees, without detracting 
from the right of Parliament. Adjacently, as previously mentioned, from 1964 this type of 
administrative devolution was extended to Wales with a Secretary of State and a Welsh Office. A 
misconception is that these offices were mere field offices of Whitehall departments. On the 
contrary, they were independent departments, with separate representation in Cabinet and their 
own expenditure programmes. Administrative devolution was as far as governments felt able to 
go before the 1970s in accommodating territorial distinctiveness on the mainland. The influence 
of the Welsh Office when it was created was substantial. With respect to local government it was 
a source or channel for central government power and financial provision. In its relations with 
local government the Welsh Office would operate through a network of consultation (rather than 
negotiation) with regulation as the objective.95  
The systems of administration that have come to be implemented, reformed and disbanded 
to support competing commitments to the national scale is a particularly relevant place to turn to 
as some have argued that Britain has really had no territorial departments at the centre like those 
in France, or an extensive system of field administration with civil servants. Moreover, local 
authorities were supposedly mere ad hoc agencies controlled by the centre. The way regional 
policies were implemented by the national level and the class political relations underlying them 
influenced the form of interest representation in decision-making processes. Systems of 
administration are intricately connected to dominant legislative and executive political institutions 
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that create the policies that administrative bodies implement. The dynamic between politics and 
administration plays out between partisans particularly when it concerns expanding or retracting 
functions of decision-making for implementation. Eventually, the Scottish and Welsh Offices 
would become the democratic basis for regional legislatures. The bigger discussion about politics 
and administration - especially with regard to decentralized policies and institutions that were 
continuously being reworked - is that they were part of systemic struggles for democratization. 
This tends to be forgotten by much of the postwar analysis of the so-called democratic method that 
governments in the West were employing.  
Constitutional reform was eventually investigated by Labour because of the rise of dissent 
regionally and locally due to the lack of authority invested in regional and local restructuring. The 
Royal Commissions were used to buy time and would ultimately play into the hands of regionalists 
heading into the 1970s. Moreover, the Conservatives would end up reforming local government in 
a manner that benefited them after they regained power in 1970. The reorganization of local 
government is associated with the wider crisis of the welfare state becoming urgent in the 1960s, 
and the attempt to restructure state spending was attempted in a way that would cause the least 
damage to dominant interests. The goal was to subordinate the local to the central. Some form of 
reorganization was going to happen irrespective of the party in control; yet ideology mattered, and 
state policies contributed to local level problems. In the end, no national government sought to 
reform local government boundaries and implement changes in the land use of a region as means 
to aid with economic planning. Nonetheless, local government shuffling was still used as a partisan 
tool to outflank the power bases of opponents and help to serve its own class interests.  
Subnational levels are relevant to a topic of devolution in that the creation of new 
administrative and even political bodies must recognize the municipal tradition and mandate that 
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is entrenched in Britain. Yet, the local level was almost always removed from regional reform 
exercises. The separation of local from regional reform was political. The politics of scale was 
such that any conversation about local reform without addressing the regional question and 
regional areas, was destined to fail as it would never address the structural problems of the local 
government area problem. Simultaneously, any conversation about regional government without 
implicating the reorganization of local government indicated a lack of sincerity in wanting to see 
transformation at all scales of the state. If regional government were fully implemented it would 
inevitably take over certain responsibilities of local government. What this would look like under 
a regional system required local level and regional level discussions simultaneously. The designers 
of Royal Commissions consciously separated local and regional systems from each other, and 
removed from these any discussion about their finances, leaving the national government to 
address such questions.  
Ongoing crises and unwavering commitments to national power over the economy to achieve 
partisan objectives leads into the next chapter, which examines the changes in the commitment to 
the national scale. This is especially relevant given the rise and consolidation of monetarism as an 
economic orthodoxy and how this would become even more contested by subnational scales. To 
be sure, their defeat in 1964 was a prelude to a decade-long struggle to construct a new statecraft 
strategy that would enable the Conservatives to win elections, and eventually change the 
ideological terrain of British politics as it concerned regionalism, urban development and 
macroeconomic policy.
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Chapter 3: The Struggles over Scale Commitments from 1970-1995 
  
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter examines decentralized institutional changes to the national, regional and local 
levels from 1970 to 1995. The timeframe is important because of the paradigm shift from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism in Britain, and across Western democracies more broadly. The 
previous chapter argued that partisan struggle was apparent throughout the ‘consensus’ years and 
noted how tumultuous industrial relations became the norm by the late 1960s. This atmosphere 
carried forward to the point of instability in the 1970s and influenced an attempt to politically 
restructure the British state at the end of the 1970s. At the national level, ideological factions 
pushed to the forefront of party caucuses, causing rifts and new strategic policy directions. 
Meanwhile, subnational actors constantly mobilized against the Conservative and Labour parties. 
Where reform was sought, political economy was relevant to how, if any, restructuring was taking 
place. Overall, the national level was preserved but the divisiveness of central-subnational 
relations led to constitutional changes in the 1990s. The pattern of one-party control at Westminster 
served to reinforce regionalist sentiment particularly because two-fifths of the electorate 
reproduced majority governments that determined national affairs.1  
The first two chapters argued that prominent post-war thinking about the democratic state 
placed an emphasis on national level decision-making and service provision. By contrast, this 
chapter explores continuities and discontinuities between post-war and new right politics.2 To 
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understand how and why institutional change took place in Britain from 1970-1995 in conjunction 
with an ideological paradigm shift, this chapter examines the confluence between the scalar 
reorganization of the economy and decentralized institutions. National development agendas 
impacted mobilization from below for reform, and this was associated with troubling experiences 
related to the spatial and sectoral division of labour. Placing an emphasis on the broader 
relationship between industrial political relations and policy administration, and specifically how 
decentralization was used (or sought) as a tool for economic regeneration, we uncover the 
motivations behind the movement to create legislative assemblies in Scotland and Wales in the 
1990s.  
This approach also offers the opportunity to provide a critique of what passed for democracy 
at the time. Decentralized institutions pursued after the Second World War did not entrench 
meaningful public participation in policy-making. Many of the deconcentrated institutions 
developed were not democratically elected but rather appointed by partisans. This is important 
because of their increasing policy responsibilities as the post-war period wore on. Considering 
this, it is necessary to contrast democratic opportunities associated with decentralization, both in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and then in the era of increasing austerity following the election of Margaret 
Thatcher. These contradistinctions add important nuances to debates that focus on social 
democracy versus Thatcherism. 
  
The National Level from 1970-1995: National Macroeconomic Agendas in a Globalizing World  
 
The early 1970s marked the end of the so-called golden age of sustained economic growth, 
full employment and reasonably stable prices. The changes to Britain’s economic fortunes and 
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economic policy priorities were influenced by changing world conditions, specifically increasing 
world price trends. Britain’s relatively poor performance in the world economy reflected a wide 
range of factors, including partisan economic doctrine, as well as shortcomings in company 
organization, divisive industrial relations, and regional imbalances influenced by inflationary 
pressures generated in the South East.3  
 Leading into the 1970s, the Conservatives’ statecraft strategy was internally divided. On 
one end, there was the influential MP Enoch Powell, sparking debates that influenced the course 
of Conservatism by focusing on anti-immigration and free market ideas, appealing to sections of 
the middle and working classes. For some, Powellism was the precursor to Thatcherism because 
of the alternative narrative it provided to the social democratic state. Despite Enoch Powell’s 
influence, Edward Heath proved to be more crucial to the subsequent emergence of Thatcherism.4 
His struggle to impose a new trajectory upon state institutions and the economy could not escape 
the crisis narrative that formed in association with the postwar intervention model. One 
consequence of the Conservatives’ approach to economic issues was the realignment of the 
alienated TUC with the Labour Party by the early 1970s. Indeed, from 1970 to 1974 the labour 
movement had reinvigorated itself, and the Labour Party was under pressure to revise its policy 
positions. By the mid-1970s, the parameters of intervention in the mixed economy were shifting 
to alternative methods of economic management. This context provided the emerging new right 
an opportunity to redefine British capitalism through financial deregulation, corporate 
restructuring, and a rejection of tripartism. In addition, legislation and various decentralization 
policies refocused public sector reform, industrial relations, attitudes toward European integration, 
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attempts to use quasi-non-governmental organizations to override local government, and civic 
populism in the direction of market-based citizen rights.  
1970-1974 
The Conservative Party returned to office in 1970 and experienced turbulence due to new 
strategic policy choices, domestic social forces in conflict, and changing world economic 
conditions. Their initial goal was to reduce state intervention in the economy. The first budget 
produced by the Tories departed from the previous Labour government’s by reducing income and 
corporate taxes. In addition, a cornerstone of the Conservatives’ early approach was to alter 
industrial relations by curbing wages in the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. However, British 
workers were unwilling to allow cuts to real incomes.5 At the time, Conservative Party thinking 
was that the free market should establish price stability for sustained economic growth, but within 
a year the economy began to stagnate, and unemployment rose to over one million people. 
Concomitantly, labour relations were aggravated because of the Industrial Relations Act; twenty-
four million working days were lost due to strike activity in 1972 alone.6  
Prime Minister Heath recognized early on that his approach to the management of the 
economy was not going to work and opted to change course through a series of ‘U-turns’ that went 
against the party’s manifesto. The first major U-turn was an increase in public spending and 
borrowing despite the government’s initial reduction in public expenditure. The second concerned 
the national currency when Richard Nixon ended the convertibility of the dollar by replacing it 
with floating exchange rates, and Heath chose to follow suit. Domestic economic policy was 
adversely affected by world events, specifically the inflationary OPEC oil shock in 1973. The 
experience brought the postwar boom to an end by cutting the rate of economic growth across 
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advanced industrial countries. Britain particularly endured double-digit inflation, balance of 
payments deficits and higher unemployment. The spike in oil prices acted like a tax, obliging 
importing countries to pay a premium. A third U-turn backtracked on the abandonment of ‘lame 
duck’ companies; instead of being left to the mercies of the market, struggling companies like 
Rolls Royce were nationalized and the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders were financially supported. The 
last U-turn consisted of statutory price and income controls. Moving away from voluntary 
agreements between industry and labour prompted a series of disputes particularly with the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Coal Board. Mass strikes, amplified by 
instability in Northern Ireland, convinced the Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency and 
a three-day work week. The inability to secure pay restraint brought the CBI and TUC into 
confrontation as well, especially when the government proceeded to index wages to inflation by 
legislating an incomes policy. This prompted militant action from miners, railway workers and 
dockyard workers, whereby Heath chose to dissolve the government and fight an election to gain 
a mandate to end the protests.7 These experiences united the left despite the mistrust created by 
the previous Labour government’s attempt to implement its own wages norms. Britain seemingly 
on the verge of being ungovernable added to the Labour Party’s prospects going into the 1974 
election, but the effects of the single member plurality system provided Labour with a minority 
government in the end. They too would struggle with balance of payments and financing the 
external deficit from 1974-1979, as well as industrial relations problems that would culminate in 
their own downfall. 
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1974-1979 
Early into the 1970s the Labour Party had to revise its policy positions in order to win over 
the radicalized labour movement’s support. In 1973, the TUC and the Labour Party adopted the 
Social Contract, a package of reforms in return for voluntary wage restraint by the unions. 
Following this, the Labour Party produced Labour’s Programme, committing it to import price 
controls, increased pensions, a renegotiation of terms with the European Economic Community, 
the restoration of free collective bargaining, and the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act. It was 
the most thoroughgoing set of commitments in years.8 Nonetheless, the priorities agreed to on 
paper by domestic coalitions had to contend with international forces. The 1974 election only made 
it more difficult as Labour won the first minority government to take office since 1929, with the 
balance of any electoral support being held by the Liberals, Northern Irish, independent 
Labourites, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Labour moved quickly to end the miners’ strike and reach 
a settlement, repealed the Industrial Relations Act, and froze council rents. Within six months an 
election was called and Labour was returned with a comfortable majority. Despite the far-left 
commitments made by the Labour Party caucus, Harold Wilson was ideologically committed to 
the reduction of inflation as a main macroeconomic agenda. Nonetheless, inflation rose to 24% in 
1975. In addition, productivity growth was slow. Within a year, the government failed to meet its 
main policy targets: adequate economic growth, full employment, a stable balance of payments, 
and stable prices. Indeed, consumer spending fell for the first time in twenty years, there were 
700,000 unemployed, and the balance of payments deficit was the largest ever recorded.9  
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There was a clear policy divide between the Conservatives and Labour from 1970 to 1974 
regarding industry. In contrast to the Conservatives, Labour committed itself to the Social 
Contract, which was a socialist policy that promised to nationalize the nation’s top twenty-five 
firms, create a National Enterprise Board (NEB) to undertake direct public investment and 
ownership in industry, force the private sector to sign planning agreements, and implement 
workers’ ability to issue directives to the private sector. The Labour Party also declared its 
intention to arrest the long decline Britain was experiencing by focusing on manufacturing and 
R&D. After winning re-election, however, a White Paper was produced in 1974 called The 
Regeneration of British Industry. It prompted an internal debate because of its toned-down 
language and priorities. Still, the goal of Labour was to revive British industry, and rethink 
economic planning through tripartite bargaining. The problem with their approach started with the 
fact that the NEB did not have the compulsory power to purchase companies. Moreover, 
compulsory planning agreements were never actually implemented, limiting a new direction in 
corporatist bargaining.10  
Martin Holmes points out that as Labour’s macroeconomic strategy unfolded, it fossilized 
industries like the auto sector by heavily investing in ailing companies like British Leyland and 
Chrysler UK. Several other sectors like British Airways and British Shipbuilding were 
experiencing similar problems with low productivity and a lack of competitiveness in world 
markets, and yet they also received an injection of money. One of the most pressing issues within 
industrial relations at the time was unemployment and how to best prevent the loss of jobs. 
Labour’s strategy (and the U-turns pursued by Conservatives) only artificially preserved jobs in 
industries that were in decline, reinforcing internal deficiencies in domestic industries, and 
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reflected the problems with industrial strategy overall. Hundreds of millions of pounds were 
invested in industry from 1974 to 1979 with no adequate return on capital. It prevented jobs from 
being lost but it did so without safeguarding these jobs in the long term, save without subsidy. 
Trade unionism contributed to this, as Labour did not want to appear unsupportive of working 
class jobs.11 
Two urgent economic problems were facing the government, namely inflation and the 
external deficit. With the rise of prices in the world market, Britain piled up a large trade deficit as 
domestic inflation and consumer prices were higher than those of other OECD countries. One of 
the traditional ways Labour attempted to control inflation and the balance of payments was to 
establish a wage norm because it was interested in working with both industry leaders and the 
unions to guide economic management. And that is indeed what happened; between 1975 and 
1976 there was an agreement between labour and capital through the TUC and CBI respectively 
to implement a wage ceiling.  
What differed this time around was that the challenges were so severe that the government 
had to consider options it would not have otherwise considered, i.e. monetarism, to control the 
money supply and hold prices steady. The Treasury chose to engineer an export-led recovery by 
reducing interest rates and selling Sterling to create more foreign exchange. And when the 
economic situation only worsened, the government was forced to borrow money from the IMF. 
This was a serious blow to the country because the Labour Party had to implement public 
expenditure cuts of two and half billion dollars over two years, tighten the money supply and 
decrease the exchange rate. It was a watershed moment for the future direction of macroeconomic 
policy because the government’s priority would no longer be unemployment. In fact, by the end 
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of the government’s term in office, there were discussions about targeting benefits and means-
testing social security, both of which provided ammunition to the new right.12  
Adding to the difficult domestic economic situation was Labour’s electoral volatility. One 
of the early situations that contributed to division within cabinet was entry in the European 
Economic Community. In 1970, sixty-nine Labour MPs voted with the Conservative government 
and twenty abstained. When Harold Wilson took office, one of his tasks was to support a 
referendum on staying in the EEC. He advocated for a Yes vote, and ultimately, 67% of the public 
agreed. By 1976, Labour’s parliamentary position was weakening because of defections to the 
Scottish Labour Party, by-election losses, and the high number of third party MPs. Labour had to 
broker political deals with third parties through difficult negotiations. Ulster Unionists were 
placated by the promise of a review of Northern Ireland’s representation in Westminster. The 
Liberals formed a Lib-Lab Pact with the Labour Party based on terms such as direct elections to 
the European Parliament, and devolution to Scotland and Wales. Moreover, the price of Scottish 
and Welsh nationalist parliamentary support was devolution. By 1977, it appeared that the 
economy was rebounding, and the government felt optimistic about its chances going forward.  
The veneer of stability was nothing more than a twilight.13 The reality of the situation was 
that the Labour government endured even more industrial disruption than the two major strikes 
had caused in 1972 and 1974. A wave of strikes in the private and public sector against pay policy 
took place across Britain in 1978-1979, termed the Winter of Discontent. It was the worst series 
of strikes and days lost to picketing and walk outs since 1926. One and a half million workers in 
the public sector took part in a one-day protest forcing the government to relax its policy and agree 
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to offer more to low paid workers. A gravediggers’ strike darkened the public mood as the 
deceased were left awaiting burial. These disputes were different as they inconvenienced citizens, 
blurring the lines of conflict traditionally between workers and employers.14 It resulted in the 
condemnation of both unions and the Labour Party. The dispute over incomes policy combined in 
1979 with other public issues like the failed referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales.  
In sum, the government faced the worst economic problems the country had experienced 
since WWII. The reconstruction of Labour’s policies assumed that the state could be used to 
engineer growth, though Heath chose a few years earlier to float the pound and enter the Common 
Market, increasing the country’s integration into the international economy.15 While the 
government settled with the miners and replaced the Tory’s Industrial Relations Act, it lacked the 
unity to restructure the machinery of government. The Conservatives were able to capitalize on 
the public mood as a result of the government’s handling of the Winter of Discontent, pushing for 
a vote of no confidence and ultimately forcing a general election in 1979. They persuaded the 
electorate that Keynesianism, trade unionism and an overburdened state were the primary source 
of Britain’s problems.  
1979-1997 
From 1979 to 1997 the Conservative Party enjoyed the longest uninterrupted period in office 
in British history, and Margaret Thatcher was the Prime Minister for eleven of those years. The 
outcome of the 1979 general election marked a divergence in the bases of regional electoral 
support. While the Conservative Party won support across the UK in 1979, by 1997 not a single 
Tory was elected in Scotland. Hence, the impressive majority victories achieved in 1979, 1983, 
1987 and 1992 masked drops in the Tory’s regional support, especially in Scotland. This reflected 
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the pursuit of Britain-wide neoliberal economic policies and the attempt to reconfigure the state’s 
authority through various decentralization policies.16 Under Prime Minister Thatcher, Britain 
experienced the most profound political, social and economic changes since the 1945-1950 Labour 
government led by Clement Atlee. Rebuilding the electoral base did not happen overnight, though. 
Starting from when she became party leader in 1975, Margaret Thatcher used a populist message 
to build on middle and working class discontents over the forms and results of the economic and 
political crisis-management practiced in the 1970s. Her ideological influences included think tanks 
like the Ridley Policy Group that spoke of the need to prepare against strikes by building up stocks, 
engaging non-union labour in advance, and getting police on side.17 Moreover, the return of 
neoclassical economics à la Milton Friedman was making headway with the political right, 
particularly the idea that government spending is influenced by the amount of money in 
circulation; if the government were to control and reduce the money supply, it could influence the 
level of inflation.18 
The Conservative Party incrementally unveiled and adapted monetarist policies into a core 
set of flagship policies as part of a ‘Thatcherite’ agenda. For the purposes of this section, these 
included industrial relations, privatization, financial deregulation, and integration with European 
markets. It was clear early on that she was against collectivism of any sort, and promoted values 
associated with the traditional family, British patriotism, law and order, and individualism. The 
major post-war yardsticks of Keynesian demand management like full employment, output 
growth, and the reduction of domestic inflation through centralized wage bargaining were replaced 
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by a new medium term financial strategy. Going forward, the focus was on controlling the supply 
of money in the economy alongside a reduction of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement.19 
This reflected the view that the government could no longer affect real economic variables rather 
than financial variables such as inflation.  
Early in the first Thatcher government’s mandate came the second OPEC oil shock to hit 
world markets in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. The increased price of oil created inflationary 
pressures and a major recession in Britain, inducing a rise in unemployment to nearly two million 
in 1980. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Thatcher was unwilling to return to the Edward Heath U-
turn days. The political left, by contrast, had to face an undeterred monetarist project amidst serious 
ideological divides on issues like unilateral disarmament, the EEC, nationalization and so on. 
These divisions ultimately saw the right of the party split from the Labour Party to form the Social 
Democratic party in 1981, which eventually aligned itself with the Liberals in 1982. The SDP-
Liberal alliance was so successful that it came within a few percent of overtaking Labour in the 
popular vote in the 1983 general election, which only boosted the Conservatives. Leading into that 
general election, Thatcher won additional support via nationalist sentiment garnered from the 
Falklands War victory against Argentina.  
Of the major flagship policies, those concerning industrial relations are arguably the most 
important to the Thatcher era. Prime Minister Thatcher had openly regarded the unions and 
especially the miners as the ‘enemy within’; they were the cause of economic decline.20 For this 
reason, the government took the lessons learned from the 1971 Industrial Relations Act seriously 
and used legislation to make it harder for trade unions to mobilize opposition. To be sure, there 
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was no shortage of social protest. Early in 1980 a steel worker’s strike lasted three months. In 
1981, following the release of a government budget, a prolonged civil service strike took place 
while riots in inner city areas like Brixton were happening. The main question at the time was 
whether the government’s course of action would prove disastrous, especially considering that 
unemployment had increased to over three million by 1982. It is telling that the Conservatives 
were able to challenge post-war thinking about British politics, i.e. that high unemployment would 
not result in negative electoral outcomes. In fact, the acceleration of social change in the early 
1980s only worked against the Labour Party as the labour movement struggled to avoid the 
depoliticization of unions and industrial relations.  
The Employment Act of 1980, followed by legislation in 1982 and 1984 had the cumulative 
impact of restricting unions by outlawing secondary strikes, making unions liable for damage 
claims caused by industrial actions, and by strengthening employer rights against closed shops.21 
The Conservatives presented industrial policy as the conferring of rights and liberties on individual 
trade unionists which made it difficult for union leadership to deny members new opportunities 
like the right to vote prior to a strike call, or for the election of union officials. Yet, the introduction 
of union ballots was not simply a matter of fulfilling democratic principles within unions.22 Prime 
Minister Thatcher eschewed incomes policy asserting that wages would be determined by the 
market, and rejected the ‘culture of dependency’ that the post-war state had previously created.  
One of the other flagship policies of the 1980s was the privatization of public companies and 
services, especially after 1983. The Conservatives were attracted to the idea of reducing public 
expenditure by transferring state-owned firms and industries to the private sector as a method to 
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incentivize formerly nationalized entities to seek efficiencies, as subsidies were no longer available 
to them. It removed their responsibility for wage negotiations and conflicts that would arise 
between unions and the state. Subsequently, the government received revenue by selling shares, 
supplementing the loss of revenues that came from cutting income tax rates. Other than the de-
nationalization of publicly owned assets, there was the subcontracting of government financed 
services like refuse collection and hospital cleaning.23  
Notwithstanding the political issues above, from the middle of the 1980s until her 
resignation, Margaret Thatcher was preoccupied with the European Economic Community and the 
poll-tax. In terms of the former, Tory policy was skeptical of British entry despite the support the 
party gave to it during the 1970s. There was no indication that the party would sign away the ability 
of Britain to veto common policies, but this is what happened in 1985 when Prime Minister 
Thatcher agreed to the Single European Act (SEA) and qualified majority voting on a range of 
issues related to the free movement of goods, services, capital and people.24 The Prime Minister 
believed the SEA was in Britain’s best interests, not realizing at the time how contested it would 
become in the decade that followed. The other political issue was the restructuring of the rate 
system at the local level for the funding of local services (explained more in the local scale section 
below). Upwards of 70% of the population disliked what became known as the poll-tax and it led 
to damaging campaigns (within the party and in the public) against Thatcher, culminating in her 
resignation in 1990 and John Major taking over party leadership.  
John Major continued the new right agenda by cutting trade union privileges, further 
pursuing privatization. The most important policy areas that Prime Minister Major had to address 
were inter-related: macroeconomic policy and European integration. Macroeconomic policy was 
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experiencing radical change in the 1990s because of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
Membership in the ERM tied British exchange rates into a European average with fixed exchange 
and interest rates to defend currency. Monetary policy was therefore no longer made in London, 
but in Germany by the Bundesbank. This loss of control was felt in 1992 when the ERM locked 
Britain into a high exchange rate forcing payment of the higher rates caused by German 
reunification. As a result, the domestic cost of goods increased, and the British rate of 
unemployment overtook the European average.25 
Britain in the early 1990s was the poorest of the G7 group of advanced industrial nations. 
The problem is that when monetarism was taking root in the early 1980s the boost to Sterling and 
the money supply came from North Sea oil, high interest rates, a squeeze on public spending and 
borrowing and an unemployment rate that reduced expectations on wages and price rises. What 
was less discussed at a policy level were the changes happening to the imperial orientation of 
British capitalism, specifically how the City was solely focused on servicing global capitalism. A 
large jump in capital export post-1979 was not in direct investment for example, but in financial 
institutions. This reflected the lack of a commitment to reindustrialization (discussed in the 
regional section below). As a result, public borrowing and interlocked exchange mechanisms 
became intermeshed with complex financial arrangements that were aligned internationally. It 
forced governments to guarantee global interests, and negatively fed into the structure of the 
domestic economy.26  
With the economy impacted by the institutional transformation in financial services, there 
was a drastic change in the relations between the market and the state, resulting from altered 
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regulatory arrangements implemented by the Conservatives. The Bank of England was the major 
promoter of regulatory change in the 1980s, and London’s status allowed the Bank to play a 
leading role in the international community of central bankers. As Michael Moran argues, the so-
called financial services revolution was not a functional change between the needs of key 
international actors, but more of a new relationship between the state and financial markets in a 
capitalist world.27 The state was actively involved in the diffusion of new international agreements 
and privileged particular forms of labour, most of which were spatially concentrated. The largest 
financial centres accounted for nearly 60% of financial service employment by the end of the 
1980s, and the most important was London followed by the conurbations of Birmingham, 
Manchester and Edinburgh.  
An adjacent process was the corporate restructuring of international finance, brought about 
by government-inspired regulatory shifts, intensifying the concentration of finance in the South 
and East of the country. Professional, technical and senior management personnel required to 
develop and administer the new services were placed in and around the heart of London. 
Rationalization subsequently took place in Northern markets characterized by slow growth in 
incomes. From post-war Bretton Woods to the dismantling of regulation in Britain, the 
Conservatives oversaw the removal of foreign exchange controls in 1979 and restrictions on 
consumer credit in 1982, the introduction of Mortgage Interest Relief at Source, reform to housing 
finance in 1983, the Composite Rate Tax extended to banks in 1984, and changes in pension 
legislation and personal taxation to draw insurance companies into mainstream personal 
investment markets. This provided freedom for financial institutions to operate within the domestic 
and global markets. Moreover, the flagship of deregulation was the Financial Services Act of 1986 
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that in combination with previous legislation swept away direct controls, liberalizing finance.28 As 
noted above, the destabilizing effects of the Act became clear in the 1990s when Britain could not 
adjust to the ERM.  
The culmination of deregulation of the City of London only served to overheat the British 
economy. The outcome was ‘Black Wednesday’ and the forced withdrawal of Britain from the 
ERM; speculation against Sterling came as a result along with devaluation of the pound. The 
estimated cost to the economy ran between three and four billion pounds, along with the domestic 
impact of controlled spending and constraints on social services like the NHS. Both politically and 
in public attitudes, Britain’s always latent Euroscepticism was aggravated by these developments. 
More recent events such as Brexit harken back to the mid-1990s and even to the referendum on 
entry in 1975.  Nonetheless, despite experiences like Black Wednesday, the Maastricht agreement 
of 1992 was a step towards integration.  
In all, there were strong continuities between Margaret Thatcher and John Major, particularly 
regarding structural trends, policy and ideology. This makes it useful to think of post—1979 
Conservatism more holistically.29 Meanwhile, the re-imagining of the Labour Party while in 
opposition helped it articulate a new persona for a new age. This would aid them by 1997 when 
the party returned to government, but not without the enduring legacy of Thatcherism conditioning 
the discursive foundation of policy-making going into the new millennium. The next chapter 
delves into the complex reality that came about under the new Labour Party. A new consensus was 
not simply replaced by an old one. There are differences in partisan alignments that are best 
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observed in the politics of scale, even if the dominant new right paradigm replaced post-war social 
democracy. 
 
The Regional Level from 1970-1995: Subnational Spatial-Sectoral Variations, Regional Policies, 
and the Scalar Politics of Devolution 
 
There is a common idea that the politics of devolution picked up in the 1970s because 
Scottish and Welsh nationalists were dissatisfied with state intervention in the regions. However, 
there are competing interpretations about what state intervention represents. Moreover, the role of 
class politics tends to be ignored as an influential factor behind the mobilization of devolutionists 
and secessionists. This section indicates how class relations and politics informed regional contests 
and the politics of scale. It describes the spatial and sectoral aspects of industrial organization and 
de-industrialization in the 1970s and early 1980s. This is followed by an examination of regional 
policies and apparatuses from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. Lastly, the role of industrial politics on 
the prospects for devolution are described from the 1970s to the mid-1990s.  
There were conflicting tensions and dilemmas associated with regional and local scale 
policies. This speaks to the competition between policy paradigms, and how political-economic 
pressures were filtered through the prevailing ideological climate. Uneven geographical and spatial 
divisions of labour were perpetuated by British and global capitalism, and presented opportunities 
for the growth of regional and nationalist political movements.30 Devolutionary governance 
emerged from the interplay between elite and ordinary actors, parties and movements, some of 
which actively opposed political forms of devolution while favouring administrative 
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components.31 Political parties, primarily Labour, tried in power to offset the costs of de-
industrialization by offering up new institutions to address rising social problems. However, the 
paradox was that state actors contributed to economic restructuring as well as the negative effects 
associated with it. The push from below for democratizing regional institutions built upon the 
momentum of industrial struggles and workers facing unemployment. Workers in coal mines, steel 
mills, shipyards and branch-plant industries influenced the adoption of devolution in labour 
organizations like the STUC as well as in the business community via the SCDI. Devolution was 
framed in a broader ideological struggle taking place in a period of transition from social 
democracy to neoliberalism, and competing narratives approached devolution as a means for 
economic development and/or for purposes of social justice.  
According to Bob Rowthorn, there was an almost continuous fall in the number of people 
employed in agriculture from 1946-1983, going from an already low 1.8 million in 1946 to under 
1 million in 1983. Over the same period employment in the service sector rose dramatically from 
under 10 million to over 14 million.32 Moreover, from 1952-1981 employment in manufacturing 
(including the nationalized industries of coal mining and shipbuilding) declined in the country, 
accounting for 80% of the total loss of jobs in Britain.33 De-industrialization in the Keynesian era 
was defined as the failure of a country or region to secure a rate of growth of output and net exports 
to sustain full employment. Prominence tends to be given to the manufacturing sector because of 
the reliance on manufacturing activities as a source of net exports and employment. The pace of 
de-industrialization and its consequences differed between regions in large part because of the 
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inherited regional characteristics going back to the Victorian era. The regions suffering above 
average rates of de-industrialization were Northern Ireland, West Midlands, Scotland, Wales, and 
Yorkshire and Humberside. Those experiencing below average rates of de-industrialization were 
East Anglia, the South West, the South East and the East Midlands. This was reinforced by the 
steady flow of net migration of technical, professional and skilled people to Southern and Eastern 
areas of Britain.34  
 Another factor contributing to geographical inequality and de-industrialization was the 
attempt to modernize production, premised on financial restructuring and technological updates to 
private manufacturing, as well as the rationalization of heavy basic sectors.35 This was also 
reflective of the changes being made to service industries as producer services completely 
dominated private sector growth in service employment. Simultaneously, new jobs were created 
and filled by women in the tertiary sector, consisting of part-time employment and focused on 
semi or unskilled labour. These jobs paid a lower wage than the male dominated full-time 
unionized jobs in the secondary sector. In fact, there was an inability to attract new manufacturing 
firms in areas that were traditionally male dominated, and this magnified the gender dimensions 
of employment. Women’s employment increased by nearly two million from 1951-1971, while 
men’s employment declined by roughly three hundred thousand. This only increased from 1971-
1981, as women obtained an additional three hundred thousand jobs, whereas men lost over three 
million. Overall, Felicity Henwood and Sally Wyatt point out that these numbers are both a 
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reflection of the increasing opportunities in the services industries, as well as the absolute decline 
in the number of men in paid work.36  
 Ultimately, the types of so-called ‘new’ manufacturing investment leading into the 1970s 
proved vulnerable to closure. The lack of investment in manufacturing was heavily connected to 
the state’s macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policies; capital and the British state often 
responded to crises in the economy by cutting industrial capacity, investment and employment. 
Moreover, there were problems associated with the ownership and control of enterprises in key 
sectors that lie outside peripheral regions. For example, Scotland developed a branch plant and 
subsidiary economy that gradually eroded local decisions concerning the Scottish economy. The 
large American component in the Scottish manufacturing sector tended to feed global fluctuations 
into the region quickly, to the point that a recession in the United States at the turn of the 1970s 
generated a concomitant recession in the Scottish secondary sector, because exports from Scottish 
branches and subsidiaries to American parent companies fell off.37  
 In the 1970s there was an erosion in industrial capacity and employment because of 
disinvestment by private capital, and particularly when international competition intensified in 
association with the first OPEC oil shock. The branch plants set up to produce commodities 
experienced reduced levels of capacity in response to falling demand or they closed altogether. By 
1975-1976, employment decline went beyond traditional industries and began to include those 
associated with clothing, textiles and electrical engineering, and a relocation of jobs to areas with 
cheaper labour. The level of employment fell by a million between 1973 and 1981. The situation 
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with the IMF between 1975-1976 only made things worse as there were conditions attached to the 
loan agreement to restructure industry and cut public expenditure.  
Numerous scholars argue that the accelerated break-up of workforces led to the re-creation 
of labour reserves. Changes to the productive processes of capitalism were not simply a result of 
some neutral desire for technical advance. A form of spatial division of labour was associated with 
sectoral specialization, meaning the organization of production structured the patterns of regional 
differentiation, decline and unemployment.38 This speaks against the idea that the development 
and enhancement of regional administration in the post-war period was a consequence of the 
expansion of the welfare state. In contrast, I join those who argue that regional planning is a 
specific form of spatial and institutional intervention in the economy: regional policy has the 
ideological role of legitimating the position of government at the national level by demonstrating 
concern for peripheral regions.39 A complementary argument is that state intervention has always 
benefited private capital.40 The point of enticing enterprises by offering incentives plays the role 
of inducing firms to locate in specific Development Areas. Even where intervention was presented 
in terms of a social welfare rationale there were ideological motivations behind the actions of state 
actors; the presentation of state aid as a form of welfare plays down the local impact of the 
extension of capitalism. The relocation of industry was not wholesale, but rather a portion of the 
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supply chain that only fed cheap labour into the productive process. Meanwhile, managers and 
decision-makers remained in the core of the economic heartland of Britain.  
There was little integration of industrial development into the broader economic structure of 
Britain, creating class differentiation between core and periphery as well as between growth 
enclaves and the marginalized areas within the periphery. In Wales for example, there was in-
migration of relatively affluent individuals in middle management from England, affecting its own 
indigenous middle class. Political nationalism arose as a reaction in order to improve local 
situations.41 Between 1972 and 1979 spatial policy changed in form and became less important in 
relation to national economic agendas. This subordination began with an increased sectoral 
emphasis behind the Conservative’s Industry and Finance Act and then continued into Labour’s 
industrial strategy. The proportion of state financial aid to industry awarded on regional grounds 
decreased substantially.42  
Throughout the postwar period asymmetrical deconcentrated and decentralized institutions 
were used to influence regional economic development in ad hoc ways, transferring certain powers 
from the centre to the regions. The following characterization draws on Brian Hogwood (1982) 
and James Mitchell (2009) to provide an explanation of some of the core operational differences 
between policies and institutions in Britain during the period under consideration. In the 1960s 
deconcentration operated top-down rather than horizontally, and this changed somewhat in the 
1970s when regional offices came to incorporate some discretion over selective assistance to areas 
in their boundaries. For example, regional offices of the Department of Trade and Industry in the 
North West, Yorkshire and Humberside regions of England (as well as in Scotland and Wales) 
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were given authority to approve assistance in individual cases. Regional offices in various regions 
with assisted areas had some autonomy though this was limited by the fact that they were not given 
set budgets to steer industry within and between regions. This was most pronounced in England 
because it had no agencies corresponding to those in Scotland and Wales. England had a system 
of administering regional and industrial policy that differed from other parts of the UK after 1979, 
but there was no uniform system of administering regional and industrial policy.  
By contrast, Scotland and Wales already had asymmetrical forms of decentralization. The 
Scottish Office controlled physical, land-use planning functions. Moreover, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland had the responsibility of drawing up regional plans. In the 1970s, the Scottish Office 
had an economic and statistics unit, a Development Department, a Home and Health Department, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as an Education Department. In 1973, a Scottish Economic 
Planning Department was set up to take over regional development from other jurisdictions within 
the Scottish Office. On the other hand, the existence of the Welsh Office complicated territorial 
management. An idea for a Council for Wales was discussed in Cabinet in the late 1960s and a 
committee was also set up to examine the prospect of devolution to Wales. The Scottish Office 
feared the precedent set by establishing a Council for Wales even though it was an organ of local 
government and would merely complement the Welsh Office. There were simultaneous concerns 
coming from England.43   
The ad hoc nature of deconcentration and decentralization by the mid-1970s consisted of the 
transfer of selective regional assistance from the national level to the regions. The Scottish and 
Welsh Offices had the responsibility of overseeing industrial investment, industrial promotion, 
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factory construction and management. The power to administer this selective assistance was 
delegated by the national Treasury to the Scottish and Welsh offices. These arrangements evolved 
in the 1970s and 1980s and were neither clearly nor neatly defined but consisted of degrees of 
autonomy. Overall, despite any new apparatuses added to pre-existing ones, they would not be 
accountable to the devolved assemblies being discussed at the time (described in detail in the next 
section). The partisans designing the prospective Scottish and Welsh legislative bodies ensured 
that industrial development and finance would remain at Westminster. Indeed, the management of 
regional economic policy would be shaped in Whitehall without reference to new devolved 
Assemblies if they were created. The perspective that regional democracy should be equipped with 
wider powers was thus not compatible with the formulation and implementation of a coherent 
national plan. Ultimately, decentralization in Scotland and Wales did not equate to more 
autonomy. Other variables like political economy were important factors in institutional design.44 
The threat of the SNP was not the only reason why devolution was put on the agenda. This 
dissertation in fact places devolution within a broader context of class relations. As Phillips (2009) 
has shown, workers’ expectations were raised by post-war economic growth; given their increased 
numerical strength in unions, they were not prepared to tolerate unemployment. The desire for 
enhanced regional economic policies shifted to political devolution where actors at different scales, 
including UK governments, employers and trade unionists, all sought it as a mechanism to 
ameliorate economic and social problems associated with unemployment.45  
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1970-1974 
 The following will draw from Jim Phillips’ seminal study entitled Industrial Politics of 
Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1970, self-government impacted Scottish and 
British politics for the rest of the decade. When the Conservatives returned to office in 1970 they 
brought a different approach to regional questions and this was relevant to the mobilization of 
various actors in support of devolution. The Labour Party ignored regional problems from 1964-
1970 and the Conservatives used this failure to promote a free market-oriented approach to 
economic policy and industrial relations. The irony is that the Conservative Party ended up 
alienating workers and employers with this approach. Regional capitalists realized that Prime 
Minister Heath favoured multi-national investment and would not subsidize lame duck enterprises. 
This shifted their attitudes toward devolution, as well as the manufacturing sector. The difference 
was that organized labour pushed for legislative rather than administrative devolution, whereas the 
business community viewed the partisan composition of such a legislature as being hostile to 
capitalism. 
 Edward Heath’s attempt to reform industrial relations while withdrawing public subsidies 
led to mass mobilization. When the Industrial Relations Bill was passed, 200,000 workers went on 
strike across Clydeside for a full day. The government ended up reversing its position, but it never 
took the necessary steps to reform the shipyards industry. The movement from below was 
increasingly meshing class politics with Home Rule. For example, a Scottish assembly was 
convened in 1972 by the STUC in Edinburgh and encompassed a broad social and political base, 
including representatives from four City, twenty-one County and one hundred and twenty-three 
District Councils, as well as representatives from the CBI in Scotland. The assembly was a 
landmark even if its cross-class alliance was fragile. For the most part, the workers were central to 
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devolutionary politics because of the unease that people felt about the local and national economy. 
The left organized a culture of mutual support across industries to criticize the remote 
administration and political power in London.46  
Oil added another dimension to devolution in Scotland when the SNP argued that royalties 
should be used to prop up Scottish entrepreneurial potential and improve social welfare. In 1972 
the campaign It’s Scotland’s Oil coincided with the Israeli-Arab War and the quadrupling of oil 
prices, boosting the popularity of devolution to new heights.47 In addition, as was mentioned in the 
last chapter, the Royal Commission on the Constitution set up in the 1960s finally published its 
recommendations in 1973. The proposal with the most backing consisted of legislative devolution 
to Scotland and Wales with powers transferred to the regions to enact legislation, while reserving 
power at Westminster to legislate for the regions on any matter. Their unicameral assemblies 
would be elected by a form of proportional representation, the single transferable vote. Ultimately, 
the Conservative government declined to implement the scheme, and the Scottish Conservative 
conference abandoned any prospect of it the same year the reports were released.48 As Mitchell 
(2009) mentions, the timing of the report proved important because shortly thereafter Labour lost 
a by-election to the SNP. With the future of the country at stake, devolution became the most 
important constitutional issue since the Republic of Ireland seceded from the UK. The severity of 
the situation was not initially appreciated, as just days prior to the release of the reports the Labour 
Party issued a booklet opposing devolution. Despite contradicting itself, Labour made a quick 
turnaround to adopt a scheme in support of the Kilbrandon Commission.49  
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1974-1979 
 The politicization of devolution turned enough heads nationally to legitimize the 
fundamental aim of self-government. In 1974, a White Paper was released by the Labour 
government called Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales, and the next 
day an election was called. The SNP was popular enough to win eleven seats and to come in second 
to Labour in thirty-five of the forty-one seats Labour won. This clearly did not go unnoticed as 
Labour released another White Paper in 1975 called Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to 
Scotland and Wales. It proposed the creation of assemblies for Scotland and Wales, elected by 
simply majority rather than some variation of proportional representation. In Scotland, the 
assembly would have law-making powers on matters like local government, health, social services, 
education, housing, physical planning, the environment and roads. The executive would be drawn 
from the assembly and headed by a chief executive. In Wales, the assembly would be given 
responsibility for executive functions carried out by the Secretary of State for Wales rather than 
have its own legislative authority. Overall, Westminster and the government of the day retained 
overriding authority over both assemblies.50  
 Devolution made a leap forward in 1976 starting with Devolution to Scotland and Wales: 
Supplementary Statement that was to be supplemental to the initial Scotland and Wales Bill of 
1976. It moved into committee stage where the government sought a guillotine (aka a timetable) 
motion, but internal party defections and abstentions in the Labour Party denied this, and 
subsequently the bill was dropped in 1977. Devolution debates were hostile enough for MPs to 
break away to form a separate Scottish Labour Party in 1976. By 1977, Prime Minister Callaghan 
was on the verge of facing a motion of no-confidence as the government’s majority was weakened 
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by by-election losses and defections. He then negotiated with the Liberals to form a Lib-Lab Pact, 
which managed to buy the government some time and life.51 Two separate bills concerning 
devolution were then reintroduced in 1978: the Scotland Act and the Wales Act. They both went 
to a second reading and were carried by Liberal Party support as well as Labour MPs realizing the 
life of government was on the line.52 Many amendments were made to these bills at the committee 
stage, such as the introduction of two simultaneous referendums on the matter. If this was not 
enough of a blow to the devolutionists given the uncertain outcomes of referendums, a Labour 
backbencher introduced an amendment requiring that 40% of all eligible voters actually cast a Yes 
vote for the referendums to pass. In the end, the bills received royal assent in 1978.  
It was a momentous achievement for those who fought for devolution, but the politics of 
devolution was very clear in the specifics of their respective institutional designs. Interestingly, 
the Secretaries of State were chosen to remain as a part of Westminster. In addition, along with 
new members who would be separately elected to the new assemblies, the existing one hundred 
and eight MPs elected in Scotland and Wales would remain in Westminster as well. Here we can 
clearly see the strategic nature of the relationship the Labour Party had with the regions as it needed 
the support of MPs from Scotland and Wales. This was an additional blow to England given that 
Scotland and Wales were already over-represented in the national parliament. However, the trade-
offs were also substantial for the Celtic regions. To be sure, economic and financial powers were 
going to remain centralized along with the civil service. Moreover, the centre would have the 
reserve power to legislate over devolved competencies and jurisdictions. The reservation powers 
retained importance because the centre had financial provisions that would limit devolution. Tax 
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powers would be rejected beyond the ability to levy a surcharge onto local taxation. This meant 
that the national Treasury controlled spending powers.53 
 The prospects of devolution were complicated by the divisiveness between the contending 
sides. The devolution referenda ultimately reflected this when both failed to produce the necessary 
numbers and results. The details are vital here. In Scotland, those who showed up voted in favour 
of devolution by a margin of 51.6% to 48.4%. Yet, only 32.9% of the electorate voted, thus missing 
the 40% mark. In contrast, only 11.8% of the eligible electors (20.3% of those who cast a ballot) 
voted in favour of devolution in Wales.  
In the end, the referendum process itself merits some reflection. Prior to the devolution 
referenda there were only two other major referenda in modern British history, the first regarding 
Northern Ireland and whether it should remain part of the UK in 1973, and the other in 1975 
regarding the EEC. British politicians viewed direct democracy as an abrogation of parliamentary 
supremacy. The surrounding political tactics showed the lengths partisans would go to in order to 
deny devolution. Labour had promised to legislate on devolution which arguably meant it had a 
mandate, whereas the other side of the argument is that a major constitutional change required 
public consultation. Opponents were able to jump on the opportunity and use the referenda as 
chance to defeat devolution. Ultimately, Labour lacked the political will to support the referenda. 
For example, it was up to private funding to fill publicity and information gaps, and efforts for 
these campaigns were minor at the national level in comparison to the EEC referendum that Prime 
Minister Wilson had supported in 1975.54   
According to James Kellas, the arguments brought to bear on the outcome revolved around 
majorities and democracy; analogies were drawn between the 33% of the electorate voting in 
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Scotland and the comparable mandates achieved by the government in different British elections. 
Meanwhile, there were others indicating that the low turnout in Wales put to rest any public desire 
for devolution.55 In the long run, it is somewhat unfair to place the blame on only the Labour 
government for the outcome. Opponents of the government’s policy regarding devolution were 
influential in having a referendum qualification attached to the legislation to secure their support 
and have the bill achieve royal assent in the first place. There is no doubt that the Labour Party’s 
lack of unity and support negatively affect the outcomes, but the Conservatives almost entirely 
campaigned on the No side, meaning any chance for devolution fell on parties like the SNP, Plaid 
Cymru, the Liberals and Labour. The No side actively argued that devolution would hinder 
capitalist enterprise as well as local government powers and functions. The Yes side faced a 
broader difficulty on the left in having to attenuate divisions regarding devolution and the 
prospects for a national labour movement.56 After the referenda experiences, the SNP voted with 
the Conservatives to bring the government down. Only after defeat in 1979 did the Labour Party 
decisively move towards a clearer commitment to Home Rule.  
1979-1995 
 The spatial and sectoral organization of capitalism from 1979 to the mid-1990s reflected 
the transition to a neoliberal market, and this influenced political and class alliances nationally, 
regionally, and locally. From the mid-1970s, a new phase of uneven economic development 
appeared in Britain, profoundly impacting the geography of socio-economic inequality.57 The 
concern was that there were contrasts in both sectors and in unemployment within the regions, not 
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only between them. The qualitative dimensions of uneven spatial development went beyond an 
overreliance on traditional industry, encompassing externally controlled branch-plant factories, 
low innovation potential, poor capacity for firms to develop, an insignificant business services 
sector, and a small proportion of professional and managerial employment. The new geography of 
depression that superimposed itself on the traditional North-South pattern produced two new 
spatial problems. The first was the urban-rural shift, consisting of the decline of manufacturing 
employment in the conurbations and the emergence of small towns and rural areas as sites of 
employment growth. The conurbations irrespective of the North-South dichotomy, experienced 
unemployment problems almost as intractable as those of the traditional assisted areas. The second 
spatial problem concerned the emergence of pervasive industrial decline in two regions: the West 
Midlands and the North West, which were Britain’s major manufacturing regions.58  
 Local labour markets displayed intersections of social composition including blue-collar 
proletarian localities, white-collar proletarian localities, service-class localities, socially 
heterogeneous localities, class-divided localities and underclass localities.59 One important 
dimension of the shift in diverse local labour markets was the reorganization of work across a 
range of industries. These included a reduction of core workforces, an increased emphasis on sub-
contracting, growing importance of technical and managerial grades, and the tendency to by-pass 
trade unions. Another dimension was the decline in blue-collar working-class occupations and 
rapid replacement by a growing service class. In the Northwest of England for example, old 
industrial towns suffered the brunt of de-industrialization with manufacturing employment falling 
47% from 1979 to 1993. The dependence on international markets had a severe effect on local 
                                            
58 Kevin Morgan, “Regional Regeneration in Britain: the Territorial Imperative and the Conservative State,” Political 
Studies 33 (1985): 561.  
59 Philip Cooke, “The Changing Urban and Regional System in the United Kingdom,” Regional Studies 20, 3 (1986): 
246.  
 
 
125 
 
areas dependent on manufacturing industries as exports needed to increase to maintain 
employment. Yet, the capacity to sustain export expansion was missing. Both national policies and 
the role of capital investment by manufacturers contributed to this. By 1983, British private 
investment going overseas was double the value of gross fixed investment in manufacturing in 
Britain, and twice as much coming into Britain.60  
 Job creation was skewed to the more prosperous regions rather than those experiencing 
manufacturing decline, and this reflected corporate office restructuring and the financial services 
revolution in the South. The argument was that service jobs would ameliorate the regional impact 
of deindustrialization, yet in Britain, the phenomenon generated a spatially uneven distribution of 
growth. Spurred on by government policies designed to create an open international market for 
financial services, foreign institutions chose to expand in London. Three times as many jobs were 
created in the financial sector of the capital from 1981 to 1987 from the previous decade. The 
growth in London also encouraged the spatial decentralization of back office and head office 
administration including the movement of managerial staff to the greater South East and areas like 
East Anglia.61  
The regions remained heavily reliant on external capital well into the 1990s. By 1996, 
foreign owned businesses accounted for 33% of all manufacturing jobs in Wales; in the previous 
year, manufacturing output grew by over 40% which was more than double the UK rate. One of 
the changes involved localizing branch plants with foreign investments shifting how global-local 
interactions and development in the region was taking place. By the end of the1990s, it was clear 
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that traditional regional policy and institutional apparatuses were ill equipped to strike a better 
balance between foreign and indigenous enterprises, which meant that the bottom-up movements 
seeking locally attuned infrastructure could elevate the need for empowered regional institutions 
to design and implement policies for regional economic needs.62  
 Regional policy coincided with new right interpretations of economic management. 
Regional policy historically sought to reduce unemployment rates in peripheral regions by offering 
subsidies to induce mobile capital to relocate. It was always geared to capital incentives. Yet Prime 
Minister Thatcher eschewed pre-1979 regional policy and dismantled important mechanisms 
promoting regional economic development. One of the most visible features, namely the Regional 
Economic Planning Councils, were abolished in 1979, and spending on regional policy was 
reduced.63 This suggested that the government did not care if pre-war special areas still made up 
45% of the British working population, serving as a reminder that the enduring geography of 
structural unemployment was influenced by national scale partisans.64 The landscape of regional 
policy changed in 1983 with the introduction of the White Paper Regional Industrial Development, 
indicating that regional industrial policy did not have a self-evident economic case. Grant 
availability would be reduced as well as the grants provided for firms locating in certain areas. The 
downgrading of regional policy was justified by the idea that investment decisions should be made 
by businesses, not the government.65 This set of phased cuts to the regional budget was followed 
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by two more from 1987-1988 and then again in 1993. The government used the control of public 
expenditure as a strategy to enable market forces to determine which firms would survive.  
Ron Martin and Peter Townroe explain that major shifts in regional (and industrial) policy 
were connected to the privatization of public sector industries and utilities mostly after 1983. The 
government continuously sought to remove sources of representation in the regions and focused 
on local authorities creating a climate conducive to enterprise. An example of this approach was 
the Enterprise Zones that were used to liberate private enterprise from regulation, including 
planning, rate relief, capital allocations, and exemption from development land tax. While regional 
policy and industrial policy were unconcerned with shaping national and regional economic 
growth through a specified development approach, there was a concomitant shift towards urban 
assistance that made up half of the government aid going to depressed regions. This was part of 
the trend towards central government localism in area assistance: urban development corporations, 
urban-based enterprise zones, and urban task force areas were all locally based. With the slimming 
down of regional policy, local government initiatives proliferated in the promotion and the 
restructuring of local economies by having cities compete for capital.66 On the one hand, the 
government undermined local authorities by transferring powers to alternative agencies, and on 
the other, the vacuum created by the lack of regional policy created a need for local intervention. 
Still, local economic restructuring lacked regional governance and coordination.  
 On the administrative side, the Welsh and Scottish Offices and their satellite agencies 
reflected the political order of the 1980s. The Scottish Development Agency was actually 
supported by the Treasury, which was surprising given its hostility to regional industrial policy 
and state intervention in the economy. The reason was the SDA never operated as an instrument 
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of public ownership or industrial planning, and so the bulk of the resources and direction came 
from the national level. By the end of the 1980s its mandate continued to be the regeneration of 
the Scottish economy. It eventually turned into Scottish Enterprise and was used to coordinate 
Local Enterprise Companies in the 1990s. Like the Scottish Office, the Welsh Office had no 
authority to resist national policy initiatives, but it could tailor them to local specifics. The Welsh 
Office was influenced by politics from 1979-1997. Though the Conservatives were the minority 
party in Wales they were able to extend their influence there by appointing the boards of dozens 
of organizations that operated on behalf of the Welsh Office. The party with the most votes and 
seats in Wales – Labour – had no role in setting priorities for the Welsh Office. The Welsh 
Development Agency by contrast, had an economic regional governance capacity that had no 
parallel in England. The difference was that strategies could be fashioned in Wales between 
organized interests like the Welsh TUC, the CBI and local authorities. This became an issue from 
1993-1995 when leading Thatcherite John Redwood tried to overturn existing priorities of the 
Welsh Office with a new right-wing agenda. As a result, there was public outcry to make it 
democratically elected.67  
 The most innovative economic development in the 1990s came from experiments at the 
local and regional levels from the belief that stronger regional governance capacity could 
encourage robust forms of regional development. The capacity to design and deliver policies 
attuned to the needs of a regional economy is important to a country’s regional policy repertoire, 
but this depends on the degree to which political power is devolved to the level of the region. Until 
1993 there was outright denial of regional government or regional councils, but in 1994 the existing 
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regional offices of the DTI, the Training, Education and Enterprise Division of the Department of 
Employment and the Departments of the Environment and Transport were integrated into a single 
budget, headed by a senior regional director. The Tories still declined to see regional economic 
planning as important, though symbolically the appearance of coordination alongside the existence 
of Government Offices for the Regions enhanced the claim of a regional plan.68 
Between the rise and fall of Thatcher as the Prime Minister, an English regional imperative 
was growing. Its institutional network lacked finance and control mechanisms and suffered from 
poor evaluation of policy instruments. For example, there were sixty-four organizations active in 
the field of economic development in Lancashire and over one hundred in Kent. The confusion 
around governmental responsibilities coincided with a plethora of non-governmental organizations 
whose remit included regional economic development, and these existed with organizations that 
were more localized. Fragmentation in England was comparatively high, but it was not simply due 
to developments from within the region, because many changes came from national level 
institutional restructuring after 1979.69  
 Historically, the Conservatives managed to maintain impressive electoral support in the 
peripheries despite the extension of the franchise to all adults. Their strength resided in an 
ideological bloc consisting of unionism and imperial identity, as well as support from skilled 
labour. The end of empire and its material rewards altered these attachments, and from the late 
1960s onward, a gradual cleavage was embedded in electoral support with the Conservatives 
gaining strength in the South Eastern core, while Labour was concentrated in Scotland, Wales and 
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the North West of England. The socioeconomic structure of the periphery and particularly Scotland 
in the 1980s, consisted of a higher per capita ratio of the working class than elsewhere in the 
country. People were more likely to live in public housing and rely on the welfare state, be 
employed in heavy industry, and there was a higher proportion of its middle class employed in the 
public sector. The observable ideological attachments were also different: towards the left in 
Scotland and Wales versus the populist/anti-state right leaning orientation that sustained Prime 
Minister Thatcher in England.70  
Despite the notable drop in Conservative electoral support in Scotland, Prime Minister 
Thatcher insisted that these areas had no right to legislative devolution, and moreover, English 
Conservative MPs actively criticized the Scottish Office and transfer payments from England to 
Scotland. Other instances such as the poll tax fueled nationalist sentiment. By the end of Margaret 
Thatcher’s tenure, a movement was building across political parties for a Constitutional ‘Claim of 
Right’ for Scotland. Nonetheless, the resolute opposition to legislative devolution carried forward 
into John Major’s leadership, and after the 1992 general election there was an even stronger 
unionist defence. In fact, ranks within the Conservatives believed that their stance on devolution 
helped them win the election.71  
 Territorial politics still influenced the Conservative’s statecraft strategy, as the 1993 White 
Paper Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good proposed limited changes to the apparatus 
of administrative devolution, including an increased responsibility for training, industrial support, 
and European Social Fund spending. There would also be a greater role for the Scottish Grand 
Committee. This direction did shift course from the Thatcher era by at least recognizing the 
                                            
70 Kendrick and McCrone, “Politics in a Cold Climate,” 595, 602.  
71 James Mitchell, “The Evolution of Devolution: Labour’s Home Rule Strategy in Opposition,” Government and 
Opposition 33, 4 (1998): 491.  
 
 
131 
 
importance of Scottish distinctiveness.72 Still, the government preferred administrative reforms 
over changes to the constitutional balance of power between regional administration and 
Westminster. In 1994, calls for indirectly elected regional assemblies in England were rejected by 
the Conservatives. Instead, as was mentioned above, Government Offices for the Regions were 
created to bring together the regional offices, not as a regional layer of government, but out of 
concern with the distribution of central resources. When it came to Wales, there was a history of 
policy maneuverability compared to Scotland. However, territorial management in Wales came to 
mirror certain changes in Scotland as the Conservatives sought to enact limited reforms to the 
apparatus of administrative devolution.  
  The SNP and Plaid Cyrmu had to quickly adapt after the demoralizing referendum 
experiences. Both parties had undergone transformations from loose movements seeking 
independence to organized mass parties with broad policy objectives. In the 1980s, they needed to 
regenerate self-government as a top political issue by changing their public image, starting with 
their attitudes towards Europe. Initially, the SNP and Plaid Cymru rejected a centralized European 
Economic Community and campaigned against entry in the 1975 referendum. In the 1980s, both 
parties were committed to independence within Europe. The augmented pro-European plans for 
full national status within the EC played into conversations about a more decentralized Europe 
with a more powerful Committee of the Regions. In addition, there was little initial inclination to 
collaborate on devolution because it sidelined discussion about independence. However, the loss 
of devolution on the national political agenda forced regional alliances to reassess their 
constitutional projects.  
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Plaid Cymru would end up embracing the limited form of devolution promoted by the 
Labour Party as a step towards future objectives. The same would go for the SNP when it joined 
the cross-party campaign for a Scottish Assembly. To distinguish themselves from the Labour 
Party they adopted a more left-leaning agenda; Plaid Cymru was committed to socialism and 
community politics built on decentralist traditions, and the SNP focused a lot on the poll tax.73 In 
1988, a Constitutional Steering Committee informed by a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly 
called for a Scottish Constitutional Convention to draw up proposals to revisit Scotland’s 
governance structure. When it came time for the convention, the Labour Party entered it with a 
contingent focused on devolution rather than independence. This prompted the SNP to withdraw 
from the process, subsequently aiding Labour’s regional image. The convention led to two reports 
produced in 1990 and 1995 and focused on a legislative scheme of devolution and a proportional 
Alternative Member electoral system. Missing was the relationship of the new Scottish Parliament 
to local government, the West Lothian Question,74 and the future relations between Edinburgh and 
London.75 While the national government seemed to be in a comfortable position having increased 
its vote share throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Home Rule regained prominence.  
One reason for this was the impact that European integration was having at the subnational 
level in Britain, especially in the distribution of structural funds and in the role of subsidiarity to 
distribute EC resources. In 1988, the decision was made to administer the new structural fund 
programmes as partnerships between central and local government, the European Commission and 
other actors. This was viewed as a challenge to the existing balance of domestic intergovernmental 
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relations as some saw the potential for the mobilization of subnational interests linked to structural 
funds. Prior to 1988, EC regional policy actors in Britain were central and local governments. The 
central government secured important positions within regional and sub-regional committees in 
order to manage the European Regional Development Fund, which meant that the centre controlled 
its domestic implementation by using partisan appointment to territorial ministries. European 
integration was necessary for the creation of new networks, but it did not shift the balance of power 
between central-subnational scales.76 Additionally, subsidiarity was swept into official EC 
parlance. It re-emerged in the Draft Treaty on the European Union adopted by the European 
Parliament in 1984. It was agreed that member states should utilize subsidiarity to inform the 
construction of a European Union. However, arguments over the term’s meaning produced two 
applied definitions in the Maastricht Treaty. There was a procedural division of policy-making 
responsibilities and a substantive principle to inform the structuring of public life by having 
decisions taken as close to citizens as possible. The emergence of subsidiarity did not sit well with 
the parliamentary Conservative Party given the encouragement of decentralization. In fact, John 
Major rejected the substantive definition of the principle in favour of a procedural one.77 
 Devolution appeared to be the left’s project, more markedly after 1979 because of the 
accentuated geographical and social conflict taking place between different parts of the country in 
response to Conservative policy. The regional divides on the issue were not eliminated, as an 
English Labour MP was unable to introduce a Devolution Bill in parliament in 1985 because seven 
Labour MPs from the North of England voted Conservative, feeling that English regions would be 
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disadvantaged.78 Despite disagreements over the West Lothian question and English regionalism, 
Labour remained committed to a Scottish Assembly. The same urgency, however, was not applied 
to Wales and even less to England. A watershed moment for devolution came from the electoral 
loss in 1987. The reason was that Labour won fifty seats in Scotland compared to the 
Conservatives’ ten. The media heralded this as a ‘Scottish mandate’. Nearly ten years after the 
1979 referendums devolution re-emerged to protect Scotland and Wales from Thatcherism. 
Labour’s policy on the constitution underwent dramatic change when it joined the Scottish Labour 
conference and the National Union of Public Employees’ (NUPE) in support of a Constitutional 
Convention to design a Home Rule scheme. The party’s leadership agreed and got involved with 
the Convention alongside the newly merged Liberal Democratic party, trade unions, churches and 
local authorities.  
 Labour’s defeat in 1983 is often considered the defining moment in the party’s 
contemporary history, but the pre-1983 period is important as well. Labour’s stance was adopted 
in response to Prime Minister Thatcher but also because of the failures of Labour’s 1974-1979 
government. Labour’s post-1979 economic policy reaffirmed a state-centric economic alternative 
to manage the market economy using a framework that regulated and then harnessed capital.79 The 
left of the party would bear the brunt of Labour’s landslide defeat in 1983 and the wounds would 
run deep until Tony Blair became the leader of the Labour Party in 1994. The rebranding as New 
Labour indicated the desire to distance itself from the leftist approach between 1979 and 1983, and 
the miners’ strike of 1984-1985. Any changes made to the party thereafter must be situated in 
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terms of a long process of reform in which the party slowly accommodated itself to the new and 
distinctly post-corporatist capital-labour relation.  
After a third consecutive electoral defeat, Labour abandoned its commitment to planned 
action by government in concert with industry. Though a change in direction was established under 
Neil Kinnock, Labour’s transformation was consolidated during Tony Blair’s tenure. He shifted 
from a class-based to a brokerage party by rethinking the party’s traditional conception of the 
distribution of voter interests.80 According to Colin Hay, the social, political and economic context 
in which New Labour found itself was central to the transformation process. Its political economy 
was based on a diagnosis of Britain’s economic woes and the measures likely to restore high 
growth. Tony Blair was committed to enhancing the market, and reducing excessive taxation, 
borrowing and spending, and this reflected currents in economic discourse.81 With this being said, 
it would be problematic to frame the reorganization of the Labour Party in the neoliberal era as a 
sign of a bi-partisan consensus. The party was a catalyst for the democratization of the British 
regions leading up to and after its electoral victory in 1997 and will be examined in detail in the 
next chapter.  
 
The Local Level from 1970-1995: Central-Local Partisan Politics and Urban Institutional Reform 
 
 The politics of urban development is often left out of discussions of the political economy 
of scale and devolution. Yet, partisanship in local government restructuring was clear in the design 
of new municipal rules and forms of decision-making in the early 1970s. Moreover, political 
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partisanship and the conflict between scales was divisive in the 1980s; the left and the right 
contested each other based on the control of their respective political scale, i.e. the Conservatives 
nationally and Labour locally. The conflicts concerning centralization and decentralization became 
extreme between the visions of Margaret Thatcher and those of socialist Labour-controlled 
municipal councils. Thus, the local level was extremely important to the politics of scale.  
How decentralization policies and institutions were used to rejig political and local scales 
connects to debates concerning economic development and democratization. Local governments 
were involved in how urban and rural areas fed into the development and the decline of 
manufacturing sectors. This included the policies associated with physical land planning, the 
building of housing as well as job and labour (re)location. Debates over regional and local 
democracy were at odds because of corresponding economic policy directives coming from the 
centre, complicated by the various deconcentrated and decentralized layers and functions that 
comprised intergovernmental relations. This section examines: the role of decentralization at the 
local scale in the Scottish and Welsh Offices and the relationship of regional policy and institutions 
to local government; how economic development and urban development related to local policies 
and administrations; and the partisan redesign of local government.  
1970-1979 
The structuring of the local level to suit or represent partisan interests reflects economic and 
ideological cleavages around certain sectors and issues, like the building or the selling of council 
housing. The class mix of different localities has impacted electoral outcomes especially where 
local conflicts influenced the electorate’s alignment towards national politics. At the local level, 
party organizations provided a channel to social bases to access local decision makers, which is 
relevant because inner-city working classes supported the Labour Party as a means to control the 
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housing market, and the land planning that impacts it.82 In contrast, the Conservatives were 
organized at the local level around the regulation of local housing markets via the manipulation of 
planning powers. In suburban Tory strongholds, local authorities aligned with the right and 
guarded against threats to property values by denying council housing construction.  
A tense dynamic arising from the function versus the area problem of local government 
described in Chapter Two carried forward from the late 1800s until 1974, because aside from 
London and a few borough changes in the 1960s, local government remained largely untouched. 
Until the 1970s there was little coordination between services, and this created a complex level of 
intergovernmental integration and the fragmentation of administration in Britain. There was no 
single relationship between central and local government as each national Ministry had peculiar 
relationships with local authorities. With separate inspectors and controllers of central departments 
in the localities or regions, the assemblage of powers wielded by these representatives of Whitehall 
was less visible than it would be if it were concentrated in the hands of a single official. Several 
statutory powers possessed by ministers related to the borrowing of money, the audit of accounts, 
the approval of by-laws, the appointment and dismissal of officers, and the prescribing of 
conditions to garner grants-in-aid. However, a unique feature of British local authority was that it 
did not have to submit its budget for approval. Nor could a local council be suspended or dissolved 
by the national government or its local agent. British local authorities were an instrument of 
democracy because they possessed control over administrative policies.83   
Eventually this set of relations gave rise to changes in the policy-making structure of local 
authorities. Increasingly, the direction was toward a corporate-management model of operations. 
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Part of this included the creation of public corporations that took responsibilities away from local 
councils while leaving others in place. While aggregate metrics of national government spending 
increased as the welfare state expanded, the services being provided to residents were from 
multiple overlapping institutional departments and scales in the British polity. An overarching 
issue was whether locally determined services should be financed by local sources of income, and 
what the level of discretion of autonomy should consist of.84  
Territorial decentralization and national government deconcentration to local field services 
overlap with each other to make up an important facet of the British political system. Territorial 
asymmetry – consisting of functional departments and administratively devolved institutions - was 
interposed within central-local relations. Differences among regions including their network of 
institutions affected the extent to which authority over decision-making could ever become 
politically and economically devolved at the regional level. This was compounded by the fact that 
there was elite resistance from central and local actors to alter regional power structures by 
encouraging institutional reform. Regionalism in Scotland and Wales was more pronounced than 
it was in England, but this did not mean England was irrelevant to developments. The English felt 
devolution worked against their interests and mobilized their connections to Westminster, 
Whitehall and the Treasury in order to rework the system of public expenditure in force at the time. 
The Treasury devised the Barnett formula (described in detail below) to protect major recurrent 
expenditures from what was considered pork barrel politics taking place between Westminster and 
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the Scottish and Welsh Offices. The recasting of financial relations in Britain was political in the 
sense that it concerned the territorial allocation of benefits.85  
According to James G. Kellas and Peter Madgwick, devolution provided the context to 
develop a block grant for Scottish and Welsh expenditures. Until 1978, public expenditure under 
the control of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales was allocated by ‘needs’ determined 
by the British government. In the 1970s, there was roughly 20% more public expenditure per head 
in six main programmes in Scotland compared to England, with Wales closer to the English 
average. Accompanying the prospect of devolution was an idea to allocate funds to Scotland and 
Wales in block format with reference to comparable expenditures in England. This was a mix 
between Treasury control and decentralization, demonstrating that regional offices worked within 
a central-local government relationship weighted towards England.86 
This is relevant to local government because of the regional administrative connection to 
municipal operations. As it concerns England, again, territorial decentralization and the politics 
that surrounded it at the local level was bound to the politicization of regional planning. Along 
with the failed bid for devolution at the end of the 1970s, English Economic Planning Councils 
were disbanded in 1979, leaving England wholly without any regional planning institutional 
apparatus. The Councils were created in the 1960s to advise the Economic Planning Boards 
(groupings of senior representatives of Government Departments in the regions). The problem was 
that English regions were often artificially designed for formal political purposes. Prior to 1974, 
there was a Standing Conference of Local Planning Authorities that represented local planning 
authorities and rivaled regional economic planning councils. Local authorities had statutory 
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development control and plan-making powers, but their plans were supposed to conform to a 
regional strategy prepared by these non-elected EPCs. Yet, regional strategies lacked integrated 
planning mechanisms and shared mandates.87 
The situation was different between territorial institutions and local governments in Scotland 
and Wales. The Secretaries of State for both nations constituted a major connection between 
centrally determined policy and local government autonomy. Their influences on local government 
was substantial, however. Given the historic nature of local government in the British constitution, 
local authorities still were able to appeal directly to the centre. This indicates some ambivalence 
regarding the status of regional offices and their position within central-local relations. The major 
difference from England was in the allocation of capital finance, especially towards local 
government. In Scotland, there was no division of capital expenditure into relevant sectors as there 
was in England and Wales. The Secretary of Scotland held more direct control of the capital 
expenditure of local authorities than in England.88  
 The contexts surrounding local economies informed interventions in urban and regional 
labour markets. An important effect of the spatial reordering of economic activity can be seen in 
the urban-rural shift; cities declined as small towns and rural areas became the dominant spaces of 
manufacturing industries and jobs, increasing nearly 80% from 1959-1975. By contrast, London 
lost 40% of its manufacturing jobs in the same period. The relative decline of cities as centres of 
industrial production is almost an inevitable consequence of the process of economic change; the 
post-war market economy aided the development of large cities and coincided with the movement 
                                            
87 Diana C. Pearce, “The Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council 1965-1979,” in British Regionalism 
1900-2000, ed. Patricia L. Garside and Michael Hebbert (London: Mansell Publishing, 1989), 129, 131, 134. 
88 Edward Page, “Why Should Central-Local Relations in Scotland be Different from Those in England,” in New 
Approaches to the Study of Central-Local Government Relationships, ed. G. W. Jones (Westmead: Gower Publishing, 
1980), 87.  
 
 
141 
 
of people to new and expanding towns away from cities when industrial bases eroded.89 The 
decline of the industrial city was influenced by political intervention and associated ideologies 
linked to the market system. The Conservatives in the early 1970s embarked on rationalizing the 
industrial base of regions by relaxing controls on where firms could be located. They initially 
supported the idea that the private sector should rationalize itself to become more competitive, and 
the government would choose growth centres in the regions on a selective basis. This strategy was 
abandoned when trends in industrial change combined with rising unemployment. Fearing the 
long-term consequences of chronic regional unemployment interventionist strategies were 
revisited, but the difference between the Conservatives and Labour was that the former favoured 
tax-incentive aid to profitable firms while Labour appropriated indiscriminate intervention via 
investment grants. Labour took steps to more comprehensive planning in 1964 and then again in 
1975, but by 1976 its national planning strategy was defeated by international influences on the 
domestic economy. In sum, neither party adopted a coordinated strategy of employment, 
investment and physical planning at the subnational level.90 
 As McKay and Cox argue, responsibility for the failure to coordinate local physical and 
national economic planning did not only fall on the central government. Local authorities were 
important to the political economy of scale and often rejected alternative policies in favour of 
protecting functional and areal interests. Also, bureaucratic resistance to integrated planning at the 
national level was substantial. By 1977, industrial and regional policies were under review in the 
1977 White Paper Policy for Inner Cities, blaming the deprivation and dereliction on the erosion 
of the cities’ economic base. Things would shift a bit under the Thatcher government’s Urban 
Programme by paying attention more to inner cities and having funds made available to a hierarchy 
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of urban local authorities. These were ‘Partnership Authorities’ to finance schemes designed to 
revive inner areas. Yet the benefits were offset by the concomitant withdrawal of grants from the 
same authorities as part of the squeeze on local government expenditure.91  
 Debates concerning the future of the urban planning process informed several proposals to 
reform local government. The most important were two constitutional inquiries set up in 1966 – 
Redcliffe-Maud and Wheatley – to examine the possible development of city-regions, namely the 
city or conurbation plus its sphere of influence as the basis for local government reform. The 
Redcliffe-Maud Commission reported four main critiques of local governance in England and 
Wales. First, many small authorities lacked the population and resources to provide staff, 
equipment and institutions needed to implement complex services. Second, the areas of local 
government did not fit the facts of social life as town and country were now socially and 
economically interdependent but fragmented administratively. Suburbs were not governed by the 
towns from which they emerged; conurbations became a single economic unit but were splintered 
into various authorities; and urban districts were divorced from rural districts. Third, the 
communities people lived in did not correspond to local authority areas, and most citizens did not 
know which authority provided their services. Fourth, the division of local government into 
competing authorities meant central governments could impose their jurisdiction or remove certain 
municipal functions more effectively.92  
The Commission proposed all-purpose unitary authorities, and as this concerned the 
coordination of land-use and policy matters, it advocated for indirectly elected provincial councils 
to serve as the top tier of local government. The unitary authority promoted an integrated approach 
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to the provision of services to the electorate and could potentially check the centre vis-à-vis a 
single local authority association. A single local authority association would thus replace the four 
that represented county boroughs, counties, urban districts, and rural districts at the time, all of 
which were at odds with each other and made sure that the national government could divide their 
interests.93 By contrast the Wheatley Commission was responsible for examining Scotland’s local 
government system. The context for regional planning had been altered from the 1940s as there 
was a sustained outflow of people from the Glasgow conurbation and a regional city developed. 
Driven by a strong conception of regional planning as a vital necessity in Scottish local 
government, the Wheatley Commission recommended directly elected regional authorities with 
extensive responsibilities, contrasting the less radical proposals of Redcliffe-Maud.94   
 The irony is that the Local Government Act implemented in 1972 bore little resemblance 
to the recommendations proposed for municipal government in England and Wales. Ideologically, 
the Labour Party saw the proposals in Redcliffe-Maud as an opportunity for an urban takeover of 
the counties, whereas entrenched county councils opposed being swept away in regional reform. 
The Conservatives, by contrast, did not agree with the measures proposed by the Royal 
Commission to create regional-unitary local governments in certain areas because it would 
undermine their power bases in traditionally dominated counties. But, in the absence of any 
provincial or regional level in local government, crucial decisions on the regional framework or 
strategy of land use were left to central departments. Of the new legislative reforms, the new forty-
five two-tier counties that replaced county boroughs were some of the most politicized because 
they were dominated by the Labour Party. One idea floated inside the Labour Party as a response 
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was to establish regional councils, but this was denied by competing interests on the left, 
particularly because trade unions preferred corporatist networks at the regional level.95 Ultimately, 
the new system was consciously designed by the Conservatives to frustrate planning and this 
reflected their idea that local government should consist of administrative fragmentation versus 
planned coordination. Institutional fragmentation directly contributed to the loss of urban powers 
also because rural weighting was still in place, meaning there were urban dwellers finding their 
votes counting for less than those in some rural areas. Thus, the new system had negative 
implications for local democracy.96  
 From the point of view of planning, the 1972 changes did not aim to take into account that 
a whole area needed to be planned as a unit around the biggest conurbations in the whole of the 
economic planning region.97 The 1972 Act underlined the need for some intermediate level of 
regional planning between the reformed local government and Whitehall, but it left local 
governments to come together on an ad hoc basis for city-region planning and take place in a 
cooperative planning process. Overall, Redcliffe-Maud sought a structure of provincial units for 
England, but nothing came of this, and the actual reform of local government failed to recognize 
the realities of contemporary urban geography by instituting powerful planning bureaucracies 
without reorganizing traditional county boundaries.98  
 This was different from the Wheatley Report on Scottish local government, which sought 
a two-tier system of large regional authorities and small local authorities for Scotland. The 
Conservatives’ 1973 Scotland Local Government Act mostly followed these recommendations. 
The reorganization of local government in Scotland reduced four hundred administrative units to 
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sixty-five, including nine regional councils, fifty-three district councils and three island councils. 
Scotland’s local government system diverged from those of England and Wales in several respects 
in the 1970s. The act introduced a regional structure of local government into Scotland; the setup 
for this began with regional planning in the 1960s in Scotland. Thus, certain proposals for Scotland 
had survived while in England they were frustrated.99 The context surrounding Scotland’s local 
government reforms related to the Strathclyde Regional Council that was introduced as a result of 
the Wheatley Commission. Yet, having reported in 1969, Wheatley was behind events as the 
region was altered by circumstances in the 1970s when the creation of Strathclyde took place in 
1975. The conception of the Regional Council in 1975 was being modified by the creation of the 
Scottish Development Agency six months after the Council took office. Overall, the Agency’s 
investment in urban renewal and local economic development in the region was influential despite 
its limited budget.100  
 The reorganization of local government in Wales in 1974 introduced a two-tier system of 
counties and districts. The land-use planning system in Wales comprised: legislation and central 
government Planning Policy Guidance; structure plans with direction provided at the county 
council level; and local plans with local policies at the district level. Following the establishment 
of the Welsh Office as a separate government department in 1964, an attempt was made to create 
a planning policy framework that looked at future social and economic development needs in 
Wales. The blueprint was Wales: The Way Ahead in 1967 seeking a clear regional economic plan. 
The debates surrounding the economic development and future of Wales were facilitated by a 
parallel political discourse about how a national plan would develop. Plaid Cymru was brought to 
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the House of Commons in 1966 and signaled the importance of the future growth of Wales. The 
political programme espoused by the party centered on principles of decentralizing political 
authority and the preservation of Welsh culture, together with issues concerning economic growth. 
The lack of an effective all-Wales tier of planning policy precipitated strong territorial political 
mobilization to counteract the perceived extension of metropolitan institutions and policies. A 
debate within Welsh political circles focused on housing, the Welsh language and economic 
development, the core areas of official planning around which territorial opposition emerged. 
Planning was mostly led by agencies other than the Welsh Office throughout the 1970s, yet it did 
not completely retreat with respect to agenda-setting. The Welsh Development Agency, the Land 
Authority for Wales and the Development Board for Rural Wales alongside central government 
initiatives like Inner Urban Areas Act 1978, and the Welsh Office all created attempted to renew 
urban and rural areas.101  
1979-1995 
 The local scale was vital to the Conservatives’ quest to realign the British state with new 
right ideological imperatives. In fact, the extent of the national government’s offensive on 
municipal councils indicates that local democracy in Britain is a locus of power.102 Between 1979 
and the early 1990s there were nearly fifty separate parliamentary acts designed to marginalize the 
role of local government.103 Local policy and expenditure were targeted by a new financial 
framework imposed by the central government pursuing efficiencies in capital expenditure and 
rationalizing annual revenue grants for local allocation. With the turn to the IMF in 1976 there was 
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a stipulation in exchange for a loan that the government would reduce public expenditure, which 
included capital spending at the local level. Capital spending was down 33% by 1978, and 
aggregate exchequer grants to local authorities fell 5% by the end of the decade. In addition to 
reducing the growth of local expenditure, the national government was questioning the quality of 
council services. This set the tone for the Conservatives’ manifesto leading into the 1979 election. 
Nonetheless, the approach used in the mid-late 1970s compared to the first two terms of Prime 
Minister Thatcher was a very different. By 1985, funds provided by the centre in the form of block 
grants to local authorities was reduced from 61 to 49% of the total.104  
 Under the previous Labour government Rate Support Grants to municipal authorities were 
cut to discourage local spending, but cuts could only be made in the level of the grant because 
there was no power to restrict the expenditure of individual authorities or their rate levels. Thus, 
despite operating in the legislative and financial context structured by Parliament, local electoral 
mandates and taxation gave councils a degree of independence. The incoming Conservatives were 
keen to address this because the local scale could ostensibly undermine the national scale’s fiscal 
strategy. The central government proceeded to produce a shift in the balance of central-local 
relations by subjecting local authorities to expenditure cuts and controls, notably in housing and 
in the privatization of service delivery. Early on, a court ruling forced a council to comply with 
the ‘right to buy’ council housing dwellings provisions of the 1980 Housing Act. The act granted 
council tenants the statutory right to buy their place of residence for a discounted rate, which 
removed local authorities’ discretion.105  
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 Another major step to increase central influence was the new block grant system (initially 
proposed by Labour in its 1979 Green Paper). This allowed the national government to taper off 
grants from any authority that spent over a standard level of expenditure. During 1981-1982 the 
government announced that it would superimpose on the block grant a system of expenditure 
targets and grant penalties that would remove funds from any authority that exceeded a spending 
target. The problem was that local authorities used capital expenditure to acquire assets like 
buildings, land, plant and machinery; also, revenue expenditure was used to meet the costs of 
providing goods and services such as public-sector wages.106  
 Initially, the changes to better control capital had little effect on municipal autonomy. Local 
councils defied central estimates by spending more after increasing the level of local rates. Taking 
the lead were Labour-controlled inner-city councils like the GLC and Sheffield metropolitan 
county councils. As a result, many Conservative MPs supported greater control over left-
dominated metropolitan county councils. From 1981 to 1984, the national government was seeking 
an alternative to domestic rates; this came in the form of the Rate Capping Bill of 1983-1984 and 
the Conservatives promised to use legislative fiat to cap the rates of high spending councils and 
simultaneously abolish metropolitan counties and the GLC. After the government won a sizeable 
majority in the general election of 1983 it was able to implement the GLC-Metropolitan Counties 
Abolition Bill in 1984. This transferred functions to district bodies and created new non-elected 
Joint Boards to run area-wide services. In other words, certain services were removed from elected 
municipal governments and given to partisan-appointed and nominated boards, reducing local 
buffers against the centre. The government’s Paying Bill in 1985 added to this by abolishing local 
elections for metropolitan county councils prior to the local elections later that year. The goal was 
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to transfer the GLC from Labour control to Conservative control by eliminating local ballots. By 
1986, a whole tier of local government responsible for several local authority functions in the 
biggest conurbations was abolished.107  
 The damage caused by all of this activity contributed to the resignation of Margaret 
Thatcher. Four major pieces of local government legislation passed through parliament during the 
1987-1988 sessions that attempted to radically alter the scope of what local authorities could 
provide. The Local Government Act, 1988 reduced public-sector employment and put public 
services out to competitive tender. In addition, a community charge, aka the ‘poll tax’, was 
implemented in the Local Government Finance Act. The new system meant that all expenditure 
above centrally determined measures would fall on a community charge. Prior to the poll tax, 
revenue raising was restricted to the rate derived from property-owners and businesses, whereas 
the community charge aimed to foster a direct relationship of accountability between all citizens 
of voting age and their local authority by levying an equal tax on each voter, allowing each 
authority to set its own rate. This changed the basis of local taxation in Britain by shifting from a 
property-based to an individual one, ending its progressive element and increasing the burden of 
responsibility on people who were deemed eligible to pay the local levies irrespective of their 
income. The outcome was calamitous, particularly in Scotland where it was implemented a year 
prior to England and Wales.108  
 In 1991, the reform of local government in Scotland was announced by the Secretary of 
State seeking to introduce single-tier authorities and was the first structural change made to local 
government since 1975. The Labour Party thought local government reform in Scotland should 
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have been part of a wider constitutional change involving the creation of a Scottish parliament. 
Instead, the Conservatives introduced new powers to cap the tax rates levied by elected councils, 
further limiting the autonomy of local authorities, bringing those powers into line with England 
and Wales.109  
 With respect to the formal system of local government, the Conservatives changed its 
character by privatizing council housing and land while also expanding the number of services 
provided by the private sector. Local government was envisaged as enabling citizens as customers 
of government services, with local authorities acting as purchasers rather than providers. Related 
to this was a series of authorities that were established independently of local government, holding 
significant powers over the same jurisdiction. These included self-governing hospital trusts and in 
metropolitan areas joint boards for policy, fire and transport with members appointed by the 
government or nominated by public and private sector acts. Such agencies were complemented by 
government programmes to increase public-private partnerships in urban policy. Many saw this 
undermining of local autonomy as blurring the lines of accountability for the provision of 
services.110 When the citizen-consumer model progressed into the 1990s new regulatory 
authorities were used to monitor public sector utilities in the name of consumer interest. Service 
delivery standards became defined in John Major’s Citizens’ Charter initiative, but it was coloured 
by an ideological bias favouring the private sector ethos. It conferred rights, duties and obligations 
to people as economic agents, but there was little public engagement beyond market research 
exercises.  
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 Local authorities were an important base from which to challenge central government 
initiatives between the 1970s and 1990s, and especially during Margaret Thatcher’s terms in office. 
Many locally-based Labour councils were radicalized in the early 1980s and this generated 
divisions within the party over political manifestos and policy direction. Municipal labourism in 
the postwar period consisted of real improvements to the material conditions of working class life 
but it displayed a heavy-handed paternalism.111 The willingness to maintain conventional relations 
with Parliament shifted in the 1970s when local mandates were increasingly defended. An early 
form of resistance came in 1972 against the Housing Finance Act from the council at Clay Cross; 
viewing itself in the tradition of protests earlier in the century, they sought to carry out socialist 
policies. Local campaigns against cuts to the standard and provision of local authority services 
became more pronounced into the 1970s amidst the property boom and pressure for commercial 
redevelopment coupled with continued housing shortages and inner-city decay. Various 
developments within the Labour Party from the late 1960s onward built on the momentum 
garnered by political and social movements seeking local socialism. It was seen at the time as an 
alternative to standard Labour Party policy at the national level and utilized the experiences within 
the Community Development Projects set up by the central government in the late 1960s to find 
strategies to combat urban poverty. Community action within local government was a method to 
challenge national government objectives like fulfilling economies of scale. When the challenge 
to local democracy hit a crisis point under the policies of Prime Minister Thatcher, local councils 
and especially those controlled by the Labour Party developed decentralized responses to central-
local restructuring.112  
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According to Ian Holliday, a new urban left movement sprang up to resist the Conservatives’ 
local government reforms in the 1980s, which drew inspiration from the new left’s community 
politics of the late 1960s.113 The ‘urban’ part meant that it was focused on city politics, and what 
made it ‘new,’ was that it viewed the proper place of local government as being a part of a network 
of community groups collectively exercising political control over local issues. Many of the new 
urban left activists that ran for municipal government were committed to the decentralization of 
local services. Thus, the new urban left was focused on extra-parliamentary struggle against the 
centre. In 1981, the left won the GLC; meanwhile the Inner London Education authority and 
Merseyside County Council remained in Labour’s hands. In the 1982 local elections, the left won 
Camden, Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, Islington and Southwark. In 1983 and 1984, the left took 
Liverpool and Manchester.114 Equally radical at the urban level was the suburban right, which held 
a restricted view of the local state and a commitment to private-sector principles in the conduct of 
local authority business. In contrast to the new urban left, the new suburban right articulated a 
limited view of the political. The left extended politics beyond legislatures and historical trade 
union constituencies to encompass sections of the population that never participated in politics, 
meanwhile the right placed strict controls on both the political domain and on the management of 
it. Whereas the new urban left developed local economic strategies and social forms of 
                                            
113 The origins of the New Left in Britain came into being in 1956-7 under the shock of the Hungarian uprising and 
the Suez crisis, which respectively led to a rejection of Stalinism and Western imperialism. Though organized labour 
was strong in Britain, it had faced significant setbacks during the Cold War period, and as a result of changing domestic 
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revolts, the civil rights struggle in the US, strikes and factory occupations in France, Germany and Italy, and the 
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participatory democracy, the new suburban right took up efficiency and effectiveness as 
deliverables and deregulated certain sectors.115  
 Examples from the left included: in Walsall, thirty-two neighbourhood offices were created 
as a means to build participation and reduce local government remoteness; Hackney Council’s 
Decentralisation Working Group also sought decentralization through thirty Neighbourhood 
Centres, one per ward, where Council services were coordinated, and services managed by a 
neighbourhood committee; lastly, the closest to a real socialist experiment in British local 
government took place in Islington, when the government sought to integrate manual and white 
collar workers in a single-status workforce. Islington’s decentralization programme of community 
development consisted of twenty-four offices composed of residents and representatives of service 
users participating in local decision-making, and the transfer of one thousand staff. Each 
Neighbourhood Office held core functions of housing, management and repairs, social services, 
environmental health and community development and Council allotted control over local budgets, 
the ability to influence Council policy and decisions, and the encouragement of a partnership with 
Council staff at the local level. By and large, local authorities were hesitant about using finances 
to support non-statutory organizations, but what differentiated the community development 
approaches in the 1980s from the 1970s was that alternative means of engagement were in some 
cases brought into the mainstream practices of local government. Examples on the right included: 
in Wandsworth, local council sought asset sales, efficiency management of remaining resources 
and capital investment in residual services. The new suburban right promoted individual 
responsibility and a ‘privatized’ understanding of the political. Principles for council management 
as in Kent revolved around decentralizing operational management responsibility to service 
                                            
115 Ian Holliday, “The New Suburban Right in British Local Government – Conservative Views of the Local,” Local 
Government Studies (1991): 45, 47-48.  
 
 
154 
 
departments and the use of commercial discipline to manage central support services. Ultimately, 
decentralization can mean different things: associated with the new right it involved the market 
provision of public need, whereas the left protected community-led interests by democratizing 
local government services with sub-municipal forms of political decision-making.116  
 
Coalitions of Interest and the Political Economy of Scale from 1970-1995 
 
This chapter analyzed partisan relations from 1970-1995 and explained the central-
subnational struggles part of the changing political and economic landscape of the British state 
during that period. The spatial differentiation of capitalism mobilized local and territorial interest 
coalitions for and against institutional reforms concerning economic growth and decline. Capitalist 
development mobilized popular social bases to defend a defined territory. Efforts to address 
deindustrialization also assisted the creation of territorial coalitions to defend regional interests. 
Thus, the construction of political alliances to establish a post-WWII social democratic state only 
lasted in so far as they could solve economic and political problems. Alliances changed as 
modernizing strategies behind national and regional policies failed. Regional institutions and local 
government were adjusted to align with competing ideological imperatives. Setting priorities at 
the subnational level by national governments led to increasing concerns about the democratic 
deficits at the heart of the governance system in Britain. This sparks a larger discussion about the 
connection between citizenship and democracy within a capitalist system, specifically how 
decision-making and participation is crafted in political and economic life. For example, many 
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argue that Margaret Thatcher’s policies reduced the substantive elements of citizenship in Britain. 
This demonstrates how the politics of scale is connected to the institutional bases of representation, 
and public inclusion in decision-making, and how the provision of public goods must be analyzed 
from a democratic point of view. 
The conflict between capitalism and democracy is observable not only throughout the 
immediate postwar period (as it was discussed in chapter two). Rather, the various social protest 
movements that actively sought to address issues at a scale closer to the people became even more 
pronounced in the 1970s when economic development failed to achieve fundamental democratic 
rights for citizens who paid taxes and worked for a living in peripheral regions. That being the 
case, it was when the new right and its main proponent, Margaret Thatcher, had taken over 
domestic national politics that substantive modern citizenship was being altered. Social, political 
as well as civil elements did not comfortably fit her vision of competitive individualism.117 For 
many, what followed in the Thatcher years was an erosion of associational and trade union rights. 
Social rights were also eroded by means of an extensive programme of cuts in the welfare state 
affecting housing, education, health care and social services. Claims made about the adverse 
effects associated with Thatcherism are qualified and quantified by an increase in inequality 
induced by fiscal policies and unemployment. The replacement of Thatcher by Major was just as 
important to debates about rights in an age of neoliberalism, particularly when the Citizens’ 
Charter was heralded as a signaling a break with the past citizen-state relationship.   
While there are strong arguments supporting a sustained period of enhanced citizenship and 
democratization in the postwar era because of the expansion of the welfare state, the so-called 
universalization of political rights and freedoms did not extend into certain realms of the state. Left 
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out of these discussions are the subnational scales of the state, and the forms of decision-making 
participation that were embedded in the provision of state services and economic development. 
Therefore, the politics of scale is relevant to a discussion about the tensions between capitalism 
and democracy at it allows us to delve into various phenomena including, but not limited to, the 
national level, such as regional administration and local government. Nuance is needed to 
appreciate the differences and confluences between the post-war welfare and post-welfare state 
when it concerns a discussion about democracy, capitalism and the state. To what extent were the 
political rights associated with democracy in the age of social democracy more democratic than 
the neoliberal age? This is relevant because what arose in the neoliberal era according to the 
Conservative Party was an enhancement of citizen participation in market choices, and a shift 
towards property-owning democracy. One way to differentiate between the Keynesian and 
neoliberal era is to highlight the shifting forms of public inclusion at the local level. On the one 
hand, the remoteness of governments from citizens during the postwar period is what sparked 
limited experiments with participation in the 1960s. Exploring local and central politics as part of 
an ongoing politics of scale offers the opportunity to account for interdependence in the 
formulation and implementation of services.  
Neil Boaden et al. explain that towards the end of the 1960s there was an over saturation of 
a narrow elite of bureaucratic officials and party politicians locally and nationally. Party politics 
came to dominate local politics and subsequently, politicians had to contend with the rising tide of 
popular mobilization. Networks of influence part and parcel of the administrative central-
subnational structures of policy-making reflected the close relationship between local investment 
and economic development. The decision-making processes of the era insulated political 
institutions from ordinary citizens. The search for efficiency in service delivery and the concern 
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for economic management thus produced a level of professionalism that viewed participation as 
an affront to technical expertise. However, by the late 1960s there were doubts about the ability of 
experts to solve ongoing problems like the North-South and urban-rural divides. Given this, there 
was some support for participation in urban planning and community development, but it wavered 
between statutory support, legislative amendment and a lack of commitment. Surrounding tenuous 
experimentation with the public’s inclusion at a strategic level were the networks of influence 
informing the extent to which the public could override private economic interests. This was 
confounded by the problem that public participation was limited to a peculiar realm of the planning 
process geared more to experts than lay people, which only served to alienate large segments of 
the population rather than insert them into policy-making processes.  
The early 1970s saw experiments with participatory planning come to an end in the 1972 
Town and Country Planning Amendment. It gave the public in England the right to be consulted 
and involved in local plan-making but abolished their right to be heard at inquiries into structure 
plans. There was little interest in seeing the public involved in decisions that concerned land 
planning by private developers. This was only made more apparent when cuts made by the central 
government fell heavily on local authorities in 1973. It was a bit different in Scotland and Wales 
where the Local Government Act introduced by the Conservatives introduced community 
councils, both inspired by the Minority Report of Derek Senior that drew influence from communal 
experiences elsewhere in Europe. By 1974 the Department of the Environment came to support 
neighbourhood management in several local authority areas. One example was Stockport, which 
covered the whole of the local authority area and included provision for a system of community 
councils. In 1974, Harold Wilson supported the idea of neighbourhood councils and issued a 
Consultation Paper that suggested making statutory status available to neighbourhood 
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organizations in areas where local support was forthcoming. The councils would have formal 
rights of consultation with local authorities over certain planning matters and could attract other 
participatory responsibilities. Despite ministerial support, the paper was not well received by local 
authorities and they opposed another layer of elected councils.118  
By the 1980s and 1990s, citizenship shifted in the direction of allowing citizens to voice 
their opinions about the services they received from public and private providers. Yet, in response 
to the new right’s interpretation of a service-user oriented system of public participation, radical 
forms of political participation and formal inclusion in political processes occurred at the local 
level. In the 1970s, community and parish participation formed to expand bases of public 
participation but were not often on the side of local councils, but in the 1980s they were actively 
promoted to oppose national politics. Therefore, citizens were transformed into state customers in 
an increasingly marketized public sector. This was a very clear change that marked the neoliberal 
era.  
But the type of democracy that existed prior to neoliberalism was less committed to public 
engagement than to public management. We can appreciate this claim after having explained the 
way administrative and political institutions were used to pursue ideological and partisan 
objectives concerning economic development. The ongoing struggle to enhance the bases of 
inclusion and representation at regional and local levels challenges the idea that the postwar period 
was wholeheartedly democratic. Regional political parties and social movements, local councils, 
and class-based mobilization brought to bear the limited means of decision-making opportunities 
available to them, and fought tooth and nail for reforms that were only implemented in 1997.  
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What clearly did change between eras was the extent to which the new right was willing to 
manipulate national and subnational democratic functions. One of their primary strategies was by 
means of partisan appointment and side-stepping elected authorities to have national economic 
agendas reflected regionally and locally. Quangos or quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organizations are crucial to understanding the move from traditional bureaucratic forms of policy 
implementation to new forms of quasi-government, blurring the lines between the public and the 
private sphere. Post-1979, quangos were specifically used to undermine Labour-controlled local 
authorities. Public administration needs to be insulated from party politics, and yet the exercise of 
independent powers by unelected bodies is contrary to the basic principles of democratic 
accountability. The four main types observed under Margaret Thatcher included: advisory bodies; 
tribunals; Boards of Visitors; and executive boards. From 1979 to 1996 their spending increased 
by over 300%, from 6 to 21.4 billion. Quangos increasingly surfaced to oppose directly elected 
regional assemblies, particularly in England with the implementation of nine Regional 
Development Agencies in the place of regional assemblies.119  
These ad hoc boards were schemes used by the national government to take over certain 
local duties and were part of other schemes including centrally-controlled decentralization to 
reform the politics of scale. To be sure, both the left and right supported decentralization practices 
by competing underlying logics. Initially, decentralization hit the private sector before it reached 
the public sector in Britain. This was in fact closely aligned with the transformation of capitalist 
systems of production towards the automated and decentralized factory, which had new ways of 
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controlling the labour process. Managerialist cost-cutting and rationalization included practices 
that pushed leaner structures through decentered cost and innovation centres. Thus, it was not only 
urban social movements aiming to transform the state, economy and civil society. Ultimately, 
through an observation of various applications of decentralization between 1970 and 1995, we 
observed the extent to which the democratic state and the layers within it are the result of political 
projects. Decentralization policies were used to change the relationship between those providing 
services to meet strategic objectives.120  
When decentralization was applied by the national government the goal was the 
concentration of power in key class and political actors’ hands. This is the case when the 
Conservatives tried to limit local authorities in local planning, deregulating the permission needed 
by developers to proceed without government planning permission. The private sector was offered 
opportunities to adopt new institutional instruments that were led by Conservative appointees 
meant to outflank left councils. By the 1990s, the momentum for constitutional reform - 
specifically devolution and by association to regional administration, local government – had 
regained its place as a major item for political implementation. What remains for examination in 
the next chapter is the extent of regionalization undertaken by Britain at the end of the 1990s and 
in the new millennium. The political economy of scale in the twenty-first century will be analyzed 
in terms of partisan central-subnational relations and political reform, and how the blending of the 
new neoliberal ethos with democratic enhancement is reflected in current governance structures.
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Chapter 4: Devolution as a Scale Commitment from 1995-2016 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the period from 1995 to the present, during which time political 
devolution as a form of decentralization becomes a scale commitment across the British state. 
Devolution ultimately becomes supported and implemented across the political spectrum 
nationally, albeit for different ideological purposes and at different stages of the period. The key 
questions we seek to answer here are: what political-economic motives produced the contemporary 
commitment to devolution, and why is this occurring now? This chapter connects to the historical 
and analytical method applied in this dissertation by explaining the mechanisms of change shaping 
institutional structures and policy approaches over time and space, specifically, how 
decentralization reflects political choices, strategies and struggles in the new millennium.1 It does 
this within a broader discussion of neoclassical economic growth theory versus a social democratic 
approach to economic development.  
As was argued in Chapter 1, research suggests that decentralization redesigns the 
constitutional and democratic order to make it more inclusive and accountable to the public, is a 
response to meet the functional needs of a changing economic and social system, accommodates 
national and cultural diversity, and/or occurs because of the rational self-interest of political actors. 
But as Gordon MacLeod argues, analyses of decentralization and devolution have conflated 
seemingly non-exploitative horizontal relations of networking and reciprocity with the subnational 
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the New Authoritarianism: Closing the Belgian Mines,” Urban Studies 33, 8 (1996): 1500.  
 
 
162 
 
level, obscuring a more complex structuring of social relations across and between spatial scales 
of governance.2 The latter point has been stressed by certain British-based scholars including 
MacLeod, who wish to account for the social impact that decentralized political and economic 
planning institutions have on society. This chapter adds to these discussions by focusing on a thick 
political economy approach, bringing together related but often interspersed streams of empirical 
research concerning national, regional and local levels of the state into an integrated view of the 
political economy of scale. It places the political economy of devolution analysis within a broader 
discussion of what Wolfgang Streeck calls the political economy of democratic capitalism’s two 
conflicting principles: one according to marginal productivity, or the free play of market forces 
and the other based on social need, influenced by democratic politics.3 Thus, the chapter nuances 
narratives about economic modernization and devolution coinciding with growth, innovation and 
public participation.  
The section breakdown is as follows: Section 1 explains a policy repositioning of the Labour 
Party, including its national macroeconomic agenda pre- and post-financial crisis, and the dilemma 
between social democracy and neoliberalism on the left. This is followed by a brief explanation of 
the coalition government’s austerity agenda to combat the economic recession. Section 2 describes 
the constitutional package of devolution to Scotland and Wales, and the economic regionalization 
of government policy in English regions. This is followed by the structural weaknesses of new 
regional political decision-making mechanisms, and contemporary issues with the North-South 
divide. There is also a brief analysis of the coalition government’s impact on the Scottish 
independence referendum, further devolution reforms to Scotland and Wales, and the prospect of 
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further constitutional change in the wake of Brexit. Section 3 examines the New Labour localism 
agenda, including devolution to London, and the rise of monitoring agencies for performance. The 
discussion of the politics of local scale also includes the rise of city-regionalism as a mechanism 
for business growth and public-private decision-making. Lastly, the coalition’s localism agenda 
via devolution deals to cities is discussed and related to its austerity agenda post-financial crisis. 
Finally, section 4 focuses on New Labour’s democratization agenda and the tensions between 
efficiency and democratic renewal in the modernization project.  
 
The National Level from 1995-2016: New Labour’s Adapted Macroeconomics for the New 
Millennium 
 
British national scale politics since 1997 witnessed several important events and turning 
points. The Labour Party’s landslide general election victory in 1997 represented the most seats 
the party won in its history, and the highest proportion of seats won in the post-war era by any 
statewide party. This came at the cost of the Conservatives’ worst showing since 1906. Tony Blair 
would retain the position of prime minister in two subsequent elections in 2001 and 2005, but 
would ultimately resign in 2007. At that point, Gordon Brown would briefly lead the country until 
a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government was elected in 2010 with the 
Conservative’s David Cameron as the Prime Minister. This was another significant moment 
because Liberals returned to cabinet for the first time since the early 1900s. There is little doubt 
that the 2008 global economic crisis - which was the worst recession experienced since the great 
depression of the 1930s – contributed to the fall of Labour as they bore the brunt of the blame for 
its impact. 
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The national level has been implicated in competing narratives, many of which speak to the 
rise of network governance, decentralization, cross-border trade agreements, and global 
financialization. On the one hand, it has been argued that the traditional view of British government 
has been increasingly challenged by an emphasis on the fragmentation of traditional governmental 
authority, with research pointing to the shift towards a range of actors horizontally and vertically 
operating outside of the central state. The counter to this claim is that the central state has retained 
its prominent position in the new millennium; particularly under the leadership of the New Labour 
Party, executive dominance became more accentuated despite devolution and the incoming 
democratic modernization agenda.4 Nonetheless, it is important to state that political power did 
not simply remain hermetically sealed at Westminster, unencumbered, nor did legislative decision-
making get diluted to regional and local scales without reserve powers remaining at the centre.  
Considering that Labour’s high economic growth modernization agenda was particularly 
relevant to devolution, it spawned a host of contentious debates, especially on the left. Discussions 
about Labour tend to be grouped in four schools of thought according to Philip Allmendinger and 
Mark Tewdwr-Jones: mainstream continuity – Labour is continuing with the core concerns of 
social democracy; social democracy in new times – there are both continuities and significant 
differences in Labour; a distinct break from the past - labour has accepted the neo-liberal 
hegemony of Thatcherism; the Labour project is sui generis – Labour amounts to a form of 
pragmatism that has mixed ideological positions together.5 Some of the more assertive arguments 
pursue the idea that New Labour fully abandoned social democracy, whereas others actually see 
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Labour’s attempt closer to a social democratic version of a market economy described in terms of 
stakeholderism.6 Ultimately, the perspective taken here is that Labour’s approach is sui generis.  
Assessing the modernization of Labour requires an explanation of the party’s diagnosis of 
the economic challenges Britain faced and the best way for it to restore high growth. Hay offers 
four comprehensive issues of causality for Labour’s change: 1) The relationship between structure 
and agency, context and conduct; contextualizing political conduct while considering mechanisms 
by which context is shaped and reshaped. 2) The relationship between the ideational and the 
material, i.e. between the ideas held about the world and the world itself. 3) The relative 
significance of political, economic and cultural factors, meaning the analysis should not restrict 
itself to exclusively political and economic variables to the point that politics is bereft of context. 
4) The relative significance of domestic and international factors, focusing on internal 
predicaments and trajectories in a comparative context.7 The following section will address several 
of these factors during the period from 1997 to 2010. 
1997-2010 
Upon entering office in 1997, Labour was focused on the long-term economic performance 
of the economy because the quarter century leading up to the new millennium showed that Britain 
relative to the G7 was performing poorly in terms of its resilience to external shocks, higher 
inflation, unemployment and incomes. In addition, it had been just shy of twenty years since the 
Labour Party had governed Britain at the national level. The party endured four consecutive and 
difficult losses (1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992) to the Conservatives, three of which were against 
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7 Colin Hay, The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), 32, 36-38.  
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Margaret Thatcher. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the shadow cast by the economic agenda of the 
Conservatives was large enough to decidedly influence a new trajectory for Labour’s strategic 
electioneering and policy objectives.  
In considering the context leading up to the 1997 election, it is relevant to note that its 
platform policies - tax increases in the budget, a commitment to restoring earnings-linked public 
pensions, a commitment to a general entitlement to social security, and a resistance to the 
individuation of benefits - were not enough to secure a victory in the 1992 election. Even in the 
1987 general election, where Labour placed government-led economic regeneration at the heart of 
its program, and continued to believe in the need to tightly regulate the market by state 
intervention, it did not prove a popular enough agenda to suit the public mood.8 Internally, the 
party struggled to pursue a radical programme of economic policies (namely the Alternative 
Economic Strategy), and the continued losses at the polls gradually encouraged a retreat from its 
more ambitious schemes of social and economic reform. Multiple working papers and a policy 
review leading into the 1990s had taken note of political trends and ultimately signaled a shift in 
course.  
For certain commentators ‘old’ Labour gave way to the ‘new’ moniker because of what was 
perceived as the impasse of social democratic politics (cf. Leo Panitch) i.e. the inability to meet 
the expectations of its traditional supporters and trade union militants. Meanwhile, others posit 
that the shift relates to the structural dependence of the state on capital, with a left-leaning Labour 
Party having to convince financial capital of the probity of its economic policies (cf. Adam 
Przeworski and Immanuel Wallerstein).9 This dissertation has provided the historical evidence to 
                                            
8 For a more detailed explanation of the challenges that New Labour encountered, see Hay, The Political Economy of 
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suggest that both points of view are true. However, we can go further than this to suggest that from 
the examination of decentralization in relation to capitalist development and economic 
governance, there has been an ongoing struggle among the elements within the above two 
positions. Labour’s immediate postwar policies connected to the politics of scale offers a fifty-
year window into how and why the Third Way became prominent leading up to the 1997 election.  
This suggests a commitment to the maintenance of economic probity alongside social 
democratic objectives as Labour’s dilemma. When the Conservatives returned to power some five 
years after Labour won its first ever majority government in 1945, it was not long before internal 
party discussions took place about removing the socialist Clause 4 of Labour’s charter, taking aim 
at the commitment to the common ownership of economic production. This fact seems to be 
forgotten on the left: the dropping of Clause 4 by New Labour in the late 1990s sparked moral 
outrage. There are various examples of the tenuous connection between democracy and capitalism 
that continuously reappear once Labour nationally regains political power.  
Stating the above helps to contextualize the current period and the notion that the Labour 
Party has completely turned its back on its social democratic roots. This is not to say that there 
have not been departures from past practice, because there were, and they started with a rejection 
of renationalization in 1997. Moreover, the fiscal squeeze under the Conservatives had to be 
addressed when Labour was elected by placing a restraint on public spending. Also, Gordon Brown 
as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a five-year deficit reduction plan to meet 
current spending from taxation over the economic cycle. No changes were made to the basic or 
top rates of income tax and the corporation tax was cut from 33 to 31%. Tax revenue was raised 
in other ways: a tax on profits made by privatized utilities, the removal or reduction of tax 
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allowances, including tax relief on mortgage interest payments, and indirect taxes applied to road 
fuel and tobacco.10   
There were very visible changes to the framework of macroeconomic policy formulation, 
including the development of a Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England with interest-
rate setting to meet government-mandated inflation targets. With the exit of the Conservative 
government from the exchange-rate mechanism in the 1990s, power was shifting from the 
Treasury to the Bank. The Labour government brought in the Code for Fiscal Responsibility vis-
à-vis the Treasury in 1998, indicating that a key feature of its approach was based on considerations 
of creating a stable economic environment. The code coincided with the introduction of the Bank 
of England Act 1998, leading to the independence of monetary targets from government 
discretion.11 On the fiscal side, new rules were introduced, including an increase in the scope of 
public-private partnerships and the Private Finance Initiative. In the lead-up to the 1997 election 
Labour promised that if it won it would match the spending aggregates the Conservatives had 
promised in the event they were re-elected. Labour also would match the inflation target and 
borrow only for investment over the course of an economic cycle. Indeed, the New Labour election 
manifesto promised not to increase standard or higher rates of income tax during the coming term 
of Parliament.12   
This initial neoliberal set of policies is tempered somewhat by the fact that from 2001 to 
2010 the government did increase public and social spending to 47% of GDP, departing from the 
post-war trend of just under 40%. Fiscal tightening led to a surplus where a doubling of the share 
                                            
10 Christopher Hood and Rozana Himaz, A Century of Fiscal Squeeze Politics: 100 Years of Austerity, Politics, and 
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11 David Cobham, Christopher Adam and Ken Mayhew, “The Economic Record of the 1997-2010 Labour 
Government: An Assessment,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 29, 1 (2013): 7. 
12 Malcolm Sawyer, “Fiscal Policy Under New Labour,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 31, 6 (2007): 888.  
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of GDP to be spent on public investment included an increase in health by 4.7% per annum over 
the 1999-2002 period and education by 5.1%. Overall, the 2000 Budget Statement pledged to 
increase public spending by 2.5% a year in real terms for 3 years from 2001 and to double net 
public investment as a share of national income to 1.8% in 2004. Clearly, the approach after its 
first two years in office was different from the past as there was a downward trend in public 
investment and an unwillingness to raise taxes to pay for current spending. By 2000/01 British 
debt was down to 31.3% of GDP compared to Belgium, Italy and Greece, all close to 100%.13 
Nonetheless, Labour’s primary concern was to create conditions for real growth, even at the cost 
of generous welfare programmes. UK GDP growth from 1997 to 2010 was second only to the US 
within the G7. From 1997 to 2008, GDP per worker growth was as fast as in the US, which then 
reversed during the recession years reflecting more aggressive job shedding. Average annual 
growth in value added in the market economy in the UK was 3.2% from 1997 to 2007, slightly 
behind the US, but above the EU average, largely due to the total hours worked.14  
The above summary requires significant qualification. The focus on national aggregates 
masks the rising levels of income inequality starting in the neoliberal era of Thatcher, accruing to 
the benefit of the top decile of earners all the way up to 2007 under New Labour. According to 
Jeremy Green this amounted to a 135% increase. Moreover, he states that in Britain, 60% of 
increased income went to the financial service sector despite it only constituting 5% of the entire 
workforce, and the rising share of the top 1% corresponded with a rising volume of FDI flows. 
Previous chapters noted the role of FDI in creating dependent branch plant economies during the 
                                            
13 Ben Clift and Jim Tomlinson, “Credible Keynesianism? New Labour Macroeconomic Policy and the Political 
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transition from older, primary industries like coal to manufacturing. Yet the volume of FDI 
intensified in the late 1990s and mid-to-late 2000s, reflecting the many mergers and acquisitions 
that occurred in that period. Indeed, cross-border mergers and acquisitions accounted for over 75% 
of all global FDI, which had a dramatic impact on the structure of British capitalism.15  
The trade deficit in manufactures got much larger and there was some deterioration in the 
balance of payments, though offset by a substantial improvement in knowledge-based services like 
finance and business services including consulting, engineering, IT, and R&D. Whatever growth 
took place in knowledge services would be unable to offset the projected losses to be expected as 
a result of the decline in energy self-sufficiency. North Sea Oil was running down to the point that 
by 2025 the UK would only be 25% self-sufficient in energy. Ken Coutts et al. indicate that the 
decline in tradable goods affected the old industrial North of Britain more than the service based 
South, which exacerbated a long-run shortfall of jobs and a shift in the balance of population as 
interregional and international immigration responded to different employment opportunities. The 
North has been far more dependent on tradeable goods, which made it vulnerable to industrial 
crises, and with fewer financial services employed it gained much less from the expansion boom 
of the 1980s and 1990s. With respect to an employment gap, the male employment rate was 20% 
lower in the North.16 
Attention was diverted from manufacturing by focusing on monetary targets important to the 
price of Sterling, and it came at the cost of tradeable goods industries. The Monetary Committee 
was neither able nor willing to deal with asset prices or the exchange rate without risking inflation 
targets, which concomitantly relates to wages, consumer prices and ultimately employment. 
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Indeed, manufacturing’s share of overall economic output in the UK fell from 30% in 1980 to 15% 
in the mid-2000s, with more than two million jobs lost in the manufacturing sector during the 
1980s, a million more in the 1990s and around 1.5 million during New Labour’s time in 
government. The emphasis on a strong pound has an impact on international competitiveness, and 
it serves to support the City’s orientation in international capital markets. In comparison to other 
European countries, British manufacturers rely more on retained profits and equity finance than 
on bank loans for investment because they are relatively unprofitable, while most OECD nations 
rely more on bank lending. The focus on financialization keeps the focus on equities in markets 
and property rather than investment in the production of tradeable goods. The growth of hedge 
funds (another consequence of the focus on equities), further exacerbates the short-term direction 
of the economy. This all contributes to the decline of manufacturing, negatively affecting the 
ability of the UK labour market to produce high quality and well-paid jobs, constitutive of the 
problems facing young people; higher skills profiles are rewarded over traditional vocational 
pathways. Indeed, sectoral transformation has seen a dramatic rise in low paid jobs which 
increased 17% from 2008 to 2012.17 
The productivity divide was discussed throughout the second and third chapters where we 
saw how differences in industrial composition, productivity and spatial location are interwoven 
with political actors’ conscious strategies to concentrate economic activities in urban 
agglomerations. What is relevant is that the urban-rural divide since the 1950s has been associated 
with a growth in productivity in all types of rural (not simply agricultural) business in the UK, but 
this trend has slowed and even reversed. What the urban-rural divides mean for class formation 
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and voting patterns is particularly relevant given that sectoral reorganization is spatially redefined 
over time, and moreover, it also becomes relevant during times of economic downturn, as is noted 
below.  
Following World War II, there was the assumption that for capitalism to be compatible with 
democracy it would have to be subjected to political control to protect democracy from being 
restrained in the name of free markets. Yet as Streeck notes, the present defense of economic 
freedom hinges on ideas that capitalism requires the protection of markets and property rights 
against political interference, independent regulatory authorities, along with central banks 
protected against electoral pressures and international institutions that do not have to worry about 
re-election.18 The tensions within New Labour’s policies were noticeable in its competing 
political-economic priorities: a pro-cyclical focus can be problematic when demand falls and 
excess capacity emerges. Also, the use of monetary policy to fight inflation has negative 
externalities for the productive economy as it can feed the tendency in Britain to suffer an interest 
rate premium, suppressing investment and driving up Sterling, penalizing tradable exports. Lastly, 
a flexible labour market leads to high job turnover.19  
Labour’s heavy dependence on the economic growth generated by financial services, most 
notably financial markets, started to unravel in 2007. Interdependent Anglo-American financial 
interaction entailed the City positioning itself to draw in American financial power centered on 
banking in London and New York. The greater openness to capital flow put pressure on the UK to 
look to the quality of the business climate as a crucial condition for their competitive success. As 
a result, financial markets experienced waves of deregulation internationally and became more 
important instruments of coordination, as well as to court wealth. The close tie between finance 
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capital and the banks was increasingly connected to stock exchanges where Britain and the US had 
the advantage.20 But a dramatic inverted pyramid of household and bank debt built on narrow 
assets like American house prices started to fall at a rapid pace.  
Following the detailed discussion of Robert Skidelsky, the housing boom that both the UK 
and the US experienced at the turn of the 2000s was built on securitization and it was through this 
that sub-prime mortgages entered the world banking system. The bundling of mortgages into 
different risks was sold to sub-prime borrowers. This took off after 2000 as as result of 
deregulation: the repeal in 1999 of America’s Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which forbade retail 
banks to engage in investment activities related to securities; the decision by the Clinton 
administration not to regulate credit-default swaps; and the 2004 decision by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission to allow banks to increase liabilities to net worth from 10:1 to 30:1. Banks 
were caught with mortgage-backed debt. By the end of 2007, UK household debt reached 177% 
of disposable income, mortgage debt climbed to 132%, and from 1997 to 2006 house prices 
increased by 97%. Initially, the British bank Northern Rock - offering home loans of up to 125% 
of the value of the property and 60% of whose total lending was financed by short-term borrowing 
- applied for emergency support from the Bank of England which prompted the first run on a 
British bank, and some six months later in February 2008 the bank was nationalized at a cost of 
100 million pounds. With the subsequent buying of the American Bear Stearns by JP Morgan 
Chase a few months after Northern Rock, governments around the world were rescuing banking 
systems from collapse. Adding to this, as these institutions panicked, they locked up liquidity.21   
The role of finance in the British economy put the UK especially at risk as Britain’s global 
banks carry liabilities that dwarf the nation’s output. Debt servicing costs increased because of the 
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recession, social services spending soared, there were simultaneous plunging stock prices, falling 
GDP, rising unemployment, and a balance of payments deficit that increased as international trade 
slumped. This was a private sector crisis that became a public debt crisis, and the Labour 
government chose to spend, cut taxes and enact a fiscal stimulus package.22 The devastation caused 
by the crisis included marked unemployment, loss of housing and personal savings. It was a 
reminder that capitalism is inherently crisis-ridden and that state intervention in the economy was 
imperative. The tide in favour of public spending in a time of crisis soon became a public debate 
between competing ideologies about economic credibility and the management of public finances. 
Under the Labour government British economic problems were understood in terms of a crisis of 
growth, and they were focused on restoring a growth model. This underlying logic would be used 
to fight a general election.  
The 2010 general election produced a hung parliament, but shortly thereafter a Coalition 
government was agreed to between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The 
Conservatives understood the crisis as debt-driven and addressing the deficit and debt would go a 
long way to resolving the growth crisis. Consistent with this discourse, the Coalition constructed 
the credibility and debt sustainability constraints as its fiscal policy. The prioritization shifted away 
from fiscal stimulus in favour of fiscal consolidation towards recovery, and this repositioned 
austerity over public expenditure.23 This indicates that the British government in the wake of the 
worst crisis in modern history would seek to reduce the deficit and alter the role of the government 
in providing public services. Indeed, the Coalition sought a private enterprise-led recovery and 
                                            
22 Hood and Himaz, A Century of Fiscal Squeeze Politics, 182. 
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introduced a host of cuts in public and social spending that were the largest since 1921-22.24 
Corporate tax was reduced from 25 to 24%, one of the lowest among developed countries, income 
tax thresholds were raised for taxpayers at the lower end of the income scale, while the top personal 
rate, which Labour had raised to 50%, was reduced to 45%. There were, additionally, plans for an 
extra spending squeeze on departments in non-protected areas, i.e. outside the NHS.25 David 
Cameron’s project used tropes like the Big Society, building from ideas about rolling forward 
society versus rolling back the frontiers of the state. But this is exactly what it did - withdraw state 
interference and resources – rearticulating the composition of economic development institutions 
and actors.26 But by far, the post-2010 emphasis has leaned even more towards what some have 
called neoliberal urbanism,27 with a localist agenda as the cornerstone of the national economic 
development repertoire (addressed below in the local scale section).  
There are clear shortcomings in the financial deregulation arrangements introduced under 
New Labour. Considering that monetary policy was privileged over fiscal policy for 
macroeconomic stabilization, and that monetary policy was a responsibility of the Bank of England 
rather than the Treasury, it certainly can be said that the government was unable to influence the 
business cycle. On the other hand, the nature of global financialization and international pressures 
on the domestic economy need to be considered at the same time. Even within a more politicized 
monetary policy, directing the economic cycle is not as simple as asserting an active versus passive 
approach, as the 1970s reminds us. The extent to which the City is at the heart of the British growth 
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model makes it difficult to regulate given its reinforcement during the post-war period, and 
especially under the monetarist direction of the 1980s and 1990s. 
As noted above, the record of New Labour reflects competing and contradictory tensions. 
The party erected national policies like a minimum wage, provided family credits, and the use of 
indirect tax revenues to redistribute resources and fund expenditure on public services. 
Nonetheless, the focus on a growth model that underplayed the importance of boosting the 
manufacturing sector proved a serious problem only recognized as such when it was too late; it 
took a severe economic crisis to trigger the notion of rebalancing the British economy. The paradox 
is that New Labour and then the Coalition government were simultaneously anxious to avoid a 
negative impact on London. The irony here is that this is a mere rediscovery of a long-standing 
problem, something highlighted throughout chapters two and three of this dissertation. Imbalance 
and inequality remain a primary concern among the devolved administrations as talent, investment 
and business in the South contributes to the broader UK economy whilst negatively affecting the 
periphery.  
According to Ron Martin et al., the scale of spatial economic imbalance in the UK has been 
growing since the late-1970s, accelerated in the 1980s, and continued to increase in the 1990s and 
the first decade of the 2000s. Margaret Thatcher used the rationale of a supply-side focus in 
Northern regions by claiming they lacked entrepreneurship, innovation and skills. Her desire to 
see increasing returns and external economies of agglomeration balanced among an equilibrium 
of economic life failed to recognize trade-offs between spatial concentrations of economic activity 
versus the dispersal of activity. In other words, highly skilled and well-educated workers fill roles 
in the financial sector fueled by market-led processes, spatially sorting workers towards more 
productive higher wage city regions. The concomitant is that underperforming cities are simply 
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‘too small or have restrictive planning rules that constrain economic development’.28 Missing from 
this focus is that regions (as is explained in the next section) are intricately bound to institutional 
governance structures entrenched at Westminster and Whitehall, with uneven access to capital 
markets.  
Taking into consideration that capital is purposefully territorialized to satisfy partisan 
interests, the trajectory of economic development tends to channel power unevenly across spaces 
and scales of the state.29 Moreover, just as post-war Keynesian regulatory structures were part of 
a process and narrative of state planning, the advance of neoliberalism as a political project is 
associated with other forms of strategies of rescaling. The current qualitative reorganization of 
state capacities involves shifts in the structural form and strategic orientation of different ties and 
levels of the state and a complex reconstitution of state and market relations. The question is what 
kind of struggles are being waged and by whom, and how rescaling reflects and produces relative 
power.30 Not only does this tie into the political economy of the national scale, but it also relates 
to new forms of devolved and fragmented policy architectures within an already asymmetrical 
governance framework, something we turn to below. 
 
The Regional Level from 1995-2016: Devolution to the Regions and New Asymmetries of Power 
 
Upon taking the leadership of the Labour Party, Tony Blair insisted on implementing 
referendums concerning devolution, with two key questions to be asked: if people wanted political 
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devolution, and if the devolved legislature should have income tax-varying powers. This was partly 
intended to disarm English back-bench parliamentary criticism of devolution. The Scottish 
referendum was held in 1997 with a 60.2% turnout. It was decisive at 74.3% in favour of 
devolution and 63.5% in support of tax-varying powers. The proportion of the electorate voting in 
favour of devolution was therefore 44.7%. By contrast, the Welsh referendum had a narrow victory 
for devolution at 50.3% of the population in favour of devolution. With an overall turnout of 
50.2%, the proportion of the electorate that voted in support of devolution was 25.3%. This result 
was achieved because of an alliance between Welsh-speaking Wales, the heartland of the North 
West and the industrial Wales of the valley, former coalfield areas.31  
Devolution differs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, respectively. The Scotland Act 
1998 was introduced in Westminster and it granted Scotland primary legislative powers in a range 
of policy areas. The Scottish Parliament is empowered to pass its own legislation and can increase 
the base rate of income tax. The devolution of powers includes: health service and public health; 
local government, housing and planning, and personal services; the environment (though subject 
to EU regulation); agriculture and fisheries, also regulated by the EU; public transport and roads; 
cultural matters; the courts and legal system; and criminal law and policing in Scotland. Overall, 
the Scottish Act rejected separatism and federalism, while safeguarding the unity of the state. 
Members are elected via an additional-member system similar to Germany’s, meaning that fifty-
six members are elected proportionally with seven in each regional constituency, and then seventy-
two members are elected via single member parliamentary constituencies. There is a separate 
executive led by a First Minister, also comprising other ministers appointed by the First Minister. 
In addition, the Parliament has a fixed term of four years, and the Scottish Parliament as well as 
                                            
31 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 199-200.  
 
 
179 
 
the executive have direct relations with the Crown rather than the Secretary of State acting as an 
intermediary.32  
In contrast to Scotland, the Government of Wales Act 1998 conferred executive rather than 
primary legislative functions to a National Assembly for Wales. The secondary powers covered 
land-use planning, education, economic development, control over local government finance and 
the allocation of EU structural funds.33 The National Assembly retains sixty members directly 
elected by the same system as in Scotland, forty in the single-member constituencies via FPTP and 
the remainder elected proportionally, each from the five regional European parliamentary 
constituencies in Wales. The Act required the Assembly to elect a First Secretary and establish 
committees reflecting party balance in the Assembly (which sits for fixed four-year terms). While 
the Welsh Assembly initially had no independent power to pass legislation or raise taxes, by 2006 
Westminster followed recommendations to allow the Welsh Assembly the power to legislate 
certain policies. Further, as a result of the 2007 Assembly elections with Plaid Cymru becoming a 
coalition partner, it managed to extract from the Labour Party the opportunity to host a full law-
making referendum in 2011 (and garner political authority along the lines of what exists in 
Scotland).34 A large part of the new state apparatus emerged at the regional scale between central 
and local government, including the Scottish and Welsh Offices, quangos and government offices 
in the regions. Historical asymmetry impacts the current institutional designs on devolution. In 
Wales, the Welsh Office historically was more limited than the Scottish Office: there was no 
convention on devolution as in Scotland, there was less elite cohesion, which partly explains why 
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devolution was more gradual than robust. Nonetheless, institutional change was welcomed after 
the experience of the Conservatives appointment of partisan Secretaries of State to promote new 
right policies in Wales. In addition, subnational political actors considered an assembly vital to 
advance Welsh interests in a more competitive and Europeanized market economy.  
Traditionally, the primary Britain-wide political party organizations overrode territorial 
interests, and this makes devolution interesting because it added a new territorial dimension into 
UK politics with the potential to denationalize parties in two new regional level party systems.35 
Yet, the two new systems were characterized by Labour dominance; for the first ten years of the 
new legislative body in Scotland, and in Wales for every election up to the present (including the 
most recent 2016 election). The nationalist parties like the SNP and Plaid Cyrmu have been the 
main opposition parties. However, in Wales there has been a remarkable rise of the Conservatives 
within the devolved system, eventually becoming the main opposition party to Labour in the 2011 
election. In Scotland, the Conservatives were marginalized until the 2016 election when they 
became the main opposition party, and Labour gave way to the SNP, which as of 2007 has been 
the governing party. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats found a solid footing in the devolved 
legislatures by joining coalition governments. One problem faced in the new political settings is 
low voter turnout, as elections went from 60% turnout in Scotland and 50% in Wales in 1998 to 
49% and 38% in 2003 respectively, lower than the historic low in UK general elections. Devolution 
has meant that party performance and voting behaviour varies, in the new context of multi-level 
electoral politics. 
Amidst the successes of third parties, Martin Laffin et al. note a resilience of the Labour 
Party at the regional level. To succeed in Scotland and Wales, Labour must compete in subnational 
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party systems that differ from the UK level, which generates different strategic pressures. A major 
factor influencing party politics is proportional representation, which ensures that Labour is not 
the sole political actor comprising government. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats are very important 
to the story of politics in the age of devolution; they have found a place within Scotland’s and 
Wales’ governing coalitions that would not have occurred without proportional representation. 
Some observers consider the national Labour Party indifferent to devolved administrations as they 
came to recognize the strategic realities facing Labour in Scotland and Wales, focusing their 
energy on winning state-wide general elections. There is, thus, a notable policy space for devolved 
governments to make their own policies divested from the central party and specifically the 
National Economic Council.36  
To understand the policy performance of devolved legislatures, scholars like Paul Cairney 
have argued for a balanced approach, recognizing both differences in policy implementation and 
similarities to UK level executive-style governance. Devolution has given pressure groups strong 
incentives to engage with territorial governments, and they now play an important part in policy 
development, which makes for a distinctive policy style as the government makes policy in 
consultation with interest groups and local authorities. The Scottish government stands apart from 
Westminster, producing unique policy choices and outcomes. Where there are divergences from 
the national level it generates a more social democratic image. Indeed, flagship policies of the first 
Scottish government included the introduction of free personal care for older people, the reduction 
and abolition of higher education fees, free public transit for seniors, a pay increase for teachers 
and then the abolition of quasi-markets in health care. Yet, when comparisons are made with the 
national level, there is a mixed picture and qualifications are needed as policy styles are not simply 
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a difference between more social democratic and consensual policy-making versus majoritarian 
and neoliberal implementation. The electoral system in Scotland has not produced a remarkably 
different type of consensus politics because Westminster’s executive-legislative mould was 
adopted in Scotland. One of the reasons for this is that for the first eight years there was a marked 
form of majoritarian coalition government, and familiar, though different, forms of governance 
continued when the SNP formed a minority government in 2007. The distinctive policy agenda in 
Scotland is complicated by the reserve powers held by Westminster, and because of the national 
government’s control of economic policy there has been a reluctance of certain groups to accept 
reorganized internal structure. For example, business and unions often maintained a continued 
focus on issues reserved to Westminster, as major banks and businesses still operate in a UK and 
international economy. Core decisions are made in London and thus everything from investment 
to employment law, pay bargaining, pensions and minimum wage are retained nationally. This has 
meant that devolved administrations must work hard to secure the support of business leaders and 
unions like the STUC as the Scottish economy is at the heart of the independence debate.37 
In Wales, one interesting facet of the switch to a new electoral model is that the mixed-
member proportional system altered candidate selection with more women pursued to balance the 
assembly. Efforts led to a gender-equal assembly, and after 2003, the first-ever majority female 
legislature in the UK.38 Such a historic achievement adds to democratic advancements associated 
with devolution and proportional representation. Simultaneously, the reality is that there was much 
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confusion concerning the scope of Assembly members’ secondary powers. Renewed debate over 
Wales’ constitutional position came quickly in the new millennium. Pressure from Plaid Cymru 
and the Liberal Democrats forced Labour to agree to a formal constitutional review that it might 
not have done otherwise. The reopening of devolution was given impetus in 2000 with a Labour-
Liberal Democrat coalition deal. A Royal Commission was led by Lord Richard, and the 
subsequent Richard Report informed the 2006 Government of Wales Act. The Act provided 
statutory confirmation to separate the executive from the Assembly and enhance the secondary 
powers of the Assembly. The Act also introduced the prospect of moving to primary powers and 
a revision of the MMP system. Ultimately, opinions about the model of devolution in Wales are 
mixed, and some observers stress that any hope for real autonomy was subverted by Labour’s 
governance style and policies. Meanwhile, others have claimed that devolution showed promise 
because it denied one party rule.39 
Historically, there was no equivalent tradition of administrative decentralization in England 
as in Scotland and Wales, but previous chapters have documented various forms of top-down 
deconcentration that were coordinated with bottom-up initiatives derived from individual regions 
and localities. Some commentary about devolution in England suggests that it lacks a regional 
identity, and because of this vacant regionalism there is no push from below to establish any 
subnational distinction from the national level. This is a short-sighted view because the historical 
geography of capitalism informs the identity of the North East and West of England, two regions 
impacted by the ongoing North-South divide. The creation and use of the terms North West and 
East were associated with coal mining, iron and steel production, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, 
and chemicals, the sectors these regions are known for. Thus, emerging spatial labour processes 
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embedded the dominant industries that rapidly assimilated residents into unionized industrial 
structures.40 Moreover, the central state’s English regional approach to economic development 
only allowed constrained forms of discretion. This was applied differently across party lines, as 
Labour viewed deconcentrated forms of economic decision-making across the standard regions as 
one method to address the structural inequalities of capitalist development, whereas the 
Conservatives were far more reluctant to maintain regional apparatuses that could potentially 
inhibit the market.  
Class politics have been especially relevant to the Northern regions of England, and they do 
not simply conform to a post-industrial picture. Even in the 2000s the manufacturing sector of the 
North West and East accounted for 30% of their GDP, higher than the national rate of 24%.41 
During the 1990s a regional political consciousness began to emerge in parts of Northern England. 
This took place within the context of modifications to regional policy structures under the 
Conservatives, but also in response to greater European integration. The deepening of EU 
integration produced a shift in parts of England toward more regional organization in order to 
compete more successfully for structural funds.42 In fact, the regional aid programme for poor 
regions in Europe made regional groups in England aware of their democratic shortcomings in 
comparison with most other regions in the EU that had had a measure of political devolution. By 
the 1990s, it was clear that some form of regional government was necessary to do business with 
the EU. Yet, English regional structures of governance beyond the capital were only made more 
coherent by the Conservatives when they created the Government Offices of the Regions. As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, these institutions administered and coordinated national policies 
subnationally, providing central government an enhanced presence in the regions. What shifted 
with respect to subnational economic development thinking in the 1990s was that the region 
became the focal point of the so-called post-Fordist political economy. Regional development was 
increasingly couched in terms of regional self-help, and redistribution was removed from the 
agenda going into the 2000s.  
On the left, regional policy development was renewed by an economic rather than political 
impulse. As Paul Benneworth describes, in 1996 Labour Party proposals for Regional 
Development and Regional Skills Agencies were published, envisaging the regionalization of 
some of the powers delegated to non-departmental public bodies i.e. quangos, as an administrative 
precursor to full political devolution in England. Proposals for English devolution in the 1997 
manifesto were even less explicit than a few years earlier. Economic considerations were primarily 
concerned with less successful regions closing the productivity gap with the South, and this led to 
certain efforts to regionalize spaces of economic development.43 The efforts made by the Labour 
Party were three-pronged: first, the already existing Government Offices of the Regions were left 
in place to coordinate and monitor, acting as the main link between regions and central 
government, as well as working in partnership with municipal governments. Second, regional 
development agencies (RDAs) were created in each region in 1999 with representatives from local 
government, the business community, the voluntary sector and other social partners. The RDAs 
were appointed to coordinate regional economic development, regeneration initiatives and 
competitiveness by establishing regional economic strategies. They were given resources and 
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responsibilities including land and property development budgets.44 Third, unelected English 
Regional Assemblies (ERAs) were simultaneously created alongside RDAs in 1999. These 
regional chambers comprised local authority councillors and representatives of regional business 
and community interests.  
This loose trifecta of regional governance was supposed to increase the efficiency of 
government to improve economic prospects. Three specific reports produced by the Treasury 
outlined the new government’s regional policy approach: Productivity in the UK, No. 3: The 
Regional Dimension (2001); A Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom (2003); and 
Productivity in the UK, No. 4: The Local Dimension (2003).45 These documents provide a picture 
of how the government now understood the causes of regional disparities in economic growth and 
the targets for policy intervention. According to the reports, regional GDPs differ by productivity, 
and to improve performance there must be a focus on drivers, namely investment, innovation, 
enterprise and competition. This challenged older conceptions of the regional problem and it 
aligned with a new vision of regional policy. Old policy was run from Whitehall whereas the 
devolved approach is flexible and allows for regional and local institutions to deliver government 
objectives. Indeed, the regional institutions look to their own style while operating in a centralized 
framework 
There were even further moves in Labour’s second term towards regional government with 
the 2003 Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act paving the way for referenda in three Northern 
regions. The ERAs could be transformed into elected democratic legislatures upon a successful 
popular vote. Only one took place, in the North East, ending with a resounding no vote of 78%. 
Not only did it remove the prospect of democratizing the regional tier in the North East, it put to 
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rest any thought of a referendum in the other Northern regions. One reason for this dramatic lack 
of support was the fact that there had been restricted powers proposed. Another problem, described 
by Ian Deas, was that a more formal structure brought forward problems with brokering 
compromise among competing interests as there has been fractures in the business community 
over an elected assembly with budgetary and scrutiny powers. There is also the Labour Party’s 
bias against elected regional government on the grounds that it threatened the party’s city- and 
local authority-based view of subnational government. The prospect of an expanded remit beyond 
growth-oriented planning has created conflict, on the one hand, with the city-focused emphasis on 
urban renaissance and neighbourhood renewal agendas, and on the other hand with the 
geographical focus on efforts to develop clusters and new industrial spaces. This reflects 
contradictions in national policy as interregional competition is an aspect of Labour’s agenda, 
producing conflict-ridden territorial politics.46   
Returning to the idea that England lacks strong regional identities, New Labour’s modus 
operandi contrasted with previous forms of regional decentralization, but the failure of the 
referendum in 2004 in the North East raises questions about why the region was challenged in 
England. Scholars like John Harrison would argue that it is a result of ‘centrally orchestrated 
regionalism’. Changes to English regional governance triggered a new wave of interest in regional 
government; for example, the regional assemblies were supposed to exercise some form of 
‘democratic’ accountability over the RDAs and foster regional civic cultures, enabling regional 
patterns to work better together by giving local authorities, business, unions and community groups 
a stake in regional governance. However, regional chambers of stakeholders were removed from 
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democratically elected MP criticism, and they were not given executive powers. Ultimately, they 
were excluded from key decisions about the allocation of resources and the design of policy but 
were still expected to deliver services against performance indicators. In this sense, the state was 
integral to enabling or restricting the devolutionary process, not only defining how it operates but 
simultaneously contributing to the indifference towards regional institutions.47  
The regional modernization agenda was motivated by the idea that regions were integral to 
a fully functioning capitalist state. The fact remained that new regional institutions were 
entrenched in the contradictions of past waves of regional policy, and this is appreciated by 
recognizing the critical role of the state and asymmetries of power. For Harrison, the new regional 
policy assumed that regions could intervene in the economy, smooth over its contradictions and 
ensure economic growth. New Labour’s economic regionalization of government policy 
privileged an economic versus democratic regionalism. It is true that the skeleton of regional 
democracy was laid out. However, the underlying concept was problematic, namely that all regions 
could generate wealth through new subnational institutions of governance without addressing 
structural weaknesses in the national economy. Regions managed to be important catalysts of 
indigenous growth clusters focused on small-scale projects, but they were never powerhouses. It 
is more than likely that the electorate voted 78% against regional democracy because the state 
refused to eliminate the asymmetrical powers attached to the new devolved administrations. 
Moreover, the state backtracked on statements regarding the ability to raise taxes, and it added 
regional institutions into the Comprehensive Spending Reviews and Public Service Agreements.48  
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Following the referendum in the North East in 2004, Labour in 2007 replaced regional 
chambers with local authority leaders’ boards and government policy shifted towards city-regions 
and functional economic areas. The government began promoting local flexibilities in the context 
of performance incentives, integrating the regions more fully and providing them with greater 
discretion over expenditure. This drive continued along the lines of administrative decentralization 
versus political devolution. Several years after the initial regional agenda was implemented, 
increasing evidence questioned regionalism’s economic dividend as seen by the inability to reduce 
disparities between regions. As a result, the new solution was to focus on city-regions as a more 
suitable territorial scale to promote economic development, leading to Multi-Area Agreements 
endorsed in the 2006 Local Government White Paper. The government then published a Review 
of Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration seeking to declutter the subnational tier, 
and improve effectiveness and efficiency in order to deliver economic growth targets. It 
encouraged local authorities to promote economic development by pooling sub-regional resources, 
and ultimately abolished the ERAs in 2011.49  
Two factors need to be noted before moving to the next section. First are the economic 
underpinnings of regional policy and how regions are left with the task of attenuating larger 
structural barriers within the national capitalist economy. New Labour assumed that more 
accountable and representative sub-national governance arrangements would serve to generate 
greater capacity for policy innovation in response to economic and social challenges. State and 
institutional restructuring was supposed to reinvigorate the economically underperforming regions 
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of the country whilst allowing the UK’s economic engine in the South to run smoothly.50 In the 
new millennium, the way spatial disparities are supposed to be addressed is by expanding clusters 
(agglomeration) of innovation.  
One aspect reiterated in this dissertation is that the parts of Britain cannot be considered in 
isolation from each other as they are connected by trade, investment, migration, and differently 
scaled sources of institutional decision-making. To be sure, sectoral variation is relevant 
considering that the private sector in London and the South East is resilient. According to Robert 
Rowthorn, on a per capita basis, employment in the private sector is 15 to 20% higher in the South 
than the North. If we include London, the number is around 40%. Higher employment creates less 
reliance on state aid, and by that measure, areas of higher employment are also less effected by the 
prospect of political cuts made to public expenditure. By way of contrast, Northern regions are 
heavily reliant on state grants to support public expenditure. Related to issues surrounding the loss 
of export-related industries in the North and the likelihood of the gap between the North and South 
continuing to widen are the industries that fill labour market gaps in the periphery. For example, 
in the wake of the collapse of industrial employment, the government has made the effort to attract 
call centres to the North, and by 2003 these employed 290,000, with an additional 160,000 working 
in these centres in ancillary occupations. This amounted to 3.7% of total employment in the North, 
but 22% of employment in financial and business services, and it accounted for 41% of the increase 
in employment in the North since 1971. These jobs are particularly vulnerable to offshoring.51  
This situation fails to be appreciated by some in England; a narrative has been promulgated 
about the so-called ‘Celtic advantage’ because its institutional development over time has 
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presumably allowed it to reap the benefits of greater foreign investment. However, Scotland still 
suffers from the post-war branch plant effect when foreign companies restructure their operations. 
The spatial effects of economic development and working-class inequality carries forward into the 
era of devolution. To be sure, Wales, has become poorer, not richer since devolution, and has less 
than 80% of the UK average GDP per capita. In addition, class continues to be rarely spoken of 
but pivotal for devolved governance where in Scotland for example low income households are 
around one million people out of a population over five million.52  
The second factor relates to the mechanisms of allocating public expenditure and how they 
perpetuate inter-territorial inequity. While spatial disparities are impacted by a combination of 
market exposure and economic cycles, as well as sectoral differentiation, they are also impacted 
by the constitutional and political imbalance arising from asymmetrical devolution. This was 
indeed the basis of the Sewell convention of Westminster that grants the national government the 
power to legislate for the devolved administrations. The convention does state that it would not 
normally legislate for regional matters without the consent of the devolved legislature. Moreover, 
none of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales or that of Northern Ireland can 
alter the terms of devolution, including the number of members of the legislatures, the electoral 
system used, or the nature of executive power and its relation to the legislature, which are outside 
devolved competence. This gives Westminster a veto over constitutional development.  
Intergovernmental relations are therefore essential to governing the UK after devolution.53 
Concomitantly, local or devolved legislatures need revenue from the central government to finance 
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their expenditure plans. Labour elected to oppose devolution’s tax-raising powers because it 
argued that the government’s approach to finance should be focused less on geography and 
political clout for the allocation of public resources. The party felt that it would be difficult for 
macroeconomic policies to be successful if they were confronted by recalcitrant local and regional 
authorities. The Welsh Assembly has no revenue-raising powers at all, while the Scottish 
Parliament has the power to vary the basic income tax rate, but the permissible range is limited. 
The government can thus increase taxes at its discretion but given that Scotland’s Parliament is 
dependent on Westminster for financing, it has fewer options. One is to withhold finance from 
local government, as 40% of the block grant goes to finance local authority expenditure. If in fact 
the devolved bodies withhold finance from local authorities, the latter need to raise council taxes 
to maintain services. This makes devolution quite limited with respect to its financial 
arrangements; there was a discrepancy between political and fiscal decentralization, as the 
devolved legislatures lacked the power to raise and spend tax-generated revenue.54  
The grant distribution framework is still the Barnett formula mentioned in the previous 
chapter. At the time of its creation, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were receiving higher 
public spending per head than England, and over time the formula was intended to level public 
spending across the three territories. In Scotland, by the early 2000s there was little convergence, 
and in Wales disparities with England only worsened. Moreover, there are also biases built into 
the distribution of funds among the English regions, caused largely by the way resources are 
allocated to local authorities, with London receiving much more than any other English region. 
Thus, the formula is considered unfair by poorer English regions, Scotland, and especially Wales.55  
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Recent years have seen increasing debate around how the devolved administrations should 
be funded, particularly the extent to which they should have greater tax raising powers. The 
Scotland Act 2012 introduced at Westminster will allow Scotland’s parliament to vary income tax 
rates and retain a proportion of all income tax raised in Scotland. Further fiscal autonomy is likely 
in the future. At the same time, the Commission on Devolution in Wales in 2012 explored the case 
for the devolution of similar tax-raising powers to the Welsh assembly. Dissatisfaction with the 
block grant is that a region’s funds are not based on its own spending needs, but rather on year-to-
year changes in grant levels determined by spending levels in England. Concerns were reignited 
in two recent reports: The House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett Formula 2009 and the 
Holtham Commission reports, aka the Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for 
Wales 2010. They recommended that the current formula be replaced by some form of expenditure 
assessment that would allocate grants based on estimates of relative spending needs.56  
The grant formula became even more problematic with the onset of the global economic 
crisis in 2008. It raised overarching questions about the sustainability of economic growth models 
primarily focused on the driving forces of the national economy in the South of England. Yet, 
since taking national power in 2010 - first in coalition with the Liberal Democrats and then in 2015 
as a majority government - the Conservatives have honed their dominant economic policy 
discourse on competitiveness and market efficiency. The austerity agenda during a major recession 
influenced regional designs on creating the Scottish Investment Bank and even gaining 
independence from the UK. The Scottish National Party sponsored an independence referendum 
in 2014 which did not win, and this was heavily connected to its ability to operate a traditionally 
high public expenditure economy with less factor endowments than England. Nonetheless, the 
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national government was forced to respond with The Scotland Bill 2015 that will give the Scottish 
parliament responsibility for 40% of revenues and 60% of expenditure in Scotland, which 
represents a considerable increase on the revenue side. The reality is that there remains 
considerable support for independence; 45% of the ballots cast in the 2014 Scottish referendum 
were for independence. A second independence referendum could be on the very near horizon 
given the push by the Conservatives for an exit from the EU. The ‘Brexit’ referendum has created 
friction about devolved responsibilities because many of the functions accorded to the regions 
during integration with Europe are being renegotiated as they are ceded back from the EU. The 
political back and forth between devolved administrations and the centre is that the regions are set 
on maintaining their control over devolved responsibilities; meanwhile the centre may try to take 
them on at the national level.  
 
The Local Level from 1995-2016: Local Economic Development and Municipal Restructuring in 
the New Millennium 
 
There are different perspectives on local government reform in the age of devolution. New 
Labour claimed it was above all about democratic renewal and the re-engagement of the public, 
while others are more critical, claiming the programme of modernization is only tangentially about 
democratically decentralizing central-local relations.57 Rather, New Labour’s approach 
institutionalized centralized mechanisms of monitoring local level performance alongside the 
creation of ‘business-friendly’ environments. To be sure, the Labour Party did propose a reversal 
of many restrictions imposed on local authorities during Margaret Thatcher and John Major years 
and a restoration of some of councils’ lost powers. They also signed the European Charter of Local 
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Self Government in 1997, indicating respect for local government as a valued part of the system 
of governance, something that the Conservatives denied.58 Going even further, we can observe the 
championing of neighbourhood renewal, community strategies, and the use of civic forums to 
provoke alternative methods of public participation. However, two decades of emerging neoliberal 
public realm management in the UK that challenged an established division of roles was not simply 
reversed by Labour once in power. Mike Geddes claims that the political economy of new localism 
contains a harsh reality of institutional deregulation and intensifying inter-spatial competition to 
the point that a shift in the balance of power between capital and labour to the advantage of capital 
is present in new governance apparatuses.59   
New processes of rescaling local and regional development were closely tied to devolution 
and new public management thinking. The creation of statutory spaces of urban and economic 
planning at subnational levels was accompanied by the parallel creation of public-private 
governance and constrained forms of discretion. The rationale has been to continue to promote 
new local governance that advocates the sharing of responsibilities between stakeholders including 
but also beyond, the public sector.  
1997-2010 
Themes concerning the local scale were particularly relevant to the New Labour government 
in 1997, specifically political management, the range and scope of local economic development 
activities, community engagement, and service delivery standards. The government published its 
modernization programme for local government in Modern Local Government – In Touch with the 
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People in 1998 indicating that the government wanted to place more responsibility on local 
authorities, but not in their present form.60 One reason was linked to how the Conservatives used 
capital limits to threaten municipal council service priorities, and these financial pressures affected 
capacity. Despite years of resistance, local authorities mostly learned to adapt by being pragmatic. 
In fact, even when facing a loss of certain functions by contracting out through compulsory 
competitive tendering, local governments still had the resources and legitimacy to lead and give 
focus to policy-making and service delivery.61 However, the geographical variations in economic 
circumstances impacted leadership concerning the direct provision of services. When New Labour 
entered office in 1997, they recognized the spatial dimension of economic policy to a greater 
degree than other post-war governments, stating that national assisted-area policies had failed to 
provide the organizational capacity required to address the impact of globalization on local 
communities.62 New Labour addressed this problem by legislating into action various local policy 
networks to coalesce with the implementation of Regional Development Agencies and Regional 
Assemblies in England. This new regime would further challenge how local authorities mobilized 
and adapted to national imperatives. Ultimately, Labour would increase its funding of local 
government, but in a controlled way to limit local authority resistance.  
The New Labour government had identified several possibilities for reform including 
opening public service areas to alternative providers and encouraging community interests to 
deliver a shared vision for local action. These principles were embedded in the Local Government 
Act 2000. Within the Act were Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). These were a non-executive 
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body consisting of stakeholders from the public, private and voluntary sectors to promote local 
economic, social and environmental priorities through a statutory community strategy. LSPs were 
also responsible for other aspects of New Labour’s agenda including the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal with the goals of lowering unemployment and crime, and providing 
better health, education, housing and physical environment. LSPs were further tasked with the 
rationalization of local partnerships to form a local umbrella institution to ‘join-up’ organizations. 
Indeed, ‘joined-up’ government was supposed to display an integrative capacity across functions 
and professions at a strategic and operational level. This was meant to provide a mechanism that 
would develop a capacity for collective local action.63  
Birmingham provides an example of how a metropolitan local authority viewed partnerships 
as working with communities towards local governance and with providers to deliver services. A 
multi-agency called the City Strategic Partnership was developed to create a long-term community 
strategy. At the same time, a City Forum was proposed as a body to allow communities of interest 
to present views to Council and place issues on the public agenda. Birmingham has a tradition of 
decentralization that especially developed in the 1980s as discussed in Chapter 3, and this evolved 
into a city-wide network without the necessary political lines of control. By the end of the 1990s 
the Local Involvement, Local Action initiative provided decision-making powers to Ward Sub-
Committees and granted them limited budgets. This was followed by a Birmingham Democracy 
Commission that framed how to utilize the principle of subsidiarity to encourage democratic 
participation. By 2001, Council produced A New Partnership for Governance that developed Ward 
Strategic Partnerships that were accountable bodies under the national Local Government Act 
2000. Between the partnerships and forums across communities there were challenges of holding 
                                            
63 Helen Sullivan, “Is Enabling Enough? Tensions and Dilemmas in New Labour’s Strategies for Joining-up Local 
Governance,” Public Policy and Administration 20, 4 (2005): 10, 12.  
 
 
198 
 
representatives from various local agencies to account as traditional government moved to new 
governance partnerships. Moreover, concerns were also expressed with regard to modest increases 
in citizen engagement.64  
Another area of reform concerned local economic and community development, which 
included various programmes: the Local Authority Business Growth Incentives Scheme in 2002 
that provided local governments a proportion of the increase in local business rates; the Local 
Government Act in 2003 allowed local authorities to borrow for investment in capital works; there 
was further stimulation of local commercial development in 2004 by introducing Business 
Improvement Districts designed to bring together local businesses and councils to devise 
improvement schemes; and then in 2005, a Local Enterprise Growth Initiative for deprived areas 
with funding based on competitive bidding. Furthermore, concerns around inner city regeneration 
tied into development through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) and the New Deal for 
Communities (NDC). The NDC programme comprised thirty-nine neighbourhood-based projects 
that could draw on the NRF over a ten-year period. To address the lack of funding to non-NRF 
areas the government decided to create Local Area Agreements (LAA). The 2006 Local 
Government White Paper set out a process of negotiating central-local financial management and 
funding. Despite these changes, the new institutional structures did not alter the speed, scale, scope 
and coordination of local economic development.65 
These new partnership arenas did have implications for locally based agencies and party 
politics. The partnerships opened the business of local authority and public service provision to 
scrutiny, but the LSPs were largely based on negotiation among sectoral local elites. Thus, the 
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membership of LSPs and NDCs were not only reflective of traditional class interests, i.e. of that 
of capital and labour, but the inclusion of community interests did not eliminate their elitist 
character. The findings are that LSPs gave greater power and legitimacy to private capital and new 
public management principles in local policy-making. The reason is that there were few sanctions 
or pressures placed on businesses to participate in LSPs and business decisions factor largely in 
the success of local strategies.66 Meanwhile, the NDC partnerships presented their own challenge 
to local authorities that parallels what LSPs did at a wider local level. Labour’s understanding of 
participation was political and assumed that community activism could be stimulated and deployed 
in the service of specifically politically conceived aims. As Adam Dinham notes, community 
development does not start from an ontology of the political person within a community, meaning 
there are divergences between civic-political and community development aspirations. This was 
borne out in how new partnership roles were filled; professionals and established groups filled 
spaces alongside residents, thus impacting processes by making them less an organic community 
than a statutory political body for strategic planning, treading a thin line that risks becoming 
another layer of bureaucracy.67 
The government also embarked on a broad level of reform couched in terms of institutional 
innovation and better public service delivery including the Best Value Regime and later the Audit 
Commission’s Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) process. Local governments had 
to prepare a local performance plan setting out targets to be inspected by appointees of the Audit 
Commission. In addition, Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) introduced in 2001 were 
extensions of the central government Treasury department. They set out an authority’s 
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commitment to deliver specific improvements in performance and to set the reward for doing so. 
LPSAs were connected to performance management regimes via labels like Best Value. These 
measures were less prescriptive than the compulsory competitive tendering introduced by the 
Conservatives, but they still tightened the centre’s grip on local government. In 2001, the CPA 
took over the Best Value program and used it in two ways: one as a punitive component against 
those at the bottom rung of the performance table, and the other as a method to implement national 
priorities by rewarding the ‘best’ councils with access to a prudential borrowing regime.68  
New Labour had added their stamp on localism by heavily focusing on asymmetrical 
devolution and political management. From 1997-2010, other major reforms included the 
introduction of a directly elected Mayor of London and the creation of the Greater London 
Assembly (GLA); the introduction of a separate executive body at the municipal level, whereby 
new council constitutions would require authorities to replace traditional committee-based 
decision-making structures with an executive in the form of a leader-and-cabinet or an elected 
mayor, with a distinction between executive and legislative roles; certain changes in electoral 
procedures; and territorial reorganization towards a unitary structure of local government. These 
processes would challenge the thesis that the politics of scale in the era of neoliberalism was simply 
a matter of consensus between the political left and right. Hence, the nuances attached to each of 
these processes of restructuring indicates that Labour was invested in certain types of political 
change the Conservatives would not have embarked on (at least not in the 1990s). This is certainly 
the case for London as the Conservatives took issue with a powerful Labour-controlled capital 
city. Previous chapters have noted the extent to which the Conservatives have altered the local 
scale as a foil against Labour.  
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That being the case, despite the 2000 Local Government Act’s new political decision-making 
structures, it did not reshape how decisions were made as originally envisaged. New council 
constitutions did not modify member-officer relations; elected mayors were not widely adopted 
with only 3% of councils undergoing the change in the early 2000s.69 In contrast, the other 97% 
adopted the leader-cabinet system with the separation of the executive. The larger changes were 
most notable in London with the creation of the GLA, which was truly novel, because it devolved 
power to an executive Mayor while giving the Assembly weak powers of scrutiny. The Mayor was 
required to produce strategic plans for economic development, transport and the environment, all 
integrated into a spatial development strategy. According to Peter Hall, it was the first attempt by 
the UK government to implement the European Spatial Development Perspective recommended 
for EU members to move towards regional spatial development. Local scale fragmentation was 
still visible in London as the region was partitioned between two RDAs, the GLA and the Office 
for London, making an effective strategy for the region difficult to coordinate.70  
It is relevant to note the degree of influence the business sector obtained in the GLA via the 
London Development Agency. The agency was under the direction of the Mayor and responsible 
for economic development, but the board was business-led. Additionally, the London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry promoted a London Business Board to the new GLA. Further, the London 
Branch of the Confederation of British Industries and London First agreed to join the board, and 
the City of London Corporation secured a position with respect to the newly devolved Mayor’s 
office. As was noted above, there was also a host of community leadership stakeholder 
involvement in political spaces like the Civic Forum that sought resident inclusion in identifying 
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major issues facing Londoners, but the business lobby had far more influence on agenda-setting. 
This speaks to the extent to which the governance of London catered to business interests in a new 
era of decentralization.71 
By the mid-2000s, while the regional level remained important to the government’s strategic 
framework, implementation worked best at the city-region, sub-region and local levels, which 
meant that economies of scale in service delivery in economic development were better in the form 
of multi-area agreements. The traditional perspective of the regional problem was realigned with 
the idea that cities were the engines of regional growth. According to John Maswon, this was the 
backdrop to the Sub-National Review (SNR) in 2007 that assessed sub-national governance and 
provided a way to promote economic development. The SNR recommended bringing together the 
Regional Spatial Strategy and the Regional Economic Strategy, and in each region, creating a 
Single Regional Strategy prepared by the RDA and a Regional Forum of Council Leaders. In this 
sense, sub-regions were the key spatial level around which growth is concentrated, and the 
objective was to increase the extent to which economic development was managed at the sub-
regional level. The SNR notably emphasized local government’s leadership role in mobilizing 
resources, securing collaboration across local authority administrative boundaries, and 
coordinating business support. Nonetheless, historic tension in central-local relations remained 
because of local authorities’ heavy reliance on grants provided by the national level. Moreover, 
the inter-agency coordination across city-regions included policy coordination between various 
institutional arrangements and these were remote from where private sector organizations made 
investment decisions.72 
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City-regions in the spatial governance of England revolved around political-economic 
debates concerning differences between economic and administrative boundaries, how subnational 
organizations and institutions could contribute to localized economic development, and the North-
South divide. With the creation of Regional Development Agencies across England in addition to 
devolution in London, a major issue concerned investment decisions in the lagging regions, and 
how to spatially intervene and manage the physical location of industry. This was, of course, an 
old problem carried forward to a new era. The political clout of London was very clearly 
observable when New Labour committed £22 billion worth of funding to the greater South East. 
The blowback from this pushed Labour to open a Northern Way programme based on spatial 
growth that ran between Liverpool and Hull and Newcastle and Leeds with a £100 million 
investment. The Northern Way programme resonated with Northern leaders and economic 
stakeholders; the three Northern RDAs were motivated to outline what the North should do 
differently for faster economic growth and to bridge the productivity divide with the South of 
England. Thus, without a spatial-political response to uneven development, economic challenges 
would remain.  
Regional mobilization also connected to the work being done at the local level in the Core 
Cities Group that consisted of eight regional cities (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, 
Manchester Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield), which worked towards formalizing a role that 
large cities would play in their regional and national economy. It became clear that the RDAs and 
the Core Cities Group were working at different scales, i.e. the region and the city, to overcome 
the same economic challenges. They chose to combine their efforts and re-launch the Northern 
Way program to create a competitive city-regional plan, indicating that city-regionalism was not 
only on the government agenda, but was also set to replace the region as the territorial basis for 
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subnational economic governance. As John Harrison argues, the construction of city and regional 
spaces involves a deliberate assembling of newly decentralized institutions to suit changing 
geographical logics of capitalism.73  
City-regionalism is further connected to local scale questions concerning the extent to which 
planning is subordinated to inter-regional competition and economic development imperatives, as 
regions must make bids to garner investments. Indeed, the way cities and regions are constructed 
is constitutive of wider systems of multi-level governance. How the state strategically and 
selectively intervenes in rescaling the subnational level, is reflected in the way that regions and 
cities are marketed to multinational firms, and how land-use planning is used to secure industrial 
placement and jobs. The political element is that democratic decision-making must not be used to 
frustrate incentives to overseas firms, like the mobilization of regulatory parameters on prospective 
development sites. This was apparent for example when the Welsh WDA was able to bid on and 
win a commitment by LG, the Chinese electronics giant, to make a major investment in the region. 
The lack of regional coherence in England in comparison to Wales’ WDA greatly assisted with 
the facilitation of Wales’ application. Land-use planning for major FDI is a noteworthy part of the 
inward investment bidding process because all development is ultimately assessed by elected local 
planning authorities. Hence, companies like Samsung, Siemens and LG can be attracted at the 
expense of environmentally sensitive greenfield locations if permitted. Combined with tax 
incentives and simplified control arrangements, processes can be expedited to encourage 
development in one area versus another.74 The layering of networked forms of governance 
embraced by the Third Way philosophy of New Labour was added to the already uneven 
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institutional, economic and social legacies of local spaces, and it stimulated the development of 
entrepreneurial localities. Spatial planning has been a part of the reworking of the state at the local 
level and a tactic used to encourage economic growth in a subnational context.75 
The local scale is also fascinating when considering the relationship of local governments to 
devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales. Indeed, local authorities were among the key players 
in laying the groundwork for devolution, particularly in Scotland where the Convention of Scottish 
Local Authorities played a central role in the Scottish Constitutional Convention.76 Post-
devolution, Scottish local councils are important to the Scottish Parliament’s executive regarding 
the delivery of devolution’s promise to enhance democracy and political accountability. The 
contrast with England in an immediate sense is the small-scale nature of central-local relations 
where there is proximity and interpersonal relationships between members of the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities, Scottish civil servants and politicians. Prior to devolution, the Scottish 
Office established a commission to investigate the relationship between the incoming new Scottish 
Parliament and local government. The McIntosh Report recommended a joint agreement among 
the thirty-two councils and the Parliament, to have a standing joint conference to deliberate based 
on equality, and that legislation should provide councils with statutory power of general 
competence. The Scottish Parliament ultimately implemented most of the recommendations, and 
central-local relations were initially focused on community leadership and a renewal of local 
democracy. The Renewing Local Democracy Working Group produced thirty-six 
recommendations to improve democracy, including the implementation of a more proportional 
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electoral system. Most favoured was the Single Transferable Vote (STV),77 but this was not well 
received by Labour councillors within Scottish local government as 78% of them were opposed to 
PR in local government. The outcome was that the Scottish Local Government Bill in 2001 ended 
up being silent on local electoral reform and it would take until 2004 for the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act and 2007 for the first election to be carried out under STV. Scotland went on to 
follow modernizing prescriptions based on the English and Welsh requirements in the Local 
Government Act 2000. Scotland went down a more conservative route as many councils rejected 
an executive model. There are in fact similarities between local government in Scotland and in 
England and Wales, especially in the New Labour era of performance assessments and ‘joined-up’ 
partnerships. Just as in England and Wales, Scottish councils are dependent on national grants. 
While definite priority was given to encouraging the participation and engagement of Scottish 
councils, central (Scottish Parliament)-local relations are not dissimilar to England and Wales and 
the UK government considering that the language used and applied addresses managerial change 
and financial reform.78 
As Phillip Allmendinger suggests, devolution is often regarded as democratic evolution, but 
the outcomes may not necessarily or ordinarily amount to variance in policy between devolved 
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administrations. He suggests that there are distinctions between institutional and organization 
change; the former concerns rules and norms and the latter administration and politics.79 
Devolution is especially important as an opportunity to study the extent of governance rather than 
government; not simply between how the centre shifts from the national to the regional level, but 
also the extent to which private, public, community and individual residents are included in policy-
making. In the devolved regions the Labour Party was prominent for the first ten years, which is 
claimed to have impacted the pace of potential change. However, assessments indicate that in both 
Scotland and Wales, there was an increase in the degree of influence that local authorities were 
exercising collectively and individually. Central-local relations did experience tensions in the mid-
2000s as local governments were claiming that the Scottish Parliament was hardening and 
acquiring powers familiar to those of Westminster. In Wales, local government appeared to have 
enhanced the quality of dialogue between the Welsh Local Government Association and the Welsh 
Assembly government. Nonetheless, the Welsh Assembly was concerned with public sector 
reform - from a point of view that respected partnership with local authorities – seeking alternative 
ways to deliver services; this meant that Wales was not immune from English influence.80 
2010-2016  
As the above indicates, the local level is vital to how the politics of scale connects to 
structural economic issues and partisan maneuvering. Scalar processes are recursive and involve a 
reorganization of local government to fit with new eras of modernization. The next phase of the 
political economy of scale began with a newly elected Conservative and Liberal-Democrat 
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coalition. Interestingly, the Coalition government championed devolution and viewed local 
government as a key agent in the national level’s agenda. The Coalition was focused on 
dismantling what it identified as the centralization of New Labour’s power at Westminster. 
According to Nick Clark and Allan Cochrane, the Conservatives immediately set out to abolish 
Comprehensive Areas Assessments, Local Areas Agreements, Regional Strategies, Government 
Offices of the Regions, the Standards Board regime, and the Audit Commission. The goals were 
to increase the general powers of competence of local authorities by reducing statutory 
responsibilities and the regulatory guidance of Whitehall, and simultaneously encourage power 
beyond local government by allowing actors like private-sector firms to set their own terms and 
conditions of contracts.81  
The Big Society emphasized alternative governance in neighbourhood and civil society 
management, with Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) as the most structured form of 
collaborative public realm management. While these partnerships with local authority were used 
during New Labour’s tenure, in the decade since these were enabled more than one-hundred and 
eighty BIDs have been created. They are hotly contested, as some see them as a mechanism to 
tackle the decline of city centres and improve local service delivery without utilizing public funds 
while others argue they are the deployment of private wealth to establish privatizing agendas. The 
latter claim speaks to the fact that the population at large do not normally have a direct say in BIDs 
decisions.82 The new localism of the Coalition government utilized economic incentives to 
encourage local authorities freeze council taxes, maintain business rates and introduce pro-
business policies, which were largely aligned with the national government’s austerity agenda. 
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The localism agenda was notable with the implementation of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
in 2010. By 2011, there were thirty-nine LEPs and the result was a highly differentiated local 
geography that challenged the reasoning behind the abolishment of Regional Development 
Agencies. They lacked statutory authority and promoted local growth in a context of uneven 
recovery post-recession; some 79% of private sector jobs created from 2010 to 2012 were in 
London and for every public sector job created in London, two were lost in other cities.83 
The paradox between austerity and devolution is said to be something that can be resolved 
by reforms promoting a more efficient and ‘smarter state’. This has been referred to as 
decentralized austerity by Vivian Lowndes and Alison Gardner because it shifts the responsibility 
to the local level while also cutting funds and services. It is also an interesting turn of events to see 
the Conservatives gain a majority government in 2015 and focus heavily on devolution deals, 
especially considering where the party stood on devolution in the late 1990s. The Conservatives, 
according to Lowndes and Gardner, have focused on a localism agenda as an economic growth 
strategy based on city agglomerations. Plans for sub-regional devolution were pioneered in Greater 
Manchester in 2014, which built on the creation of a Greater Manchester Combined Authority in 
2011. The creation of the GMCA was a method to earn business rates revenue and oversight of 
funding, conditional on directly electing a mayor. The Conservatives in 2015 took this further with 
the Cities and Devolution Bill, when all local authorities were invited to submit a proposal to 
combine. This was followed by the Sheffield City Region Combined Authority and two others that 
cover the North East of England. For Lowndes and Gardner, this represents a method to distract 
from cuts while bringing local assemblages closer to the central government’s interests. In one 
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way, the push by the Conservatives to have directly elected mayors is political because it 
challenges long-standing Labour power bases held in councils. Devolution deals also do not come 
with Assemblies as in London, and there is no new money granted for the combined authorities.84 
In the end, this comprehensive picture of devolution at the local and regional levels, combined 
with national macroeconomic objectives, must be brought into a discussion about democracy. In 
the last section of this chapter, I address the nuances, contradictions and conflicts among economic 
development, political modernization, and the public’s participation in political and economic 
affairs. 
 
Coalitions of Interest and the Political Economy of Scale from 1995-2016: Post-Democracy, 
Deliberative Democracy, and De-politicization in the Era of Devolution 
 
A large portion of commentary on the twenty-first century regarding politics, economics and 
democracy is that everything has aligned with neoliberalism and this has become manifest in the 
public sector vis-à-vis new public management, and further trickled down to the public’s level of 
individualization in public engagement. It is hard to fully disagree with this sentiment as the 
changes in the new millennium are palpable. These include the restructuring of capital-labour 
dynamics and the impact this has on inequality in society, as well as the way austerity, deficits and 
taxes inform the design of public services. But with that said, this dissertation has argued that 
democracy as a historical phenomenon must be understood in relation to economic development 
and the partisan contentions at inter-related scales of the state not one or another scale, but all of 
them. More specifically, capitalism is the tie that binds these contentions to different scales of the 
state. The political, social and economic contradictions that arise from spatially differentiated 
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economic development both influences and is simultaneously impacted by the scaled organization 
of the state. In other words, we have observed eras of capitalism, and in these eras, democracy has 
been tenuously interwoven within power relations. We too often look back to golden eras to 
denounce the present without realizing that previous epochs were also contradictory, but in 
different ways. 
This chapter carries the above analysis further by focusing on a political experiment that 
allows us to contextualize subsidiarity. Britain devolved power in 1997, which offers the 
opportunity to observe any differences between the past and present epoch. More broadly, this 
chapter contributes to comparative democratic research because of its preference to categorize 
waves of democratization primarily in terms of the transition to newer, more expansive 
mechanisms of political decision-making.85 In fact, the first wave of democratization by several 
accounts was the expansion of the franchise and consolidation of the aggregative form of 
democracy. The second wave of democratization was ‘participatory’ in that it was concerned with 
citizens more broadly-defined and how they resented top-down politics, as well as the 
incorporation of historically marginalized segments of the population, even within the context of 
universal suffrage. Popular forms of protest in the late 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s spawned 
bottom-up challenges to top-down paternalism, which was viewed as an explicitly different form 
of democratic participation. For certain democratic theorists, the present period entails a 
deliberative turn in democracy.86 This consists of the broader trend of more openness and 
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transparency in government, increased use of public hearings, new experiments in deliberative 
policy-making, especially in local and administrative law, and collaborative policy-making and 
decentralization of administrative structures.87 The relevance of this assertion for our discussion is 
that many observers viewed devolution as democratizing democracy in Britain.  
The real question is whether these developments amount to a paradigm change. Just as the 
economy has shifted to neoliberalism but not in the form of a simple consensus, so has democracy 
become more participatory and deliberative in certain ways, but not without the qualification that 
these practices vary according to sponsoring governments and agencies. Research concerning the 
latter is increasingly being couched within a systemic approach that seeks to understand an 
encompassing political system and how small-scale public forums can or are being scaled and the 
challenges they encounter.88 Some would argue that the current era is a third transformation of 
democracy not only because of the deliberative turn, but because it amounts to post-parliamentary 
or post-representative politics. The idea of post-democracy is that the political issues of the past 
are becoming less or even non-political, and their depoliticization implies relocated arenas of 
democratic contestation. Some see depoliticization as the exact opposite of the popular 
mobilization of the participatory revolution of the 1960s because it takes the politics out of issues 
and utilizes neutral non-confrontational language to inform decision-making, revolving around 
pragmatism, efficiency and professionalization. In this sense, democracy is less about 
emancipation: new leadership styles subvert contentious politics and thus people, conforming to 
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the new political economy of neoliberalism.89 Considering this contextualization, there are three 
facets concerning post-democracy and politics, as well as the third transformation of democracy, 
that need to be mentioned to close out the chapter.  
1. Depoliticization is less apparent when factored into how politics works at different scales 
of the state, namely the devolved administrations. The atmosphere of politics at the regional level 
was still taking on a government versus opposition dynamic well into the 2000s despite the 
transition to a consensual style proportional representation system. This is interesting because one 
of the most influential taxonomies concerning formal democratic systems was developed by Arend 
Lijphart and one of the core stereotypes he notes is that Britain is less like its European 
counterparts. This was due to the electoral system utilized at the national level. In this perspective, 
the executive-legislative relationship firmly in the Westminster mould ensured that the 
majoritarian variation of democracy lacked a diffusion of power across sectors.90 In contrast, the 
subnational level in Britain has produced interesting findings particularly because it operates under 
a new proportional model. In Scotland, scholars have noted how institutional innovations have 
both vast and limited effects on executive-legislative relations. In terms of the latter, the reason is 
that the first decade of the Scottish Parliament was marked by a form of majoritarian coalition 
government. The findings are similar in Wales as well. Minority coalition agreements were very 
workable, but government relations have also been read as a return to adversarial politics as parties 
like Plaid Cyrmu established themselves as official opposition and along a more traditional 
parliamentary arrangement.91 At the same time, and contrary to the depoliticization thesis, leaders 
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in the regions politicized various issues. While the argument could be made that the old class 
versus capital semantics appears to have ebbed in the neoliberal era, it has not disappeared, 
especially as concerns the politics surrounding austerity, the North-South divide, and the 2008 
financial crisis. The class history of the regions was addressed at length in chapters two and three 
and their context has been relevant in the devolved era particularly because Labour in Scotland 
and Wales also had to distinguish itself from Labour nationally; in some instances, there were clear 
breaks with New Labour, as was seen with the rejection of using the private sector in delivery 
public services by Welsh Labour. 
2. There is less of a third transformation of democracy within the context of devolution, but 
rather, expanded bases of public engagement in new institutions have simultaneously incorporated 
influential private sector networks. The movement towards an invigoration of the British political 
system consisted of several democratic objectives. One was the abolition of all but ninety-two 
hereditary peerages in 1999 by the Labour Party; the reform was to be part of a larger set of reforms 
including the introduction of the Human Rights Act in 1998 as part of the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This was a statement of the rights of the citizen and a 
limitation of the power of the executive to make the state more accountable. Another major reform 
introduced in Labour’s 1997 election manifesto was to appoint a commission of inquiry into the 
electoral system and hold a referendum on the outcome. The report of the commission favoured a 
more proportional Alternative Vote plus system, but there was no referendum and the commitment 
was ignored in both the 2001 and 2005 party manifestos.92  
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The idea that politics was about becoming more open, transparent and accountable thus 
seemed to be underway, though many have highlighted that the denial of electoral reform was a 
clear sign that the type of democratic advancement Labour was interested in was more cynical than 
what was presented to the public. Nonetheless, these developments point to the contradictions and 
difficulties of democratic advancement within the context of neoliberalism. To better understand 
the extent of the third transformation of democracy, we must turn our attention to the 
democratization of the regions, because we really find some fascinating experimentation with civic 
engagement at the subnational level. The sections above implicitly spoke to the simultaneous 
expansion and failure of genuine democratization to all the regions, but what was left out was how 
the actual reforms sought the inclusion of the public. 
Norman Bonney has provided an interesting snapshot of devolution and public engagement 
in Scotland. He mentions that the Consultative Steering Group for the Scottish Parliament’s 
recommendations expressly emphasized participation by citizens in the making of parliamentary 
and hence executive policy. The first term of the Scottish Parliament maintained a close connection 
to organizations that were foundational to the Scottish campaign for devolution, and these were 
given special status in the new devolved administration through the Scottish Council of Voluntary 
Organizations Commitment. An effect of devolution has been to make consultations more public 
where they previously often happened behind closed doors in the Scottish Office. Indeed, new 
institutions for the making of legislation and policy have been forged, but there is a tendency for 
more organized and resourced interests to have a strong influence on proceedings in committees. 
In fact, the emphasis on participatory democracy generated what amounts to elite action to inform 
politics in Scotland. Bonney calls this the participatory democracy of organized interests.93 
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In a similar examination of Wales, Elin Royles describes how the White Paper on devolution 
A Voice for Wales, published in 1997, indicated how devolution was equated with a more inclusive 
and participatory democracy in Britain. In Wales, the difference observed in the development of 
civil society’s involvement in devolution was impacted by the internal focus of devolution within 
the Labour Party in Wales. With the lower turnout of support in the devolution referendum - 
arguably influenced because Labour’s lack of initiating civil society inclusion in the campaign for 
democratization - it became very clear that the new Assembly would have to try and cultivate a 
strong sense of civic engagement. Devolution did impact how organizations engaged the Welsh 
Assembly: there was a commitment on behalf of the Assembly to public inclusion but also a 
statutory requirement in the Government of Wales Act to develop a Voluntary Sector Scheme to 
guarantee a role for voluntary associations in committees. This provided regular access to political 
channels, but the style of executive devolution impacted the engagement of civil society because 
the Assembly had to heavily focus on engaging Westminster as it did not have primary legislative 
powers. Moreover, civil society organizations required high level professionalization in order to 
influence the Assembly. Devolution transformed the use of engagement in the political process, 
but this had mixed consequences as many organizations depend on funding and the financial 
differences between civil society organizations means that there is inequality in how the public 
engages.94  
3.  The participatory and deliberative innovations that have taken off in the era of devolution 
have a complex connection to multilevel governance reforms.95 On the one hand, the New Deal 
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for Communities did present something unique in that it was part of New Labour’s devolution 
package that led to community governance structures within English neighbourhoods, potentially 
leading to new norms of democratic legitimacy. Hence in certain contexts, community-based 
organizations have come to be viewed as legitimate representatives of their communities - 
speaking on behalf of people and spending money for them - challenging the idea that the council 
chamber is the only site for democratic decision-making. In some cases, the way this legitimacy 
was conferred was by having local community representatives elected by residents within the local 
communities where these organizations were located. Scholars have been examining the lengths 
to which legitimacy is issue- and place-specific, conditional and susceptible to challenge in the 
context of community governance. They find that the diffusion of some resources to local 
neighbourhood regeneration partnerships opens new input and output opportunity structures.96 
On the other hand, the discourse and institutional mechanisms associated with ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ simultaneously challenges the broader extent to which community governance is 
inclusive and participatory. As we have seen, in the context of devolution both public and 
stakeholder engagement are claimed to be core features of new governance structures, and yet 
there is no one-size-fits-all approach. To be sure, an example of new participatory engagement 
structures in England included the several hundred organizations that Civic Forums drew 
stakeholder input from. One concern with these forums was that they were more concerned with 
fostering cross-sectoral debate, but ultimately, they did not play a large role in agenda-setting or 
the production of applied strategies rather than operate as a mechanism for the consultation of 
different public-private interests.97  
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Another prominent approach was Economic and Social Partners (ESPs) and these were 
supposed to include representatives of diverse constituencies. One apparent problem with these 
organizations is that they contain a low proportion of women, black and other ethnic 
representatives. Like the Local Strategic Partnerships noted in the local scale section, there are 
concerns with the ESPs regarding styles of decision-making and how barriers prevented effective 
partner involvement. For the most part, ESPs were largely focused on umbrella organizations like 
the TUC and CBI. Additionally, civic groups have had to deal with the fact that local partnerships 
are limited by the influence of more organized and resourced regional governance networks.98 As 
Vivien Lowndes and Helen Sullivan argue, any potential for synergy between partnerships and 
public participation depends upon the types of partnership, the level at which they operate, and the 
roles available to the public. Ultimately, partnerships have tended to operate at the local level in 
one of three ways: strategic, sectoral and neighbourhood, each of which has implications for citizen 
participation.99 While research provides reason for optimism regarding opportunities provided to 
influence decision-making, particularly at the neighbourhood level, it also has found that the sub-
national level of governance is not simply more readily open to civic influence, especially at the 
sectoral (and even less so at the strategic) level. There are persistent administrative, political and 
procedural barriers to the democratization of decision-making in the era of devolution, as new 
structures have not been introduced onto a blank slate.100 
As previously mentioned, Labour’s localism agenda which included ESPs and LSPs, also 
led to the creation of Local Area Agreements (LAAs). LAAs set out the priorities for a local area 
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agreed by central government, local authorities and service delivery bodies, with the overall aim 
to deliver better local services by improving partnerships, establishing clear targets, and using 
resources more efficiently. As Kezia Lavan points out, these were to be achieved through devolved 
decision-making; by 2005, there were sixty-six LAAs nationwide. Yet, LAAs were experiencing 
problems in achieving local areas’ aspirations. As a response to the challenges they faced, the 
progressive circles that had been surfacing participatory budgeting101 as a tool to supplement 
LAAs, began to get the attention of local authorities and the national government in England.102  
Participatory budgeting is a very interesting phenomenon that deserves some attention here, 
especially because of its polycentrism and what this means for democratic innovation in the 
context of the UK. For many observers, it is one of the most accomplished and consolidated 
practices of participatory and deliberative democracy.103 The process humbly went from being 
implemented in one city, Porto Alegre, Brazil, during the transition from authoritarian to 
democratic rule in 1989, to being a practiced in upwards of twenty-eight hundred cities globally 
in 2013.104 There are various reasons why participatory budgeting has captured the ‘radical 
imaginary’ of activists and progressive left-leaning political parties around the world, not least 
because of the potential to fundamentally change prevailing socio-economic conditions.105 In the 
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early 2000s, the results of participatory budgeting were making international headlines, assisted 
by the attention brought to it by the World Social Forum.106 The 2000s were ripe for the export of 
participatory budgeting to the Western world, especially because of the ‘malaise’ being talked 
about.107 However, the introduction of participatory budgeting to European democracies, for the 
most part, amounts to a walking away from the model applied in Porto Alegre in the 1990s.108 
Even the Porto Alegre experience was eventually reduced to nothing by the mid-to-late 2000s, 
thanks to the lack of political support provided by a newly elected centre-right party in 2004, 
indicating that there are tensions associated with politicizing participation as a method to 
redistribute resources to working class and marginal populations.  
Participatory budgeting in England was initially seen as a method to involve the local 
community and voluntary sector in the LAA through decision-making about local priorities. A 
participatory budget cycle for decision-making, consultation, planning and spending was therefore 
seen as something that could be adapted and applied. It was not a national programme, but rather, 
areas using their own resources would choose to implement forms of participatory budgeting to 
achieve certain ends. Thus, one of the differences with the application of participatory budgeting 
in the UK was that it went through the echelons of the state bureaucracy, rather than it being put 
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on the political agenda by a Left-wing party. Yet, by 2002, participatory budgeting reached the 
national level when the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister started to examine its potential, and 
by 2004, the PB Unit was created to explore how participatory budgeting might work across 
different pilot areas. By 2008, participatory budgeting was finally connected to national policy; 
New Labour issued a White Paper called In Control: Real People, Real Power, that would aim to 
roll out participatory budgeting in all local authorities by 2012 (though this never did happen with 
the change in government in 2010). 
By 2008, participatory budgeting included thirty-four ‘grant-making’ pilots, whereby 
participatory decision-making was about awarding grants to community groups. Thus, 
participatory budgeting was mostly attached to community development and engagement rather 
than a politicized programme used to redistribute resources. Most of the projects were relatively 
small area-based arrangements that involved the allocation of limited discretionary funds to 
projects.109 The benefit of these processes was that many of them involved a much greater number 
of people in decision-making than any other local neighbourhood renewal planning process.110 In 
fact, prior to these processes resource allocation was primarily done by local councils. The 
participatory budgeting pilots varied in terms of the opportunities they provided for participation. 
In some cases, organizations were invited to bid on a proposed idea, and they would be responsible 
for implementing their project if it was selected. This is one of the larger critiques, namely that 
some of the processes were primarily comprised of professionals or representatives from the 
voluntary sector. Another critique is that some pilots provided limited opportunities for the public 
to discuss and ask questions about projects, which is a cornerstone of what participatory budgeting 
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is all about. This was not the case for all pilots; for example, Newcastle set up structures 
comprising a forty person resident-led group to develop their whole process.111 In all cases, 
participatory budgeting offered limited agenda-setting; the source of funding set the parameters 
within which decisions could be taken, i.e. transport budgets could only be spent on local transport 
projects, meaning funding did not necessarily address the most pressing local priorities.112 
As it has been described throughout this chapter, there are tensions in how democratic reform 
is connected to broader socio-economic objectives, and the extent to which newly decentralized 
practices are able to mobilize and empower people at the local scale. Observers have argued that 
the participatory budgeting model in the UK was aligned to Third Way politics, having to adapt to 
Labour’s culture of performance targets and central control mechanisms, rather than transform 
state-society relations.113 From a practitioner’s perspective, Lavan notes: 
It has been suggested by some council officers interviewed that the way PB models were 
initially proposed to local authorities in the UK was ‘naïve’. Those involved in the initial 
introduction of the idea into the country intended that ‘models’ based on research from Porto 
Alegre […] could be used to inform work in the UK. It was hoped that basic principles of 
redistribution, empowerment and direct democracy would be directly translated into a UK 
policy context of ‘narrowing the gap’, citizen engagement and neighbourhood working. 
Seven years later it is clear that this is not how PB is developing in the UK. It has been more 
of a case of an interaction of ideas seeking to find solutions to similar, but not identical social 
and political realities.114  
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Thus, we might conclude that participatory budgeting was a technique for the distribution of scarce 
resources, rather than a radical overhaul of how people understand their place in the democratic 
system.115  
The public sector funding environment changed significantly when the Conservative-led 
coalition government took over. Most of the discretionary funds the participatory budgeting 
processes were allocating no longer existed when the Coalition government took over. This was 
because the over-arching Local Area Agreements that participatory budgeting was connected to 
were abolished by the national level. The Coalition’s Big Society prerogatives to have 
communities locally engaged in a way that achieves more with less, was feared by some staff of 
the PB Unit, i.e. that under certain political conditions the development of PB could proceed as 
something characterized by ‘service users’ making individualistic and consumerist ‘choices’.116  
Despite this context, participatory budgeting carried forward and was politically supported 
at the regional level. There have been a number of pilots in Wales,117 and in Scotland, there were 
at least fifty-eight process that had taken place between 2009-2016. As is the case in England, the 
regional level’s implementation of participatory budgeting was mostly associated with grant-
making. Scotland is especially interesting because of the various formal reports and political 
support that has aimed to widen the use of participatory budgeting. For example, in 2011, the 
‘Christie Commission’ on the Future Delivery of Public services outlined a comprehensive public 
service reform agenda that should aim to empower individuals and communities receiving public 
services by involving them in the design and delivery of the services they use.118 Participatory 
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budgeting was thus something that has only recently taken off, and much of the reason is that the 
Scottish Parliament is in support of it. The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 led to 
the creation of the Community Choices Fund that supports participatory budgeting, is administered 
locally, and is focused on deprived areas. As with the cases in England, however, there have been 
similar opportunities and challenges in implementation and what the processes offer in terms of 
public dialogue and deliberation on projects.119 Overall, perhaps the most important consideration 
of participatory budgeting applied in the UK (and North America for that matter) is that complex 
institutional arrangements are not developed enough and prepared to accept new inputs on the 
design and allocation of resources beyond a limited level. Without that institutionalized connection 
between party and political support, bureaucracies, and the public, the fertile conditions that could 
potentially transform democracy, cannot meaningfully develop over time.120  
Increasingly, the public is approached by official institutions and political actors in the name 
of direct democracy. And the politicized use of referendums provides a telling example. The 
rhetoric of direct democracy is now commonly mobilized as a method to restructure scales of the 
state. But this is evidence of neither post-politics nor a third transformation of democracy. 
Referendums are an active mechanism used to promote the capitalist ambitions of partisans, and 
though referendums are presented as an instrument of broad-based popular participation, the way 
they are framed in Britain serves very narrow interests.   
Two very recent referendums, namely the Scottish independence referendum and the Brexit 
referendum, drew upon nationalism to mobilize populist sentiment in favour of political ambitions, 
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but underlying both were questions related to the regional and national economies and how 
capitalism could be better supported and mobilized. In Scotland, there were questions about the 
ability of the government to facilitate a transition from the reliance on grants provided by the 
Barnett formula and whether this would negatively impact fiscal probity. The Brexit referendum 
was also linked to in questions about the national level’s attachment to a supranational capitalist 
trade regime that partisans viewed as too controlling of British interests. One difference between 
the referendum in 2016 versus 1975 was that the ‘Leave’ side campaigners were able to sell the 
case that the euro zone was mired in debt, stagnation and unemployment.121 In 2016, sovereignty 
was a core issue as Leave voters were more likely to buy the mantra of ‘take back control of 
Britain’s borders’. At the same time, there was the promulgation of disempowerment, namely that 
Britain was unable to stem visible changes to communities caused by the influx of immigration. 
The result of the 2016 referendum was thus influenced by social class, race, generation and 
geography.  
The Leave vote won its strongest support in specific areas: communities that tend to be more 
economically disadvantaged than average, where levels of education are low, and the local 
population is heavily white.122 Geography is telling in that Scotland and Northern Ireland voted 
Remain, whereas Wales and all of England outside of London voted Leave. Additional factors are 
relevant to this picture: turnout was high in areas that tend to vote for the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) and the Conservatives, and these supporters have different generational values than 
younger people towards immigration, national identity and EU membership. The point is that 
Brexit was not just an exercise in popular sovereignty. To be clear, the UK Independence Party 
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was rebranded from the Anti-Federalist League in 1993 and began calling for an ‘in/out’ 
referendum on the UK’s EU membership over twenty years ago. This single-issue Eurosceptic 
political party solely focused on European integration, honing its anti-EU message over time, and 
was able to draw support from Conservative politicians, as well as increasingly disaffected 
populations impacted by the growing inequality generated by British and global capitalism.123  
The public was the ultimate arbiter of state scaling options in both recent referendums (as 
they were in the 1970s), and in the case of the Brexit referendum over thirty-three million votes 
were cast, one of the largest exercises in democratic decision-making in British history. One 
lingering question concerns the design of referendum processes: do referendums reflect 
contemporary deliberative democratic norms? This is relevant considering that most deliberative 
democratic forums tend to involve smaller samples of residents who spend time learning about an 
issue, and then collectively deliberating on how to address said issue, whereas direct democratic 
referendums are more focused on the individual act of voting to decide the outcome of an issue. 
What is concerning is how referendum processes are often about partisan maneuvering and 
manipulation. While the complexities of direct democratic referendums were already pointed out 
in Chapter 3, the more recent contexts of referendums fall within the era of the so-called turn to 
deliberative democratization. The connection between direct and deliberative democracy depends 
on the types of processes entrenched in the use of referendums, and the ways politicians and their 
political parties as well as the media attempt to manipulate them. Just a couple of examples of 
manipulation include the implementation of extraordinary process qualifications for determining 
outcomes, or the denial of public funding for ‘Yes/No’ campaigns leaving education to private 
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funders promoting their own agenda. The media can also be culpable by denying a neutral public 
space to educate the public on the pros and cons/yes and no sides of a referendum vote.124   
Scholars do note that there are types of referendums. For example, one defining criterion is 
who has the right to launch one. From a comparative perspective, referendums are either based on 
legislative initiation, or by initiatives stemming from the electorate, generally in the form of a 
collection of a stipulated number of signatures. The former tends to focus on plebiscites, while the 
latter mostly imports deliberative elements into referendums by providing multiple avenues for 
citizens to insert demands into a political system, including submitting concerns on behalf of 
citizens forcing the government to respond. This approach to referendums means that qualified 
voters can, if necessary, repudiate parliamentary decisions. This form of a referendum is notable 
in Swiss Cantons, but not in Britain. In this way, direct democracy functions in the decision-
making process beyond the legitimizing of governmental policies or ambitions. Referendums 
educate the electorate, stimulate political actors and insert citizens into multiple points of contact 
between the electorate and the elected. The longitudinal research on referendums in Switzerland 
suggests that participation is influenced by the design of political institutions, including how 
preparation phases of referendum processes are used to involve many people.125  
This chapter and dissertation both emphasize the structural tensions between economic 
efficiency and democratic renewal. Matthew Flinders suitably argues that “at the heart of modern 
capitalist democracy a double standard exists in that the system professes an egalitarian policy and 
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social system while simultaneously promoting an economic system that creates gaping disparities 
in well-being and the sum of this is the trade-off between equality and efficiency.”126 The social 
democratic solution to this was expressed by David Miliband in 2006 as then Minister of 
Communities and Local Government: empowering communities through additional devolution 
measures. He coined the term “Double Devolution” arguing that at local levels there was a need 
for a stronger framework of opportunity and responsibility, and that the driving principle of reform 
should be subsidiarity.127 As has been described, devolution is attractive because it promises to 
bring government closer to the people.  
This chapter has shown that there is good reason to suggest that devolution did bring exciting 
enhancements to democracy, but not exactly the double devolution envisioned by David Miliband. 
To be sure, the approaches described above, i.e. post-democracy, deliberative and direct 
democratic assumptions attached to decentralized governance, rarely address factors associated 
with class, partisanship and power struggles. Where the simultaneous approach to devolution is 
meant to establish economic powerhouses regionally and across cities there are contradictions in 
what this means for democracy. When the Conservatives returned to power they asserted the 
imperative that a Big Society be built on the principles of voluntary work, self-help and mutual 
aid to support a diminished state. The design of institutions or processes that promote public 
engagement and participation, vary by political level, ideological imprint, and the types of interests 
allowed to participate. Ultimately, this coincides with a dualistic aspect of capitalist democracy, 
namely that citizen and consumer approaches to inclusion are simultaneous expressions of the 
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dilemmas facing the self-development aspects of democracy and democracy that sustains 
governing between civil society and the economy.128 The combination of agents, norms and 
institutions plays out across political-economic scales, and as we have observed throughout this 
chapter this is complex, ongoing and conflict-ridden, but not without positive opportunities arising 
from the creation of new spaces of political restructuring. Democracy is always being transformed 
by action, and this will always involve politics, power and economics.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The Historical Lessons of the Political Economy of Scale in Britain  
 
An old adage speaks to the notion that truths are discovered by building on previous 
discoveries, or rather, by standing on the shoulders of giants. This dissertation has suggested that 
one way to nuance prominent discourses that examine inter-related social, political and economic 
phenomena, is to do comparative historical research. The critical social science epistemology this 
dissertation builds on seeks to uncover the mechanisms of macro-structural change associated with 
governments, states, economies and democracies. It recognizes the role that class plays in 
informing the structuring of political and economic institutions, relations and processes at different 
scales. Yet, the connection between class, political partisanship, and sectoral contestation, for 
example, are not the primary lenses through which many scholars tend to understand the specific 
phenomena this dissertation focuses on to inform the mechanisms of macro-structural change in 
advanced industrial countries, namely decentralization and devolution. As Alex Law and Gerry 
Mooney argue, particularly in the current historical period, class appears to be the name we dare 
not speak, not with respect to the social location of people, in analyzing how governments 
distribute resources and design policies, nor in how political and economic structures are 
(re)designed.1  
I have attempted to contribute to the discipline of political science by revisiting and 
challenging the historical lineages of research that have defined our thinking about the British 
government, state, economy and democracy. As discussed in the first chapter, this largely connects 
                                            
1 Law and Mooney, “‘We’ve Never Had it So Good’,” 542 
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to postwar modernization and democratic theory. What commonly stands out is how distanced 
these analytical approaches are from the social contexts with which processes develop and change. 
In addition to this is how we choose to study social context, which for this dissertation is the scaled 
relations and partisan struggles within the British capitalist and democratic system. One way to 
understand what a system consists of is to study when, how and why it has changed over time. 
This is relevant to challenging past theories in that it recognizes that systems are not static, and 
that previous research has too often attempted to fit case studies into universal categories to be 
used for comparing analytical taxonomies.  
A methodological privileging of certain scales and institutions as the definitive features of 
the British system is exactly what this dissertation speaks against. Focusing on change additionally 
allows us to specify the criteria by which change is to be assessed, and this allows us to reflect on 
the continuity and discontinuity of political structures. Colin Hay argues that we can do this by 
appreciating the relationship between structure and agency, namely that human intervention, 
however mediated and unintended its consequences are, occurs within a structured environment.2 
I have argued in this dissertation that we cannot remove social contexts from systems and conduct 
parsimonious comparisons between the parts of a whole, not if the goal is to explain the connection 
between structure and agency.  
Modernization and democratic theorists of the post-war era took for granted the progressive 
extension of democratic citizenship simultaneously with capitalist transformation, and considered 
democracy largely about electing representatives to build a national welfare state. Yet, by 
dissecting how the political engagement of diverse actors at different scales of the state were 
invested in challenging the national level, I have been able to nuance commentary about what 
                                            
2 Colin Hay, “Continuity and Discontinuity in British Political Development,” in Postwar British Politics in 
Perspective, David Marsh et al. (Malden: Polity Press, 1999), 35.  
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democracy also consisted of in terms of decentralized institutions and their partisan relations. Not 
only was this so-called low politics extremely important because it spoke to why the national level 
was not able to fully mobilize subnational change unilaterally whenever it pleased and without 
resistance, but because it was also actively part of defining what politics, economics and 
democracy meant to the encompassing political system.  
Hence, democracy consists of a more complicated web of relationships between political 
and economic scales, institutions and actors. The simultaneous examination of national and 
subnational levels together uncovered several problems with how decision-making processes 
factored into public involvement. There were issues with formal democracy i.e. the maintenance 
of voting qualifications into the post-war period at the local level, and the denial of regional 
democracy until the end of the twentieth century. At the national level, property and privilege were 
qualifications for the House of Lords, and Members of Parliament were not representative of the 
population. Beyond simply formal democracy, other avenues for engaging the public in urban 
planning for example, a very important part of building and reinvigorating cities, jobs and industry, 
were very limited. More broadly, social democracy was concerned with capital-labour relations at 
a corporatist level; it did not guarantee shop floor democracy within industry, nor the public’s 
determination of how policy was made or implemented in the public sector or at the legislative 
level. Moreover, democracy at different levels of the state has been gendered and racialized 
through various exclusionary policies and practices, and much of this affected citizenship by 
reinforcing barriers to political participation. In response to perceived democratic deficits, 
mobilization has occurred among multiple publics and counter-publics against different scales of 
the state’s decision-making institutions and even against the organizational leadership mechanisms 
embedded in capital-labour relations. 
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This dissertation challenged assumptions about the British political system and democracy 
by applying and adapting some of the core elements of critical democratization research. To be 
sure, analyses of conflicts of interest in the political arenas of Western nations as part of democratic 
class struggles are decades old. Critical democratization analyses have argued against the idea that 
the unceasing development of industrial technology was the most important driver of societal 
change; rather, the state is not seen as a neutral arbiter between different groups as the new 
technologically-advanced and democratic system does not provide all groups roughly equal 
opportunities to mobilize. Instead, politics is an expression of socio-economic cleavages in society, 
and the struggle over the distribution of power resources is central to politics.3  
The extent to which governments provide social protection and redistribution thus hinges, in 
this interpretation, on the ability of unions and left parties to mobilize workers politically. Such a 
proposition is not self-evident, for several theoretical traditions (and perhaps even segments of the 
public) downplay the significance of who governs in making society more inclusive.4 Nonetheless, 
cross-national qualitative and quantitative research documents the importance of working-class 
mobilization as a condition for early welfare state and democratic consolidation and for explaining 
national differences in subsequent expansion.5 This suggests that in contrast to postwar paradigms, 
the focus should not be on the characteristics of various democratic institutions or social programs 
                                            
3 See Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) 4, 8, 21. If this appears 
all too familiar it is because we can relate to how in the modern context there are similar views about the world, as 
changes to society are caused by rapid technological advancement. We hear about the collapsing of class and the 
opening of opportunity to everyone in the new deliberative, digital, open government age. Yet, in the context of Britain 
there are still those who remind us that its society remains divided by class; the gap between the richest and poorest 
is wider than in any period in the twentieth century, and technology has not simply led to universal enrichment of the 
least well off. See Selina Todd, The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class (London: John Murray, 2015), 
267. 
4 Kwon and Pontusson, “Globalization, Labour Power and Partisan Politics Revisited,” 254. 
5 John Myles and Jill Quadagno, “Political Theories of the Welfare State,” Social Service Review 76, 1 (2002): 38 
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but the ways in which different nations arrive at their peculiar public-private sector mix.6 Dennis 
Pilon notes that:   
with this in mind we can see that institutions themselves are neither democratic nor 
undemocratic but only ever just potentially a means to democratic ends. What is important 
is the democratic substance they produce. Think of democracy as a relationship amongst 
people for their own collective self-governance. But the effort to introduce and sustain that 
relationship has always been contested by those who would prefer things to be organized in 
a different way (e.g. by status or wealth), as well as by the broader social relations of 
inequality – e.g. class, race, gender, etc. – that exist in any given locale.7 
Working our way through historical research paradigms by revisiting social, political and 
economic phenomena over time also connects to current research paradigms. To be sure, although 
studies within the critical democratic class struggle paradigm have focused on how class-based 
left parties appear to have played a significant role in the development of social rights, there have 
been calls for research to analyze the multidimensional aspects of the development of welfare 
states and democracies.8 Comparative research has studied how social expenditures, the 
development of social citizenship and social democratic rights are correlated with leftist parties. 
That research focuses on the relative strength of left parties in the electorate, the left’s share of 
seats in the legislature and participation in cabinets, as well as the density of unions. For Walter 
Korpi, drawing on this quantitative data is advantageous but not without its limits. He states that 
at best, regression analyses can give a relatively objective basis for interpretations of the presence 
                                            
6 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 2.  
7 Dennis Pilon, “The Struggle Over Actually Existing Democracy,” Socialist Register 54 (2018): 5.  
8 Walter Korpi, “Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social Rights During 
Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries Since 1930," American Sociological Review 54, 3 (1989): 325.  
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or absence of effects of potential causal variables, but it does not determine the relative roles played 
by different factors in historical processes.9   
To build on the critical epistemology just described - which simultaneously incorporates 
perspectives on democracy, political institutions and the welfare state - an entry point for this 
dissertation was to examine how decentralization is the result of investments of power resources 
and involves selectivity in the opportunities and constraints for action by what they introduce. The 
pursuit of decentralization in nearly every European state in the latter decades of the twentieth 
century offers an opportunity to examine how decentralization is mobilized by considerations of 
class. I provided an historical examination from the postwar period to the present and found that, 
in the British case, decentralization is inextricably linked to class conflicts arising from the 
contradictions of capitalism. This finding diverges from the four groups outlined in Chapter 1, i.e. 
pluralism, functionalism, centre-periphery struggles, and the rational actor model, which make 
claims about why decentralization occurs. Thus, decentralization was at one and the same time a 
mechanism that allowed national political actors to reconfigure the social bases of class power in 
subnational spaces, while simultaneously serving as a mechanism by which regional and local 
coalitions sought to reconfigure scales to redistribute power and assist with class-based economic 
objectives. Sectoral relations across different scales of the state influenced the course of these 
decentralized structures, and ideology was important in distinguishing how actors influenced the 
way in which they were sought after, used, reformed or dismantled.  
Though a major focus of this dissertation was to explain why decentralization happens, it 
was simultaneously about connecting the struggles over decentralization to big structures and 
processes. I approached this by examining devolution, a large scale programme of restructuring 
                                            
9 Korpi, “Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship," 316. 
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the entire British political system. I relied heavily on the politics of scale literature as the main way 
to visualize how different actors at different scales of the state were part and parcel of the struggle 
for and against devolution. The politics of scale takes its starting point from the failure of the state 
concept and specifically how it has conditioned the ways in which the core problems of modern 
political science have been phrased.10 Building upon class-based analysis, scholars in this approach 
presume that the activities of the state can play an important role in shaping class relations: the 
latter are not simply given by structures established at the level of production even though they are 
the starting point. There is an initial distinction between two ways in which state economic 
interventions impact class structure: the first is that interventions alter production itself, while the 
second is that they both give expression to and shape the political organization of the classes. Yet 
as Gough explains, it is misleading to regard these as separate, i.e. material/economic and 
political/ideological.11  
This approach12 uniquely argues that neither the state’s spatial form nor historically specific 
forms of state spatiality are ever structurally given.13	From this, the objective should be to explore 
the complex connections among the institutionalization of political activity, the changing role of 
the capitalist state, and the importance of territorially embedding continued capital accumulation 
within the context of economic competitiveness.14 It also notes that the examination of scales must 
include how actors not only engage in action within a given institutional matrix but reflexively 
                                            
10 Jens Bartelson, The Critique of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4.  
11 Jamie Gough, “Class Relations and Local Economic Planning,” in Politics, Geography and Social Stratification, 
ed. Keith Hoggart and Eleonore Kofman (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 168-169.  
12 This dissertation does not delve into the differences among scholars concerning the politics of scale but rather draws 
on the similarities some of them share with respect to studying scales in relation the spatial geographies of capitalism 
and how class conflict is embedded in such spaces. 
13 Neil Brenner, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 84.  
14 Mark Goodwin, Martin Jones and Rhys A. Jones, “The Theoretical Challenge of Devolution and Constitutional 
Change in the United Kingdom,” in Territory, Identity and Spatial Planning: Spatial Governance in a Fragmented 
Nation, ed. Mark Tewdwr-Jones and Philip Allmendinger (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 37.  
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reconstitute institutions and their resulting matrix.15 In other words, scale both expresses and helps 
to constitute the social, economic and political power of class actors. This dissertation brought 
together various processes and sites of struggle at the urban, regional and national levels. Building 
on Gough, it showed how British devolution was more broadly connected to the struggles over 
decentralization and democracy because of how they were simultaneous expressions and re-
articulations of the spatial contradictions of capitalism and its associated class tensions.16 Political 
parties (statewide and regional), local councilors, the working class, and spatially rooted social 
movements, were most certainly divided by place and ideology when it came to the scaling of the 
state, how economic development should be pursued, and how decision-making should be 
institutionalized.  
The above raises the question: what do political actors intend to accomplish by implementing 
devolution? There are at least three clusters of perspectives concerning what devolution 
accomplishes. First, devolution is about empowering the marginalized; it grants those who have 
been excluded from participation in national power increased access to decision-making 
opportunities.17 In this perspective, devolution changed the institutional architecture of Scottish 
politics, including the formal machinery and operation of democracy and government, which are 
different from the old Scottish Office model.18 Second, devolution accelerates the evolution of the 
constitutional principles governing the state; it involves the transfer of legislative functions to a 
subordinate elected body on a geographical basis. In this way, devolution is concerned with 
reconciling two conflicting principles, the supremacy of Parliament as well as the grant of self-
                                            
15 Jessop, “Institutional re(turns) and the Strategic-Relational Approach,” 1226.  
16 Gough, “Changing Scale as Changing Class Relations, 186.  
17 Allan Cochrane, “Devolving the Heartland: Making Up a New Social Policy for the ‘South East’,” Critical Social 
Policy 26, 3 (2006): 685.  
18 McGarvey, “Devolution in Scotland: Change and Continuity.” 25. 
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government in domestic affairs to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.19 Third, devolution 
augments legitimacy and democratic accountability; as a response to the public’s increasing 
distrust of formal political institutions, the intention of devolution is to design more collaborative 
and transparent approaches to developing and administering public policy. Ultimately, a more 
nuanced perspective is needed to grasp the (political, fiscal and legal) complexities of enacting 
devolution. For example, it has been stated that the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament 
represent a distinct break with Westminster because the devolved systems do not use the first-past-
the-post electoral system.20 At the same time, there is the claim that devolution did not create a 
new tier of government, but rather added a democratic element to an already existing 
administrative tier.21 I have argued that devolution contains elements of both substantive change 
but also path dependency, and notably a mix of competing objectives attached to decentralization, 
economic modernization and democratization. 
Overall, I found that the left was a strong advocate for decentralization, devolution and 
democratic expansion. The left consisted of coalitions nationally, regionally and locally. At the 
same time, the left was not - as many scholars who focus on national level comparisons argue – 
always enthusiastic or even willing to pursue very progressive forms of decentralization, 
devolution and democratic expansion. This varied according to scale, to time period, and to the 
pressures of other actors. By way of contrast, the right was almost always opposed to political 
devolution and democratic enhancement, but it was willing to reconfigure scales of the state and 
implement decentralization as a mechanism to facilitate the private sector’s control of economic 
development.   
                                            
19 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 1. 
20 Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK, 178-179. 
21 James Mitchell, “Evolution and Devolution: Citizenship, Institutions, and Public Policy,” Publius, 36, 1 (2006): 
165. 
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Why is this point about ideology, the right and the left of the political spectrum important? 
The reason is that if social class is relevant to scale transformation, then it requires attention to the 
class basis of entire democratic political systems, both past and present. This is particularly 
relevant to the current epoch, and particularly the research that is attempting to challenge the basis 
of mainstream thinking about democracy. For example, Ian O’Flynn and Nicole Curato state that 
there needs to be an understanding that free and fair elections are not enough on their own to 
determine the democratic quality of a system, but rather what is required are “free and fair 
deliberation among equals as the basis for legitimacy.”22 This relates to what was only briefly 
discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the third transformation of democracy: that it is both deliberative 
and post-democratic. This dissertation attempts to build a foundation for future research about the 
expanded bases of potentially deliberative democratization. But it cautions against an apparent 
turning away from critical pedagogy to a more familiar postwar modernization and democratic 
theory redux: viewing contemporary political systems in advanced industrial democracies as 
separated from class relations at multiple scales of the state. 
If our goal is to avoid this, our starting point must be associated with critical thinking about 
the historic struggle for democracy. The struggle for democracy is an ongoing story about social 
class relations, and it is particularly a story about the continuous efforts by organized labour to 
utilize political institutions as mechanisms to make most people’s lives more livable through the 
implementation of social policies and rights. Hence, if sites of deliberation are to be connected to 
the broader political and economic system of a nation-state, they must be framed in terms of 
creating inclusive horizontal spaces that are responsible for redistributing resources across society, 
not how new ‘deliberative’ institutional mechanisms can enhance representative democracy for 
                                            
22 Ian O’Flynn and Nicole Curato, “Deliberative Democratizatin: A Framework for Systemic Analysis,” Policy Studies 
36, 3 (2015): 299.  
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the sake of attenuating democratic deficits such as a lack of transparency, openness and 
accountability.  
Nothing underscores the importance of this undertaking more than the fact that we currently 
see scholars providing competing narratives about democracy in the era of devolution. For 
example, there are claims on the one hand about the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales 
and London being constitutive of new spaces of deliberative democracy, rendering public debate 
more open and more diverse.23 On the other hand, there are simultaneous claims that by 
comparative standards the difference between majoritarian and consensual democracies is that the 
latter offer greater opportunities for participatory and deliberative democracy, leading to higher 
levels of public trust and fewer examples of extreme policy shifts.24 Therefore, the latter position 
asserts that devolution is not actually all that deliberative when compared to, say, Sweden. 
Arguably, the only way that this can be resolved is by comparative historical analysis across scales 
of the state. This dissertation lays the groundwork for future research by offering a host of mixed 
perspectives, across time and scales, about what democracy looked like and what the struggles 
surrounding democracy consisted of from the postwar period to the present. Upcoming research 
can thus build on this dissertation by focusing on the connection between the political economy of 
scale and deliberative democratization. If scales are not immutable, then how they are amenable 
to contestation is an important basis for continuing research on the role that class plays with respect 
to phenomena like decentralization, geographical economic development, and deliberative public 
engagement. It is up to contemporary scholars to examine whether deliberative spaces challenge 
some of the most negative aspects of modern capitalism.  
 
                                            
23 Morgan, “The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?,” 1248.  
24 Flinders, “Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution,” 67.  
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